本文選題：買方壟斷勢力 + 買方抗衡勢力��； 參考：《首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著中國零售業(yè)市場集中度的提高,零售商在上下游市場的地位大幅上升,有限的貨架空間和對消費者偏好有效的掌握使得零售商逐漸積聚起買方勢力,能夠?qū)⿷?yīng)商實行直接或間接控制,通過收取通道費、要求大量銷售折扣、簽訂排他性協(xié)議等手段對供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行壓榨,并不斷降低售價獲得更大的市場份額,使邊緣零售商的利潤空間遭到壓縮。本文通過最高限估計法對中國零售市場福利損失進(jìn)行了測算,發(fā)現(xiàn)中國零售商確實利用買方勢力并造成了社會福利損失。在反壟斷法頒布以來,該損失仍然呈現(xiàn)上升趨勢。鑒于此,政府應(yīng)該有效規(guī)制大型零售商濫用買方勢力的行為。本文認(rèn)為市場結(jié)構(gòu)不同,零售商具有的買方勢力以及所造成的社會福利損失也不同。本文依循S-C-P研究框架對市場結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行了細(xì)分,以供應(yīng)商是否具有賣方勢力為標(biāo)準(zhǔn),將買方勢力分為買方壟斷勢力和買方抗衡勢力,進(jìn)而結(jié)合中國供應(yīng)商市場現(xiàn)狀得到結(jié)論,中國大型零售商買方壟斷勢力和抗衡勢力同時并存。再次,為了能夠更為清晰的了解不同買方勢力對市場造成的影響,構(gòu)建博弈模型進(jìn)行理論分析并得出:主導(dǎo)零售商具有買方壟斷勢力時,福利損失的程度相對更大,但是當(dāng)增加主導(dǎo)零售商數(shù)量和促進(jìn)各方有效競爭時能夠減少損失;當(dāng)主導(dǎo)零售商具有買方抗衡勢力時,隨著抗衡勢力的提高,能夠提高消費者福利,并且在有效控制邊緣零售商的條件下可以進(jìn)一步改善經(jīng)濟(jì)效率。
[Abstract]:With the increasing concentration of retail market in China, the position of retailers in the upstream and downstream markets has increased significantly. The limited shelf space and effective grasp of consumer preferences make retailers gradually accumulate the power of buyers. Able to exert direct or indirect control over suppliers by charging passage fees, demanding large sales discounts, signing exclusive agreements and other means to squeeze suppliers, and continuously reducing prices to gain a larger market share. Reduce margins for marginal retailers. This paper calculates the welfare loss of Chinese retail market by the maximum limit estimation method, and finds that Chinese retailers do make use of the buyer's power and cause the social welfare loss. Since the promulgation of the anti-monopoly law, the loss is still on the rise. In view of this, the government should effectively regulate the abuse of buyer power by large retailers. This paper argues that different market structure, retailers have different buyer power and social welfare losses. According to the S-C-P research framework, this paper subdivides the market structure, taking whether the supplier has the seller's power as the standard, divides the buyer's power into the buyer's monopoly power and the buyer's counterweight power, and then obtains the conclusion according to the Chinese supplier's market situation. The buyer's monopoly power and the countervailing power of large retailers in China coexist at the same time. Thirdly, in order to understand the influence of different buyer's power on the market more clearly, we build a game model to analyze and draw the conclusion: when the dominant retailer has the monopoly power of buyer, the degree of welfare loss is relatively greater. However, when increasing the number of leading retailers and promoting effective competition between parties, losses can be reduced; when leading retailers have buyer countervailing power, with the increase of countervailing power, consumers' welfare can be improved. Furthermore, the economic efficiency can be further improved under the condition of effective control of marginal retailers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F724.2

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本文編號：2062833