發(fā)布時間：2018-05-07 10:16

  本文選題：網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售平臺 + 電子商務(wù)�。� 參考：《北京交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：當(dāng)前網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售平臺發(fā)展迅猛,阿里巴巴平臺與京東平臺所占市場份額之和達(dá)到80%以上。網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售產(chǎn)業(yè)已經(jīng)處于高度集中的格局。按照傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論中的相關(guān)概念,這種高度集中的市場是需要規(guī)制的。然而當(dāng)前全球范圍內(nèi),沒有對網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售平臺進(jìn)行過任何形式的規(guī)制或反壟斷調(diào)查。前人針對壟斷勢力的研究多偏向于競爭者之間壟斷行為分析和市場勢力測量,對于壟斷勢力的來源以及網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售環(huán)境特點(diǎn)的關(guān)注較為缺乏。在此背景下,本文提出了核心研究問題:網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售平臺是否擁有壟斷勢力。本文首先從零售模式的歷史演進(jìn)出發(fā),結(jié)合網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售模式的特點(diǎn),提煉出零售平臺相對于其供應(yīng)側(cè)和消費(fèi)側(cè)的主要關(guān)系與決策變量。并以此為基礎(chǔ)提出了零售平臺壟斷勢力分析框架�？蚣苤赋�,零售平臺壟斷勢力的本質(zhì)是基于時空整合能力和時空轉(zhuǎn)化效率,對平臺兩側(cè)或多側(cè)施加影響的能力。文章基于博弈論的方法對分析框架進(jìn)行了論證,分類討論了處于不同市場結(jié)構(gòu)的自營類零售平臺的壟斷勢力。文章總結(jié)指出自營類零售平臺通過對時空范圍內(nèi)稀缺購買力的控制,獲得了壟斷勢力,在一定條件下造成了社會總福利的下降,產(chǎn)生強(qiáng)者愈強(qiáng),弱者愈弱的馬太效應(yīng)。該條件取決于供應(yīng)側(cè)和零售平臺所處的市場結(jié)構(gòu)、消費(fèi)側(cè)的需求價格彈性以及通道費(fèi)和軟件服務(wù)費(fèi)的收費(fèi)水平。服務(wù)類平臺方面,文章以阿里巴巴零售平臺為例,分析了壟斷勢力的來源、行為及影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)阿里巴巴以強(qiáng)大的消費(fèi)側(cè)群體為籌碼,利用買賣雙方匹配中非常稀缺的屏幕資源和消費(fèi)者注意力,采用拍賣形式收取營銷服務(wù)費(fèi)用。該行為通過完全價格歧視,剝奪了全部供貨商剩余,但并未造成社會福利的無謂損失。文章最后利用MIMIC模型,以阿里巴巴零售平臺為例,對本文提出的壟斷勢力分析框架進(jìn)行了實(shí)證分析。結(jié)果顯示壟斷勢力分析框架是有效的,且利用參數(shù)估計(jì)結(jié)果可以測算出壟斷勢力變化趨勢。計(jì)算結(jié)果表明,阿里巴巴存在壟斷勢力,但從時間序列上來看并未大幅提升。全文重點(diǎn)探討了網(wǎng)絡(luò)零售平臺壟斷勢力的來源、行為和測量方法,構(gòu)建了壟斷勢力分析框架,給出了壟斷勢力導(dǎo)致社會福利變化的影響條件,提出了政策建議,為反壟斷機(jī)構(gòu)、其他政府部門及相關(guān)企業(yè)提供了重要參考。
[Abstract]:At present, the online retail platform is developing rapidly, Alibaba platform and JingDong platform account for more than 80% of the market share. Network retail industry has been in a highly concentrated pattern. According to the related concepts of traditional industrial organization theory, this highly centralized market needs to be regulated. However, there has not been any regulation or antitrust investigation on online retail platforms worldwide. Previous studies on monopoly power tend to focus on the analysis of monopoly behavior among competitors and the measurement of market power. However, there is a lack of attention to the source of monopoly power and the characteristics of network retail environment. Under this background, this paper puts forward the core research question: whether the network retailing platform has monopoly power. Starting from the historical evolution of the retail model and combining the characteristics of the online retail model, this paper abstracts the main relationship and decision variables of the retail platform relative to its supply-side and consumer-side. On this basis, the paper puts forward the analysis framework of monopoly power of retail platform. The framework points out that the essence of monopoly power of retail platform is the ability to exert influence on both sides or sides of the platform based on space-time integration ability and space-time conversion efficiency. Based on the game theory, this paper demonstrates the framework of the analysis, and discusses the monopoly power of self-owned retail platforms in different market structures. This paper concludes that the proprietary retail platform gains monopoly power by controlling the scarce purchasing power in time and space. Under certain conditions, it results in the decline of total social welfare and the Matthew effect that the stronger the stronger and the weaker the weak. This condition depends on the market structure of the supply side and the retail platform, the demand price elasticity on the consumer side and the level of the channel fee and software service charge. In the aspect of service platform, taking Alibaba retail platform as an example, this paper analyzes the origin, behavior and influence of monopoly power. It is found that Alibaba takes a strong consumer side group as a bargaining chip, takes advantage of the very scarce screen resources and consumers' attention in the matching of the buyers and sellers, and collects the marketing service fees by way of auction. Through total price discrimination, this behavior deprives all suppliers of surplus, but does not result in meaningless loss of social welfare. Finally, by using MIMIC model and taking Alibaba retail platform as an example, the paper makes an empirical analysis on the framework of monopoly power analysis proposed in this paper. The results show that the analytical framework of monopoly power is effective and the trend of monopoly power can be measured by using the parameter estimation results. The results show that Alibaba has monopoly power, but in time series, it has not been greatly improved. This paper mainly discusses the origin, behavior and measurement methods of monopoly power in network retail platform, constructs the analysis framework of monopoly power, gives the influence conditions of monopoly power to social welfare change, and puts forward policy recommendations, which is an antitrust agency. Other government departments and related enterprises provide important reference.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F724.6

