電子商務(wù)物流末端共同配送聯(lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偰Ｐ脱芯?/H1>
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-02 18:13
本文關(guān)鍵詞：電子商務(wù)物流末端共同配送聯(lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偰Ｐ脱芯?/strong> 出處：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文 論文類型：學(xué)位論文
更多相關(guān)文章： 配送聯(lián)盟 影響因素分析 成本分?jǐn)偰Ｐ?/b> MATLAB軟件 Shapely值法
【摘要】：近年來,在大數(shù)據(jù)強(qiáng)有力的支撐下,各大電商平臺(tái)實(shí)施精準(zhǔn)營銷,狂熱的網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物熱潮瞬間即可實(shí)現(xiàn)幾十億的交易額。然而,線下龐大的包裹量給電商物流配送行業(yè)帶來了前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)。為了應(yīng)對(duì)挑戰(zhàn)抓住歷史發(fā)展機(jī)遇,國內(nèi)物流巨頭在物流配送領(lǐng)域爭相謀劃,從京東斥資百億搭建物流體系,到阿里巴巴不惜投入巨資打造菜鳥網(wǎng)絡(luò),再到順豐聯(lián)手四大物流巨頭籌建“豐巢科技”,各大電商物流企業(yè)對(duì)電商物流的重視程度可見一斑。在現(xiàn)代科技的助推下,雖然部分大型企業(yè)已在自動(dòng)化分揀、配送路徑等方面有所改善,但目前,一方面末端配送單次配送量小、配送頻率高、客戶對(duì)快件送達(dá)的時(shí)點(diǎn)要求高等問題依然存在;另一方面,電商物流企業(yè)末端配送包裹包裝過度、包裹回收循環(huán)利用率低,快遞信息泄露嚴(yán)重等問題日益凸顯。一份快遞從原始發(fā)出到送達(dá)客戶手里,經(jīng)過多重環(huán)節(jié),從信息錄入到包裹分揀,再到快遞配送,每個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)都有可能造成信息泄露,使原本并不完善的末端配送又面臨新的挑戰(zhàn)。末端物流共同配送作為新的配送模式,其科學(xué)性、可行性已得到領(lǐng)域內(nèi)專家的一致認(rèn)可,有望破解“最后一公里”難題,然而在實(shí)踐中,末端物流共同配送模式被企業(yè)采納率卻很低。造成矛盾局面的原因在于:聯(lián)盟組建與運(yùn)作效率低,成本分?jǐn)�、利益分配不均等問題未能解決。目前,國內(nèi)外有關(guān)末端共同配送聯(lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偟难芯窟�不夠深入,而電商物流企業(yè)解決配送難題又迫在眉睫,因而對(duì)共同配送聯(lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偟难芯坑葹橹匾�。基于�?本文以電商物流末端共同配送成本分?jǐn)倿檠芯繉?duì)象,主要包括四個(gè)方面:(1)重點(diǎn)分析了電子商務(wù)物流、末端配送與共同配送之間關(guān)系,總結(jié)出電商物流的瓶頸在末端配送,繼而對(duì)末端配送的現(xiàn)狀、存在問題以及模式等進(jìn)行剖析。(2)梳理共同配送聯(lián)盟驅(qū)動(dòng)因素并探索了聯(lián)盟的運(yùn)作流程、運(yùn)作模式、協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制等,為有效推廣末端共同配送模式奠定基礎(chǔ)。(3)提出企業(yè)個(gè)性化配送服務(wù)因素,鼓勵(lì)聯(lián)盟成員服務(wù)創(chuàng)新�，F(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)主要從企業(yè)資源價(jià)值、企業(yè)配送時(shí)間延遲風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、企業(yè)承擔(dān)的技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、企業(yè)年均配送量等方面研究成本分?jǐn)倖栴},本文針對(duì)新時(shí)期下消費(fèi)者對(duì)末端物流配送差異化服務(wù)強(qiáng)烈的需求,適時(shí)提出企業(yè)個(gè)性化配送服務(wù)因素。(4)梳理了電商物流末端共同配送成本分?jǐn)偓F(xiàn)存問題,并就現(xiàn)有成本分?jǐn)偰Ｐ蛢?yōu)缺點(diǎn)進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析,最終提出構(gòu)建基于Shapley值法的綜合成本協(xié)商分?jǐn)偰Ｐ�。模型以�?lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偭繛槟繕?biāo)函數(shù),以企業(yè)資源價(jià)值、企業(yè)配送時(shí)間延遲風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、企業(yè)承擔(dān)的技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、企業(yè)年均配送量,企業(yè)個(gè)性化配送服務(wù)為約束條件,同時(shí)為彌補(bǔ)Shapley針對(duì)貢獻(xiàn)率均等化的缺陷,運(yùn)用AHP分析法與1~9標(biāo)度法確定各因素權(quán)重系數(shù),最終構(gòu)建基于Shapley值法的綜合成本協(xié)商分?jǐn)偰Ｐ?并通過引入算例實(shí)證分析,運(yùn)用MATLAB 7.0軟件求解,驗(yàn)證模型的有效性及分?jǐn)偨Y(jié)果的科學(xué)性。通過上述研究,得出以下結(jié)論:(1)采用聯(lián)盟運(yùn)作后聯(lián)盟配送耗費(fèi)的總成本量小于聯(lián)盟組建前配送耗費(fèi)的總成本量,共同配送聯(lián)盟有助于提升聯(lián)盟整體經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。(2)聯(lián)盟內(nèi)每個(gè)成員所分?jǐn)偟呐渌统杀玖烤∮诼?lián)盟組建前單獨(dú)配送耗費(fèi)的成本量,組建聯(lián)盟有利于提升個(gè)體的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。(3)聯(lián)盟內(nèi)各成員成本分?jǐn)偛辉倬然?以聯(lián)盟成員貢獻(xiàn)大小為分?jǐn)傄罁?jù),為聯(lián)盟做出的貢獻(xiàn)率越大,所獲得的成本減免越多。如聯(lián)盟成員在個(gè)性化配送服務(wù)方面貢獻(xiàn)突出,那么該成員成本減免幅度就越大,通過貢獻(xiàn)與最終成本分?jǐn)偭筷P(guān)聯(lián)的方式,保障個(gè)體之間的公平性,激發(fā)聯(lián)盟成員配送創(chuàng)新的動(dòng)力。最后,基于上述研究結(jié)論提出如下管理建議:(1)鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)組建共同配送聯(lián)盟,降低成本提升經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)效益;(2)聯(lián)盟與成員協(xié)商優(yōu)化配送方案,節(jié)省聯(lián)盟企業(yè)成員配送時(shí)間;(3)挖掘電商物流配送市場需求,創(chuàng)新個(gè)性配送服務(wù)體系,提高客戶粘性;(4)完善考核評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo),保證成員企業(yè)效益公平公正。
