處方藥市場技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓問題研究
發(fā)布時間：2019-01-12 17:37
【摘要】：現(xiàn)如今,艾滋病毒和結(jié)核病等傳染性疾病已成為嚴(yán)重影響人類健康的公共問題。尤其發(fā)展中國家和欠發(fā)達(dá)國家受到疾病困擾尤為嚴(yán)重。但是,藥物專利卻影響著藥物的可獲得性,使得藥品的價格在發(fā)展中國家和欠發(fā)達(dá)國家反而比在發(fā)達(dá)國家更高。強制許可的應(yīng)用雖然一定程度上緩解了上述問題,但是同時也會引發(fā)一系列社會問題,如發(fā)達(dá)國家專利藥制造商市場競爭削弱,其利潤降低,竟而影響其創(chuàng)新研究的動力,相應(yīng)吸引投資能力降低、最終導(dǎo)致制藥工業(yè)水平滯后等。雖然專利藥制造商可以獲取一定的補償,但是國際也沒有統(tǒng)一的合適的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)可以參考。因此藥品研發(fā)與保證以可承受價格獲得藥品之間的沖突沒能很好地得到解決。為了解決這個沖突,本文對于發(fā)達(dá)國家專利藥和發(fā)展中國家制造商之間的自愿轉(zhuǎn)讓做了相關(guān)研究。在處方藥市場下,本文構(gòu)建了一個雙寡頭模型。我們考慮兩種創(chuàng)新方式(質(zhì)量提高型和成本降低型)和三種不同的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓合同機(jī)制(即固定費用合同,特許權(quán)合同和兩部收費合同),分析比較沒有發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)讓的市場和不同轉(zhuǎn)讓合同下的市場中發(fā)達(dá)國家專利藥生產(chǎn)商家以及本土生產(chǎn)普通藥生產(chǎn)企業(yè)的利潤,分析每一種創(chuàng)新方式下的每一種轉(zhuǎn)讓合同實施要滿足的條件,以及發(fā)達(dá)國家專利藥生產(chǎn)商家的最優(yōu)決策和最優(yōu)利潤。同時對進(jìn)口國的病人剩余和社會福利的相關(guān)情況進(jìn)分析,并對強制許可的補償標(biāo)準(zhǔn)提供一個合理的參考。通過本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn):產(chǎn)品差異化和醫(yī)生代理行為對發(fā)達(dá)國家企業(yè)的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓決策有很大的影響。(1)在質(zhì)量提高型以及成本降低的非重大創(chuàng)新情況下,當(dāng)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新相對不高時,發(fā)達(dá)國家制造商可以采用任何合同機(jī)制來發(fā)生技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓。(2)在使用不同的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓合同時,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)只要發(fā)生固定費用,特許權(quán)使用費和兩部收費合同,就可以增加患者剩余,但專利權(quán)合同和兩部收費合同可能會減少進(jìn)口國的社會福利。(3)若創(chuàng)新類型為質(zhì)量提高型,在一定條件下,兩部收費合同同將等于固定費用或特許權(quán)使用費合同。若創(chuàng)新類型為成本降低型,在一定條件下,兩部收費合同同將等于固定費用。(4)在成本降低的重大創(chuàng)新情況下,與以往文獻(xiàn)結(jié)論很不一樣,傳統(tǒng)文獻(xiàn)認(rèn)為由于重大創(chuàng)新造成壟斷而不愿意再發(fā)生技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)讓,現(xiàn)在發(fā)現(xiàn)由于醫(yī)生代理行為的差異,使得發(fā)達(dá)國家制造商在一定條件下也愿意進(jìn)行技術(shù)授權(quán)。本文研究結(jié)論對發(fā)達(dá)國家制造商的最優(yōu)轉(zhuǎn)讓策略的選擇,和發(fā)展中國家合理引進(jìn)先進(jìn)技術(shù),以及相關(guān)政策的制定和完善都具有很重要的管理啟示意義和政策含義。
[Abstract]:Nowadays, infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis have become a serious public problem affecting human health. In particular, developing countries and less developed countries suffer from the disease is particularly serious. However, drug patents affect the availability of drugs, making drug prices higher in developing and less developed countries than in developed countries. Although the application of compulsory licensing alleviates the above problems to some extent, it will also lead to a series of social problems, such as the weakening of market competition and the decline of profits of patent drug manufacturers in developed countries, thus affecting the impetus for innovation and research. Accordingly, the ability to attract investment is reduced, resulting in the level of pharmaceutical industry lagging behind and so on. Although patented drug manufacturers can get some compensation, there is no uniform international standard to refer to. Therefore, the conflict between drug development and guaranteed access to drugs at affordable prices has not been well resolved. In order to resolve this conflict, this paper studies the voluntary transfer of patent drugs between developed countries and manufacturers in developing countries. In the prescription drug market, this paper constructs a duopoly model. We consider two innovative approaches (quality improvement and cost reduction) and three different mechanisms for technology transfer contracts (i.e. fixed cost contracts, concession contracts and two fee contracts), Analyzing and comparing the profits of the developed countries' patent drug producers and local producers of common medicines in the markets where there is no transfer and markets under different transfer contracts. This paper analyzes the conditions to be satisfied in the implementation of each transfer contract under each innovative mode, and the optimal decision and profit of the patent pharmaceutical manufacturers in developed countries. At the same time, the author analyzes the patient surplus and social welfare in importing country, and provides a reasonable reference to the compensation standard of compulsory license. In this paper, we find that product differentiation and doctor-agent behavior have great influence on the technology transfer decision of developed country enterprises. (1) in the case of non-significant innovation of quality improvement and cost reduction, When technological innovation is relatively low, manufacturers in developed countries can use any contractual mechanism to transfer technology. (2) when using different technology transfer contracts, we find that as long as there is a fixed cost, Royalties and two fee contracts can increase patient surplus, but patent contracts and two fee contracts may reduce social welfare in importing countries. (3) if the innovation type is quality-enhancing, under certain conditions, Both fee contracts will be equal to fixed fees or royalties contracts. If the innovation type is cost reduction, under certain conditions, the two fee contracts will be equal to the fixed cost. (4) in the case of significant innovation with lower cost, it is very different from the previous literature conclusion. Traditional literature holds that technology transfer is unwilling to occur because of monopoly caused by major innovation. Now it is found that due to the difference of doctors' agency behavior, manufacturers in developed countries are willing to license technology under certain conditions. