本文選題：信息不對(duì)稱 + 平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)��； 參考：《武漢大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著互聯(lián)網(wǎng)時(shí)代的開始,越來越多的交易活動(dòng)發(fā)生在線上,為交易提供便利的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)平臺(tái)成為了交易各方進(jìn)行線上交易的載體。對(duì)比過往,在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)尚未如此普及之前,日常購(gòu)物、生活繳費(fèi)等活動(dòng)以線下面對(duì)面交易為主,但是隨著時(shí)代的帶來的轉(zhuǎn)變,很多傳統(tǒng)的線下支付活動(dòng)逐漸轉(zhuǎn)到線上交易。類似于天貓、京東等B2C模式(商家對(duì)個(gè)人)平臺(tái)漸漸地成為了商家與用戶交易的重要方式。伴隨著線上交易的規(guī)模越來越大,B2C模式的比例逐步擴(kuò)大,網(wǎng)購(gòu)也從早期的單一價(jià)格優(yōu)勢(shì)逐漸轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閮r(jià)格與品質(zhì)并重。隨著消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買力的提升,對(duì)于產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量的關(guān)注也較之以前有了明顯的增加。一方面,平臺(tái)提供的外部性使得參與其中的用戶受到其他用戶規(guī)模的影響,另一方面,規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大化也加劇了可能出現(xiàn)的信息不對(duì)稱問題。文章主要想研究網(wǎng)絡(luò)環(huán)境下的平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商,面對(duì)存在產(chǎn)品信息不對(duì)稱情況下的經(jīng)營(yíng)模式選擇以及針對(duì)不同的經(jīng)營(yíng)模式所采取的激勵(lì)措施。因?yàn)楫a(chǎn)品質(zhì)量信息不對(duì)稱問題的存在,平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商在實(shí)際的經(jīng)營(yíng)中會(huì)面臨著中面臨著經(jīng)營(yíng)模式選擇。同時(shí),在平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商選擇不同模式時(shí),針對(duì)其決策主體以及決策的變量有所不同,需要針對(duì)性的對(duì)不同情況下的賣家(同時(shí)也是產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商)進(jìn)行激勵(lì)。本文主要相通過考慮平臺(tái)中進(jìn)行銷售的產(chǎn)品存在質(zhì)量信息不對(duì)稱問題,來分析平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商選擇不同經(jīng)營(yíng)模式時(shí)的激勵(lì)策略。希望通過對(duì)比平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商選擇不同經(jīng)營(yíng)模式的差異與聯(lián)系,分析出當(dāng)平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商選擇平臺(tái)型經(jīng)營(yíng)模式時(shí),產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商擁有產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量信息同時(shí)對(duì)其營(yíng)銷努力程度無法進(jìn)行監(jiān)督的前提下,平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商所需要進(jìn)行的激勵(lì)策略選擇。同時(shí),分析出當(dāng)平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商選擇自營(yíng)型經(jīng)營(yíng)模式時(shí),面對(duì)產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商掌握完全的質(zhì)量信息時(shí),需要對(duì)其供應(yīng)不同質(zhì)量水平的產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行一定的激勵(lì)措施,從而使得其告知自己關(guān)于產(chǎn)品的真實(shí)信息,從而達(dá)到平臺(tái)利潤(rùn)最大化的目的。本文從這一邏輯出發(fā),文章主要得出平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商需要面臨信息不對(duì)稱條件下的經(jīng)營(yíng)模式選擇,在產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量信息、規(guī)模系數(shù)、定價(jià)等信息已知的條件下,高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品所占比例及平臺(tái)監(jiān)督成本不同對(duì)于平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商的模式選擇存在影響,同時(shí)也會(huì)影響其相應(yīng)的最優(yōu)激勵(lì)策略選擇。主要結(jié)論如下:(1)在平臺(tái)型運(yùn)營(yíng)模式的最優(yōu)契約下,不同質(zhì)量水平的供應(yīng)商會(huì)根據(jù)自身產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量選擇對(duì)應(yīng)的契約,并根據(jù)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量展開合理的營(yíng)銷活動(dòng),同時(shí)平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商也可以達(dá)到其利潤(rùn)最大化。對(duì)不同類的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量水平分析,可以得出對(duì)于高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的賣家而言,低質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的質(zhì)量對(duì)于平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商與其制定的最優(yōu)契約沒有關(guān)聯(lián),對(duì)于其分配系數(shù)沒有任何影響。(2)在自營(yíng)型運(yùn)營(yíng)模式的最優(yōu)契約下,不同質(zhì)量水平的供應(yīng)商會(huì)根據(jù)自身產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量告知平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商自身信息,平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商然后根據(jù)其匯報(bào)的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量展開營(yíng)銷活動(dòng),最終達(dá)到利潤(rùn)最大化的目的。對(duì)于高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)商而言,自身質(zhì)量水平越高則收益會(huì)隨之增加,同時(shí)低質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的水平增加,會(huì)使得高質(zhì)量供應(yīng)商的收益受損。(3)當(dāng)平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商面臨兩種經(jīng)營(yíng)模式選擇時(shí),通過數(shù)值模擬分析出當(dāng)平臺(tái)監(jiān)督成本系數(shù)一定的前提下,隨著市場(chǎng)中高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的比例增加,平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商選擇自營(yíng)模式下的收益會(huì)逐漸增加。當(dāng)市場(chǎng)中高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的比例超過一定值時(shí),平臺(tái)運(yùn)營(yíng)商會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)向選擇自營(yíng)性經(jīng)營(yíng)模式,并且會(huì)隨著高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品占比升高而收益之差進(jìn)一步拉大。