[Abstract]:In recent years, in support of big data strong, the implementation of precision marketing major business platform, online shopping craze crazy you can achieve instant billions of transactions. However, brought hitherto unknown challenge amount of the huge line to the electricity supplier logistics industry. In order to should seize the historical opportunity for development to the challenge, the domestic logistics giants the field of logistics distribution to plan, build logistics system from the Jingdong to the Alibaba willing to spend billions, invested heavily to build the rookie network, and then to the SF together four logistics giants to build "Feng nest technology", the major electricity supplier logistics enterprises to pay attention to the electricity supplier logistics degree. Remarkable boost in the modern science and technology, although some large enterprises have been in automatic sorting, improved distribution path etc. However, one end of the distribution of a single small amount of distribution, the distribution of high frequency, express delivery to customers The time problems still exist; on the other hand, the end of the distribution of electricity supplier logistics enterprise package package, the package recycling rate is low, the serious problem of express information disclosure has become increasingly prominent. A courier from the original issue to reach the hands of customers, through multiple links, from information input to the parcel sorting, then to express delivery and every link may result in information disclosure, the end of the distribution was not perfect and face new challenges. The end of the logistics distribution mode of joint distribution as a new, scientific, feasibility has been recognized by experts in the field, is expected to break the last mile problem, but in practice, the common distribution pattern at the end of the logistics enterprise adoption rate is very low. The reason is that the contradiction of alliance formation and operation efficiency is low, cost sharing, unequal distribution of benefits and problems to be solved. The research at home and abroad joint distribution alliance related end cost allocation is not deep enough, and the electricity supplier logistics enterprises to solve the distribution problem is imminent, so it is very important for the study of allocation of joint distribution alliance cost. Based on this, the electricity supplier logistics terminal joint distribution cost allocation as the research object, mainly includes four aspects: (1) focus on the analysis of the relationship between electronic commerce and logistics, terminal distribution and joint distribution, summed up the electricity supplier logistics bottleneck at the end of the distribution, then the status of the end of the distribution, analysis of existing problems and patterns in. (2) joint distribution alliance, combing driving factors and explore the alliance operation process, operation mode, coordination mechanism and lay the foundation for the effective promotion of joint distribution terminal. (3) proposed the enterprise personalized delivery service, encourage members of the alliance service innovation. The existing literature mainly from the enterprise Enterprise resource value, delivery time delay risk, technology risk borne by enterprises, enterprise annual distribution quantity of cost allocation problem, according to the new era of the end consumer logistics service differentiation strong demand, timely put forward the enterprise personalized delivery service. (4) reviews the joint distribution cost