【摘要】：作為“城市礦山”的電子廢棄物中不僅具有多種可資源化再利用的材料,還含有對(duì)環(huán)境及人類健康造成威脅的有害物質(zhì)。因此,電器電子產(chǎn)品制造商與處理商的綠色創(chuàng)新合作有助于促進(jìn)資源循環(huán)利用,減少二次污染,實(shí)現(xiàn)電子廢棄物源頭治理�，F(xiàn)有關(guān)于電子廢棄物治理的研究集中于回收的模式選擇與激勵(lì),基于回收價(jià)格的逆向供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)等方面,鮮有關(guān)注制造商與處理商通過合作以激勵(lì)制造商電子產(chǎn)品綠色創(chuàng)新的研究�；谝陨媳尘�,本文運(yùn)用博弈論與委托代理理論在以往學(xué)者研究的基礎(chǔ)上,針對(duì)制造商電子產(chǎn)品綠色創(chuàng)新,處理商與其在電子廢棄物回收處理中合作的激勵(lì)問題進(jìn)行研究,主要從以下幾方面展開:(1)綠色創(chuàng)新下制造商與處理商合作激勵(lì)契約設(shè)計(jì)。首先,處理商設(shè)計(jì)收益共享契約激勵(lì)制造商提升產(chǎn)品綠色度,但是在最優(yōu)的收益分享比例下,逆向供應(yīng)鏈未達(dá)到系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)。因而,在此基礎(chǔ)上引入虛擬第三方,通過設(shè)計(jì)雙向激勵(lì)契約,同時(shí)激勵(lì)雙方提高電子產(chǎn)品綠色度和對(duì)電子廢棄物拆解處理水平,消除企業(yè)個(gè)體與逆向供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)利益的沖突,實(shí)現(xiàn)系統(tǒng)整體收益最大化。(2)綠色創(chuàng)新下考慮雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的制造商與處理商合作契約設(shè)計(jì)。由于信息的非對(duì)稱,雙方合作中存在雙邊道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。為此,首先設(shè)計(jì)了單周期的正式契約,確定最優(yōu)的支付合同,以提升雙方各自的努力程度。由于雙方的努力投入未達(dá)到系統(tǒng)最優(yōu)水平,因而在正式契約的基礎(chǔ)上,增加處理商“自我實(shí)施”約束條件彌補(bǔ)正式契約的不足,構(gòu)建關(guān)系契約,激勵(lì)制造商與處理商同時(shí)提高努力水平達(dá)到系統(tǒng)最優(yōu),促進(jìn)雙方達(dá)成長(zhǎng)期合作。(3)綠色創(chuàng)新下考慮政府補(bǔ)貼的制造商與處理商激勵(lì)契約設(shè)計(jì)�，F(xiàn)階段我國(guó)電子廢棄物回收處理體系尚未成熟,制造商與處理商的合作需要政府的扶持和引導(dǎo),因此研究了制造商與處理商在不同博弈關(guān)系下政府激勵(lì)契約的設(shè)計(jì),分析了政府與企業(yè)的最優(yōu)策略,為政府制定對(duì)企業(yè)的補(bǔ)貼政策提供理論參考。
[Abstract]:As a "city mine", the electronic waste not only has a variety of materials that can be reused, but also contains harmful substances that pose a threat to the environment and human health. Therefore, the green innovation cooperation between manufacturers and processors of electrical and electronic products is helpful to promote the recycling of resources, reduce secondary pollution and realize the source treatment of electronic wastes. The current research on e-waste management focuses on the selection and incentive of recycling mode, reverse supply chain coordination based on recovery price, etc. Little attention has been paid to research on collaboration between manufacturers and processors to stimulate green innovation in manufacturers' electronic products. Based on the above background, this paper uses game theory and principal-agent theory to study the incentive problem of cooperation between manufacturers and electronic waste recycling, based on previous scholars' research, aiming at green innovation of electronic products of manufacturers. The main contents are as follows: (1) Design of incentive contract between manufacturer and processor under green innovation. Firstly, the manufacturer designs the revenue-sharing contract to encourage the manufacturer to improve the green degree of the product, but under the optimal revenue-sharing ratio, the reverse supply chain does not reach the optimal system. On the basis of this, virtual third party is introduced, and by designing two-way incentive contract, both sides are encouraged to improve the green degree of electronic product and the level of dismantling and disposing of electronic waste, so as to eliminate the conflict between enterprise individual and the interests of reverse supply chain system. To maximize the overall income of the system. (2) under the green innovation considering the bilateral moral hazard of the manufacturer and deal with the contract design. Due to asymmetric information, there is a bilateral moral hazard in bilateral cooperation. For this purpose, a single cycle formal contract is first designed to determine the optimal payment contract to enhance the efforts of both parties. Because the efforts of both sides have not reached the optimal level of the system, on the basis of the formal contract, we increase the constraint conditions of "self-implementation" of the processor to make up for the deficiency of the formal contract, and construct the relationship contract. Incentive manufacturers and processors simultaneously improve the level of effort to reach the optimal system, promote long-term cooperation between the two sides. (3) under green innovation, manufacturers and processors considering government subsidies incentive contract design. At present, the system of electronic waste recovery and treatment in China is not mature, and the cooperation between manufacturers and processors needs the support and guidance of the government. Therefore, the design of government incentive contracts between manufacturers and processors under different game relations is studied. The optimal strategy of government and enterprise is analyzed to provide theoretical reference for government to formulate subsidy policy to enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274;F426.6;F713.2

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