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance to the choice of optimal transfer strategy for manufacturers in developed countries, the reasonable introduction of advanced technology to developing countries, and the formulation and improvement of relevant policies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F416.72;F713.584
本文編號：2408029
[Abstract]:Nowadays, infectious diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis have become a serious public problem affecting human health. In particular, developing countries and less developed countries suffer from the disease is particularly serious. However, drug patents affect the availability of drugs, making drug prices higher in developing and less developed countries than in developed countries. Although the application of compulsory licensing alleviates the above problems to some extent, it will also lead to a series of social problems, such as the weakening of market competition and the decline of profits of patent drug manufacturers in developed countries, thus affecting the impetus for innovation and research. Accordingly, the ability to attract investment is reduced, resulting in the level of pharmaceutical industry lagging behind and so on. Although patented drug manufacturers can get some compensation, there is no uniform international standard to refer to. Therefore, the conflict between drug development and guaranteed access to drugs at affordable prices has not been well resolved. In order to resolve this conflict, this paper studies the voluntary transfer of patent drugs between developed countries and manufacturers in developing countries. In the prescription drug market, this paper constructs a duopoly model. We consider two innovative approaches (quality improvement and cost reduction) and three different mechanisms for technology transfer contracts (i.e. fixed cost contracts, concession contracts and two fee contracts), Analyzing and comparing the profits of the developed countries' patent drug producers and local producers of common medicines in the markets where there is no transfer and markets under different transfer contracts. This paper analyzes the conditions to be satisfied in the implementation of each transfer contract under each innovative mode, and the optimal decision and profit of the patent pharmaceutical manufacturers in developed countries. At the same time, the author analyzes the patient surplus and social welfare in importing country, and provides a reasonable reference to the compensation standard of compulsory license. In this paper, we find that product differentiation and doctor-agent behavior have great influence on the technology transfer decision of developed country enterprises. (1) in the case of non-significant innovation of quality improvement and cost reduction, When technological innovation is relatively low, manufacturers in developed countries can use any contractual mechanism to transfer technology. (2) when using different technology transfer contracts, we find that as long as there is a fixed cost, Royalties and two fee contracts can increase patient surplus, but patent contracts and two fee contracts may reduce social welfare in importing countries. (3) if the innovation type is quality-enhancing, under certain conditions, Both fee contracts will be equal to fixed fees or royalties contracts. If the innovation type is cost reduction, under certain conditions, the two fee contracts will be equal to the fixed cost. (4) in the case of significant innovation with lower cost, it is very different from the previous literature conclusion. Traditional literature holds that technology transfer is unwilling to occur because of monopoly caused by major innovation. Now it is found that due to the difference of doctors' agency behavior, manufacturers in developed countries are willing to license technology under certain conditions. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance to the choice of optimal transfer strategy for manufacturers in developed countries, the reasonable introduction of advanced technology to developing countries, and the formulation and improvement of relevant policies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F416.72;F713.584
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