allocation of existing electricity supplier logistics terminal the problem, and the advantages and disadvantages of existing cost allocation model analysis, finally puts forward the construction cost allocation model of integrated Shapley value method based on negotiation model. In alliance cost allocation volume as objective function, the value of enterprise resources, enterprise distribution time delay risk, technology risk borne by enterprises, enterprise annual distribution quantity, distribution of individual enterprises serve as constraints, and to make up for the defects of Shapley contribution rate of equalization, using AHP analysis method and 1~9 index method to determine the result In weight, finally construct the comprehensive cost allocation model Shapley value method based on negotiation, and by introducing the example of empirical analysis, using MATLAB 7 software to solve scientific model validation and allocation results. Through the above research, draw the following conclusions: (1) the total amount of the cost of operation cost distribution alliance alliance the total cost of distribution cost amount is less than before the formation of the alliance, the alliance of joint distribution contribute to the overall promotion of economic benefit alliance. (2) the distribution cost per share of union members are less than the amount before the alliance cost distribution cost alone, the formation of alliances is conducive to enhancing the economic benefit of the individual. (3) in the alliance each member is no longer equal to cost sharing, alliance member contribution share basis, done for the league, the greater the rate of the cost reduction more. Such as alliance members in the personalized delivery service Outstanding contributions, then the members of the larger cost reduction, and finally through the contribution cost allocation quantity association way, ensure fairness between individuals, stimulate innovation power distribution alliance members. Finally, based on above conclusions put forward the following suggestions: (1) management to encourage enterprises to joint distribution alliance, lowering cost and improving the economic and social benefits; (2) alliance and the members of the consultative distribution optimization scheme, save the alliance member delivery time; (3) mining electricity supplier logistics market demand, distribution service system innovation personality, improve customer stickiness; (4) improve the evaluation index, ensure the benefit of member enterprises Fair.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.6;F252;F715.5
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本文關(guān)鍵詞：電子商務(wù)物流末端共同配送聯(lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偰Ｐ脱芯?/strong> 出處：《浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文 論文類型：學(xué)位論文
更多相關(guān)文章： 配送聯(lián)盟 影響因素分析 成本分?jǐn)偰Ｐ?/b> MATLAB軟件 Shapely值法
【摘要】：近年來,在大數(shù)據(jù)強(qiáng)有力的支撐下,各大電商平臺(tái)實(shí)施精準(zhǔn)營銷,狂熱的網(wǎng)絡(luò)購物熱潮瞬間即可實(shí)現(xiàn)幾十億的交易額。然而,線下龐大的包裹量給電商物流配送行業(yè)帶來了前所未有的挑戰(zhàn)。為了應(yīng)對(duì)挑戰(zhàn)抓住歷史發(fā)展機(jī)遇,國內(nèi)物流巨頭在物流配送領(lǐng)域爭相謀劃,從京東斥資百億搭建物流體系,到阿里巴巴不惜投入巨資打造菜鳥網(wǎng)絡(luò),再到順豐聯(lián)手四大物流巨頭籌建“豐巢科技”,各大電商物流企業(yè)對(duì)電商物流的重視程度可見一斑。在現(xiàn)代科技的助推下,雖然部分大型企業(yè)已在自動(dòng)化分揀、配送路徑等方面有所改善,但目前,一方面末端配送單次配送量小、配送頻率高、客戶對(duì)快件送達(dá)的時(shí)點(diǎn)要求高等問題依然存在;另一方面,電商物流企業(yè)末端配送包裹包裝過度、包裹回收循環(huán)利用率低,快遞信息泄露嚴(yán)重等問題日益凸顯。一份快遞從原始發(fā)出到送達(dá)客戶手里,經(jīng)過多重環(huán)節(jié),從信息錄入到包裹分揀,再到快遞配送,每個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)都有可能造成信息泄露,使原本并不完善的末端配送又面臨新的挑戰(zhàn)。末端物流共同配送作為新的配送模式,其科學(xué)性、可行性已得到領(lǐng)域內(nèi)專家的一致認(rèn)可,有望破解“最后一公里”難題,然而在實(shí)踐中,末端物流共同配送模式被企業(yè)采納率卻很低。