[Abstract]:With the coming of Internet era, more and more transactions occur online, provide convenient Internet platform become the carrier of the parties for online transactions for transactions. Compared to the past, before the Internet, has not been so popular in daily shopping, payment and other life activities in line face transactions, but with the changes brought about and many of the traditional offline payment activities gradually go to the online transaction. Similar to Tmall, the Jingdong B2C (business to individual) platform gradually become an important way for businesses and users with online trading transactions. With the increasing scale, the proportion of B2C mode is gradually expanding, online shopping also from the early single price advantage gradually into both the price and quality. With the enhancement of consumer purchasing power, the product quality is concerned than before there is an obvious increase. On the one hand, the platform The externality provides the participating users affected by other users, on the other hand, the scale of expansion also exacerbated the problem of asymmetric information may appear. This paper want to study under the environment of network platform operators, faced with the choice of operation pattern of products under the condition of asymmetric information and to take different management model of incentive measures. Because of the information asymmetry problem of product quality, platform operators will face facing the choice of operation mode in the actual operation. At the same time, the platform operators choose different mode, the main decision-making and decision variables are different, need to be targeted to different situations the seller (and suppliers) incentives. This paper is considering to sell the product quality problems of asymmetric information platform, to The choice of operation mode of incentive strategy of different platform operators. Hope to choose the difference and contact of different operating modes by comparing the platform operators, analysis of the platform operators choose the platform business model, product suppliers have the premise of product quality information and the marketing effort to supervision under the platform operators the need to choose the incentive strategy. At the same time, analysis of the platform operators choose self management model, product suppliers face master quality of complete information, the need for the supply of different quality level of products for certain incentives, which makes the real information to inform themselves about the product, so as to achieve the maximum profit of the platform the purpose of this paper. From this logic, this article draws the platform operators need to face under the condition of asymmetric information management mode In the choice of product quality information, scale coefficient, pricing information is known under the condition of high quality products and the proportion of the cost of supervision platform for different platform operator mode selection effect will also affect the choice of their corresponding optimal incentive strategies. The following conclusions: (1) in the optimal contract type platform the operation mode under different quality level of suppliers according to its product quality is selected according to the contract, and the reasonable marketing activities according to the quality of the products, and platform operators can achieve the maximum profit. The analysis of product quality level of different types, can obtain high-quality products for the sellers, the quality of low quality the product is not associated to the optimal contract platform operators and develop, for without any influence. The distribution coefficient (2) in the optimal contract of self operation mode under different The quality level of the supplier will inform the operator's own information platform according to their product quality, platform operators and then according to the report of product quality marketing activities, and ultimately achieve the purpose of maximizing profits. For high quality product suppliers, the quality level of their higher income will increase, while the low quality level of the products increased the high quality supplier income damaged. (3) when facing platform operators two management mode selection, through numerical simulation and analysis of the premise of supervision platform cost coefficient is certain, with the high quality products in the market increased, platform operators choose self mode when the income will gradually increase. High quality products in the market more than a certain value, the platform operators to choose self management mode, and with high quality products accounted for increased income The difference between the benefit and the benefit is further enlarged.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.6;F274

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本文編號(hào)：1763925