發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-10-18 17:21

【摘要】：隨著市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,社會(huì)民主化進(jìn)程不斷加深,這對(duì)政府部門制定公共事業(yè)價(jià)格的形式提出了新的要求。為了順應(yīng)這種變化,上世紀(jì)90年代末,我國(guó)在政府價(jià)格決策方面出臺(tái)了價(jià)格聽證制度,吸收價(jià)格聽證會(huì)上相關(guān)利益方的意見。價(jià)格聽證會(huì)逐步成為公共部門價(jià)格決策的重要環(huán)節(jié),這在一定程度上提高了公共產(chǎn)品和公共服務(wù)價(jià)格制定的公開性和透明性。但我國(guó)的價(jià)格聽證實(shí)踐仍然存在著各種弊端,遭到社會(huì)各界的質(zhì)疑。一方面,相關(guān)法律對(duì)于價(jià)格聽證的規(guī)定比較概括,使得其中各利益相關(guān)者的權(quán)利義務(wù)得不到實(shí)施,致使政府、經(jīng)營(yíng)者、消費(fèi)者三大利益主體結(jié)構(gòu)中消費(fèi)者處于弱勢(shì)地位。另一方面,聽證會(huì)中消費(fèi)者的弱勢(shì)地位導(dǎo)致聽證會(huì)“逢聽必漲”、“聽證專業(yè)戶”、“信息不對(duì)等”等亂象叢生,嚴(yán)重削弱了公共價(jià)格制定的群眾基礎(chǔ)和公信力。因此,進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化價(jià)格聽證制度,完善價(jià)格聽證程序,對(duì)推動(dòng)我國(guó)價(jià)格決策科學(xué)化具有重要意義。 文章在借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)價(jià)格聽證研究的基礎(chǔ)上,從博弈論的視角,深入剖析我國(guó)價(jià)格聽證制度中的政府部門、經(jīng)營(yíng)者和消費(fèi)者這三大主要利益相關(guān)者結(jié)構(gòu),構(gòu)建博弈模型。同時(shí)結(jié)合北京市公共交通價(jià)格調(diào)整聽證案例,揭示我國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí)價(jià)格聽證中三大主要利益相關(guān)群體之間博弈力量不均衡現(xiàn)象,并分析造成這種困境的原因。最后,以平衡博弈三方力量為準(zhǔn)則,從改善政府管理角度,分別提出完善制度規(guī)范、保證信息安全和建立群眾基礎(chǔ)等建議,以期完善我國(guó)價(jià)格聽證制度,加快公民參與社會(huì)管理的步伐。主要研究成果包括：(1)總結(jié)出目前我國(guó)價(jià)格聽證制度所存在的具體問(wèn)題。在各利益者地位設(shè)置上存在天然失衡現(xiàn)象,法律中價(jià)格聽證參與人的界定和產(chǎn)生方式缺失明確規(guī)定,價(jià)格聽證參與人的進(jìn)入權(quán)掌握在政府部門手中；(2)運(yùn)用博弈論的方法,構(gòu)建了政府部門、經(jīng)營(yíng)者和消費(fèi)者兩兩博弈關(guān)系,據(jù)此來(lái)了解價(jià)格聽證過(guò)程中主要局中人是如何進(jìn)行博弈,并影響價(jià)格聽證結(jié)果的；(3)指出價(jià)格聽證主要利益相關(guān)者之間博弈存在著局中人地位不平等、力量不均衡、效力不一致等困境,并認(rèn)為法律制度缺失、民主意識(shí)淡薄、政企關(guān)系不清以及主體經(jīng)濟(jì)人的特性等都是導(dǎo)致這一困境出現(xiàn)的原因,從而提出對(duì)應(yīng)的解決途徑。
[Abstract]:With the development of market economy, the process of social democratization is deepening. In order to adapt to this kind of change, in the late 1990s, our country introduced the price hearing system in the government price decision, absorbing the views of the relevant stakeholders in the price hearing. Price hearings gradually become an important part of public sector price decision-making, which to some extent improves the openness and transparency of public goods and public service pricing. However, the practice of price hearing in our country still has a variety of drawbacks, which has been questioned by all walks of life. On the one hand, the provisions of the relevant laws on price hearing are more general, which makes the rights and obligations of the stakeholders can not be implemented, resulting in the government, operators, consumers in the three main interests of the consumer in a weak position. On the other hand, the weak position of consumers in the hearings leads to the chaos of hearing "every hearing," hearing professional households "," unequal information ", and so on, which seriously weakens the public basis and credibility of public price formulation. Therefore, it is of great significance to further optimize the price hearing system and perfect the price hearing procedure to promote the scientific price decision in our country. Based on the research of price hearing at home and abroad and from the perspective of game theory, this paper deeply analyzes the structure of the three main stakeholders in the price hearing system of our country, namely the government department, the operator and the consumer, and constructs the game model. At the same time, combining with the case of public transport price adjustment hearing in Beijing, this paper reveals the imbalance of game power among the three major interest groups in the real price hearing in China, and analyzes the reasons for this dilemma. Finally, in order to perfect the price hearing system of our country, we take the balanced game as the criterion, from the angle of improving the government management, put forward the suggestion of perfecting the system norm, guaranteeing the information security and establishing the mass base, etc., in order to perfect the price hearing system of our country. Speed up the pace of citizen participation in social management. The main research results are as follows: (1) the concrete problems existing in the price hearing system in China are summarized. There is a natural imbalance in the establishment of the status of the stakeholders. It is clearly stipulated in the law that the definition and the mode of production of the participants in the price hearing are in the hands of the government; (2) the method of game theory is used. The game relationship among government departments, operators and consumers is constructed to understand how the main players in the price hearing process play games and affect the results of the price hearings. (3) pointing out that the main stakeholders of price hearing have the dilemma of unequal status, unbalanced power, inconsistent effectiveness and so on, and holding that the legal system is lacking and the democratic consciousness is weak. The unclear relationship between the government and the enterprise and the characteristics of the principal economic man are the causes of this dilemma, and the corresponding solutions are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：F726

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