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 榮朝和;韓舒怡;閆申;王學(xué)成;;關(guān)于匹配概念及其時空經(jīng)濟(jì)分析框架的思考[J];北京交通大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2017年02期

2 曲創(chuàng);劉重陽;;平臺廠商市場勢力測度研究——以搜索引擎市場為例[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2016年02期

3 張曉明;閆申;;中國光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)市場勢力與并購績效的實(shí)證研究[J];中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報;2015年07期

4 楊文明;;互聯(lián)網(wǎng)平臺企業(yè)免費(fèi)定價反壟斷規(guī)制批判[J];廣東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)學(xué)報;2015年01期

5 榮朝和;;論時空分析在經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中的基礎(chǔ)性作用[J];北京交通大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2014年04期

6 吳繼;;基于雙邊市場的電子商務(wù)平臺橫向差異化競爭機(jī)制研究[J];商業(yè)時代;2014年22期

7 吳漢洪;孟劍;;雙邊市場理論與應(yīng)用述評[J];中國人民大學(xué)學(xué)報;2014年02期

8 吳宏偉;胡潤田;;互聯(lián)網(wǎng)反壟斷與“雙邊市場”理論研究[J];首都師范大學(xué)學(xué)報(社會科學(xué)版);2014年01期

9 李煜;呂廷杰;郝曉燁;;雙邊市場理論與應(yīng)用研究現(xiàn)狀綜述[J];首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)學(xué)報;2013年02期

10 陳甬軍;楊振;;制造業(yè)外資進(jìn)入與市場勢力波動:競爭還是壟斷[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2012年10期

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 王娟;基于消費(fèi)者行為的零售業(yè)態(tài)演進(jìn)研究[D];中南大學(xué);2012年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 李曉青;基于雙邊市場的電子商務(wù)平臺反壟斷與規(guī)制分析[D];山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2016年

2 孫國臣;基于我國零售商市場勢力的通道費(fèi)福利效應(yīng)研究[D];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2012年

3 車雯雯;電子商務(wù)C2C平臺定價模型及盈利影響因素研究[D];上海交通大學(xué);2010年

4 郭麗丹;雙邊市場平臺企業(yè)的策略及相關(guān)反壟斷問題研究[D];東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2007年

，

本文編號：1856529