本文選題：研發(fā)外包 + 技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化�。� 參考：《重慶理工大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日益激烈,服務(wù)外包不再局限于交易型服務(wù),而是不斷拓寬業(yè)務(wù)范圍和提高價(jià)值層次,逐漸向知識(shí)密集型服務(wù)外包轉(zhuǎn)移,其中最典型的知識(shí)密集型服務(wù)外包為研發(fā)外包。研發(fā)外包能幫助企業(yè)快速獲取知識(shí),但同時(shí)其顯著的知識(shí)性特點(diǎn)通常使得企業(yè)很難獨(dú)自順利地進(jìn)行研發(fā)成果轉(zhuǎn)化,需要服務(wù)商協(xié)助才能提高產(chǎn)品化概率。因此,較為全面的研發(fā)外包實(shí)質(zhì)上分為兩個(gè)階段:第一階段為知識(shí)創(chuàng)造過程;第二階段為技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化過程。然而,自利的服務(wù)商會(huì)利用信息優(yōu)勢(shì)在協(xié)助過程中“搭便車”,導(dǎo)致技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化依然達(dá)不到客戶預(yù)期的效果。鑒于此,如何解決技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化中的服務(wù)商道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范問題,仍然是客戶實(shí)行研發(fā)外包戰(zhàn)略需要考慮的問題。本文以研發(fā)外包中技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化為主線,在收益共享激勵(lì)基礎(chǔ)上,引入監(jiān)督機(jī)制和審計(jì)機(jī)制,研究在服務(wù)商道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下的研發(fā)外包激勵(lì)機(jī)制。主要從兩個(gè)維度展開研究工作:第一,對(duì)非創(chuàng)新性知識(shí)技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化中服務(wù)商道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范與激勵(lì)問題進(jìn)行分析,構(gòu)建合作獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)模型和非合作監(jiān)督機(jī)制,其中合作獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)模型即為傳統(tǒng)的利益分配激勵(lì),通過設(shè)定最優(yōu)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)報(bào)酬吸引服務(wù)商努力工作;而非合作監(jiān)督機(jī)制則是對(duì)服務(wù)商實(shí)行確定性監(jiān)督或隨機(jī)監(jiān)督,確定最優(yōu)監(jiān)督概率以確保服務(wù)商沒有“偷懶”機(jī)會(huì)。隨后對(duì)二者進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析,確定各自適用環(huán)境,并通過算例驗(yàn)證。第二,對(duì)創(chuàng)新性知識(shí)技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化中服務(wù)商道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范與激勵(lì)問題進(jìn)行分析,構(gòu)建事中監(jiān)督機(jī)制和事后審計(jì)機(jī)制,其中“事中”和“事后”以技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化結(jié)果為分界,通過對(duì)服務(wù)商行為進(jìn)行事中或事后監(jiān)控“迫使”服務(wù)商努力工作,并利用算例驗(yàn)證兩種機(jī)制適用條件。研究結(jié)果表明:第一,在非創(chuàng)新性知識(shí)技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化中,客戶支付報(bào)酬對(duì)服務(wù)商有一定激勵(lì)作用,但由于項(xiàng)目本身有一定概率成功,所以監(jiān)督機(jī)制的引入很有必要,尤其是隨機(jī)監(jiān)督機(jī)制,不僅能增加項(xiàng)目成功概率,更提升了客戶整體收益;第二,在創(chuàng)新性知識(shí)技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化中,即使服務(wù)商努力工作,項(xiàng)目也不一定成功,因此事中監(jiān)督機(jī)制中的隨機(jī)監(jiān)督機(jī)制會(huì)為服務(wù)商提供“搭便車”機(jī)會(huì),所以這種情況下,依據(jù)監(jiān)控成本和項(xiàng)目成功概率,選擇事中監(jiān)督機(jī)制中的確定性監(jiān)督機(jī)制或事后審計(jì)機(jī)制可以達(dá)到客戶收益最大化目標(biāo)。本論文的研究,不僅豐富了研發(fā)外包中服務(wù)商道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范監(jiān)控領(lǐng)域理論,更完善了技術(shù)成果轉(zhuǎn)化中服務(wù)商道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)防范措施,并且為企業(yè)提供了有效的激勵(lì)機(jī)制選擇方案,推進(jìn)技術(shù)成果產(chǎn)品化,實(shí)現(xiàn)客戶企業(yè)收益最大化。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly fierce competition in the market, service outsourcing is no longer limited to transactional services, but expands the scope of business and enhance the level of value, and gradually transfer to knowledge-intensive service outsourcing. The most typical knowledge-intensive service outsourcing is R & D outsourcing. R & D outsourcing can help enterprises to acquire knowledge quickly, but at the same time, its remarkable knowledge characteristics usually make it difficult for enterprises to transform their R & D achievements independently and smoothly, and need the help of service providers to improve the probability of production. Therefore, the more comprehensive R & D outsourcing is essentially divided into two stages: the first stage is the process of knowledge creation and the second stage is the process of technology achievement transformation. However, self-profit service providers will take advantage of the information advantages in the assistance process "hitchhiking", resulting in the transformation of technical results still not achieve the desired results of customers. In view of this, how to solve the problem of how to prevent the moral hazard of service providers in the transformation of technological achievements is still a problem to be considered by customers in carrying out the strategy of R & D outsourcing. This paper focuses on the transformation of technology achievements in R & D outsourcing, introduces supervision mechanism and audit mechanism on the basis of revenue-sharing incentive, and studies the incentive mechanism of R & D outsourcing under the moral hazard of service providers. Mainly from two dimensions to carry out the research work: first, the non-innovative knowledge and technology achievements in the transformation of moral hazard prevention and incentive problems of service providers are analyzed, the establishment of cooperative reward model and non-cooperative supervision mechanism, The cooperative reward model is the traditional incentive of benefit distribution, which attracts the service provider to work hard by setting the optimal reward, while the non-cooperative supervision mechanism is to supervise the service provider by deterministic supervision or random supervision. Determine the optimal supervision probability to ensure that service providers do not have the opportunity to be lazy. Then the comparison and analysis of the two, determine the respective applicable environment, and through an example to verify. Secondly, the paper analyzes the moral hazard prevention and incentive problems of service providers in the transformation of innovative knowledge and technology achievements, and constructs the supervision mechanism and the ex post audit mechanism, in which "in the event" and "afterwards" are divided by the result of the transformation of the technological achievements. By monitoring the behavior of the service provider in the event or afterwards, the service provider is forced to work hard, and the application conditions of the two mechanisms are verified by an example. The results show that: first, in the transformation of non-innovative knowledge and technology achievements, customer payment has a certain incentive to service providers, but because the project itself has a certain probability of success, it is necessary to introduce the supervision mechanism. In particular, the random supervision mechanism can not only increase the probability of success of the project, but also enhance the overall income of the customer. Second, in the transformation of innovative knowledge and technology achievements, even if the service provider works hard, the project will not necessarily succeed. Therefore, the random supervision mechanism in the incident will provide the service provider with a "hitchhike" opportunity, so in this case, based on the monitoring cost and the project success probability, Choosing the deterministic supervision mechanism or the ex post audit mechanism in the supervisory mechanism can achieve the goal of maximizing customer income. The research of this paper not only enriches the theory of service providers' moral hazard prevention and control in R & D outsourcing, but also improves the measures of service providers' moral hazard prevention in the transformation of technological achievements, and provides an effective incentive mechanism for enterprises to choose. Promote the production of technical achievements to maximize the revenue of customer enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：B82-053;F752.68

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本文編號(hào)：2017309