本文選題：市場建模　切入點：博弈競價　出處：《揚州大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：目前,電子化市場已經(jīng)成為極為重要的商品交換平臺與方式之一。隨著在線商務(wù)的飛速發(fā)展,市場模型及商品分配與定價機制逐漸成為學(xué)術(shù)界和產(chǎn)業(yè)界研究的熱點內(nèi)容。現(xiàn)有市場模型的研究主要集中在利益優(yōu)化、價格構(gòu)成和激勵措施,缺少市場機制的設(shè)計、開發(fā)與效率評估等方面研究。本文在研究相關(guān)在線商務(wù)理論和模型的基礎(chǔ)上,對在線商務(wù)市場進(jìn)行建模,設(shè)計了帶動態(tài)環(huán)境下自適應(yīng)的妥協(xié)協(xié)商機制,通過多邊多議題策略集最大邏輯一致求解與離散化算法對在線商務(wù)市場建模,并選用IJCAI的TAC競賽提供的Market Design實驗平臺,驗證本文提出方案對動態(tài)環(huán)境的處理能力以及策略調(diào)整對智能體的市場競爭力的影響。研究的主要內(nèi)容及貢獻(xiàn)包括:(1)設(shè)計了一個電子化市場模型,并給出市場形式化描述語言,進(jìn)而闡述了帶動態(tài)環(huán)境自適應(yīng)的妥協(xié)協(xié)商機制及最大邏輯一致求解策略。(2)提出了一種在多智能體系統(tǒng)中,表征系統(tǒng)內(nèi)部agent個體對贏者集的滿意度計算方法�；跐M意度,針對單一獲勝者和多位獲勝者兩種情形,分別設(shè)計了 SWDP和CWDP算法。對照實驗表明,SWDP和CWDP算法能夠聚集多agent系統(tǒng)(MAS)中的個體意愿,并且選出具有最優(yōu)滿意度的贏者集。通過證明:SWDP算法滿足帕累托公理。(3)提出一種伙伴利益均衡的求解方法,包括基于最大社會效益的分組算法和聯(lián)盟內(nèi)利益迭代分配算法。在介紹了形成伙伴或結(jié)盟、利益分配的相關(guān)工作之后,給出了問題模型和相關(guān)概念的形式化定義;分別設(shè)計了基于最大社會效益的分組算法和聯(lián)盟內(nèi)利益迭代分配算法,并給出了算法的性能分析,以市政供水規(guī)劃為例詳細(xì)闡述了伙伴利益均衡求解方法及過程。(4)研究了剛性價格市場下的拍賣機制,定義了潛在市場模型,并設(shè)計了動態(tài)拍賣程序,并證明了這個程序可以在有限的步驟內(nèi)找到一個有效的競爭均衡,并給出了一個剛性價格限制下的拍賣機制運行的實例。以上的研究為電子商務(wù)的市場建模、分配及定價奠定了理論基礎(chǔ),在給出了電子化市場建模的基礎(chǔ)上,分別研究了社會滿意度最優(yōu),伙伴合作利益均衡和剛性價格條件下的競爭均衡等問題,通過算法及應(yīng)用實例驗證了本文提出機制的有效性。
[Abstract]:At present, the electronic market has become one of the most important commodity exchange platforms and methods. With the rapid development of online commerce, Market models and commodity distribution and pricing mechanisms have gradually become hot topics in academia and industry. The existing market models focus on interest optimization, price composition and incentive measures, and lack of market mechanism design. Based on the research of related online business theories and models, this paper models the online commerce market and designs an adaptive compromise negotiation mechanism with dynamic environment. The online business market is modeled by the maximum logical consistent solution and discretization algorithm of the multi-topic strategy set, and the Market Design experimental platform provided by IJCAI's TAC competition is selected. The main contents and contributions of this paper include the design of an electronic market model, and the formal description language of the market. Furthermore, the compromise negotiation mechanism with dynamic environment adaptive and the maximum logic consistent solution strategy. 2) A method to calculate the satisfaction degree of the agent individuals to the winner set in a multi-agent system is proposed, which is based on the degree of satisfaction. In this paper, SWDP and CWDP algorithms are designed for the case of single winner and multi-winner, respectively. The comparative experiments show that SWDP and CWDP can gather the individual will in multi-#en3# system. And the winner set with optimal satisfaction is selected. By proving that the SWDP algorithm satisfies Pareto axiom. It includes grouping algorithm based on maximum social benefit and iterative benefit allocation algorithm in alliance. After introducing the related work of forming partner or alliance and benefit distribution, the formal definition of problem model and related concepts is given. The grouping algorithm based on the maximum social benefit and the iterative benefit allocation algorithm in the alliance are designed, and the performance analysis of the algorithm is given. Taking the municipal water supply planning as an example, the paper expounds the method and process of solving the benefit balance of the partners in detail. It studies the auction mechanism in the rigid price market, defines the potential market model, and designs the dynamic auction program. It is proved that this program can find an effective competitive equilibrium in limited steps, and an example of auction mechanism running under rigid price constraints is given. Distribution and pricing have laid the theoretical foundation. On the basis of the electronic market model, we have studied the social satisfaction degree optimization, the partner cooperation benefit equilibrium and the competition equilibrium under the rigid price condition and so on. The effectiveness of the proposed mechanism is verified by an algorithm and an application example.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：揚州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F724.6;TP18

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