造成矛盾局面的原因在于:聯(lián)盟組建與運(yùn)作效率低,成本分?jǐn)�、利益分配不均等問題未能解決。目前,國內(nèi)外有關(guān)末端共同配送聯(lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偟难芯窟�不夠深入,而電商物流企業(yè)解決配送難題又迫在眉睫,因而對(duì)共同配送聯(lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偟难芯坑葹橹匾�。基于�?本文以電商物流末端共同配送成本分?jǐn)倿檠芯繉?duì)象,主要包括四個(gè)方面:(1)重點(diǎn)分析了電子商務(wù)物流、末端配送與共同配送之間關(guān)系,總結(jié)出電商物流的瓶頸在末端配送,繼而對(duì)末端配送的現(xiàn)狀、存在問題以及模式等進(jìn)行剖析。(2)梳理共同配送聯(lián)盟驅(qū)動(dòng)因素并探索了聯(lián)盟的運(yùn)作流程、運(yùn)作模式、協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制等,為有效推廣末端共同配送模式奠定基礎(chǔ)。(3)提出企業(yè)個(gè)性化配送服務(wù)因素,鼓勵(lì)聯(lián)盟成員服務(wù)創(chuàng)新�，F(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)主要從企業(yè)資源價(jià)值、企業(yè)配送時(shí)間延遲風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、企業(yè)承擔(dān)的技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、企業(yè)年均配送量等方面研究成本分?jǐn)倖栴},本文針對(duì)新時(shí)期下消費(fèi)者對(duì)末端物流配送差異化服務(wù)強(qiáng)烈的需求,適時(shí)提出企業(yè)個(gè)性化配送服務(wù)因素。(4)梳理了電商物流末端共同配送成本分?jǐn)偓F(xiàn)存問題,并就現(xiàn)有成本分?jǐn)偰Ｐ蛢?yōu)缺點(diǎn)進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析,最終提出構(gòu)建基于Shapley值法的綜合成本協(xié)商分?jǐn)偰Ｐ�。模型以�?lián)盟成本分?jǐn)偭繛槟繕?biāo)函數(shù),以企業(yè)資源價(jià)值、企業(yè)配送時(shí)間延遲風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、企業(yè)承擔(dān)的技術(shù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、企業(yè)年均配送量,企業(yè)個(gè)性化配送服務(wù)為約束條件,同時(shí)為彌補(bǔ)Shapley針對(duì)貢獻(xiàn)率均等化的缺陷,運(yùn)用AHP分析法與1~9標(biāo)度法確定各因素權(quán)重系數(shù),最終構(gòu)建基于Shapley值法的綜合成本協(xié)商分?jǐn)偰Ｐ?并通過引入算例實(shí)證分析,運(yùn)用MATLAB 7.0軟件求解,驗(yàn)證模型的有效性及分?jǐn)偨Y(jié)果的科學(xué)性。通過上述研究,得出以下結(jié)論:(1)采用聯(lián)盟運(yùn)作后聯(lián)盟配送耗費(fèi)的總成本量小于聯(lián)盟組建前配送耗費(fèi)的總成本量,共同配送聯(lián)盟有助于提升聯(lián)盟整體經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。(2)聯(lián)盟內(nèi)每個(gè)成員所分?jǐn)偟呐渌统杀玖烤∮诼?lián)盟組建前單獨(dú)配送耗費(fèi)的成本量,組建聯(lián)盟有利于提升個(gè)體的經(jīng)濟(jì)效益。(3)聯(lián)盟內(nèi)各成員成本分?jǐn)偛辉倬然?以聯(lián)盟成員貢獻(xiàn)大小為分?jǐn)傄罁?jù),為聯(lián)盟做出的貢獻(xiàn)率越大,所獲得的成本減免越多。如聯(lián)盟成員在個(gè)性化配送服務(wù)方面貢獻(xiàn)突出,那么該成員成本減免幅度就越大,通過貢獻(xiàn)與最終成本分?jǐn)偭筷P(guān)聯(lián)的方式,保障個(gè)體之間的公平性,激發(fā)聯(lián)盟成員配送創(chuàng)新的動(dòng)力。最后,基于上述研究結(jié)論提出如下管理建議:(1)鼓勵(lì)企業(yè)組建共同配送聯(lián)盟,降低成本提升經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)效益;(2)聯(lián)盟與成員協(xié)商優(yōu)化配送方案,節(jié)省聯(lián)盟企業(yè)成員配送時(shí)間;(3)挖掘電商物流配送市場需求,創(chuàng)新個(gè)性配送服務(wù)體系,提高客戶粘性;(4)完善考核評(píng)價(jià)指標(biāo),保證成員企業(yè)效益公平公正。
[Abstract]:In recent years, in support of big data strong, the implementation of precision marketing major business platform, online shopping craze crazy you can achieve instant billions of transactions. However, brought hitherto unknown challenge amount of the huge line to the electricity supplier logistics industry. In order to should seize the historical opportunity for development to the challenge, the domestic logistics giants the field of logistics distribution to plan, build logistics system from the Jingdong to the Alibaba willing to spend billions, invested heavily to build the rookie network, and then to the SF together four logistics giants to build "Feng nest technology", the major electricity supplier logistics enterprises to pay attention to the electricity supplier logistics degree. Remarkable boost in the modern science and technology, although some large enterprises have been in automatic sorting, improved distribution path etc. However, one end of the distribution of a single small amount of distribution, the distribution of high frequency, express delivery to customers The time problems still exist; on the other hand, the end of the distribution of electricity supplier logistics enterprise package package, the package recycling rate is low, the serious problem of express information disclosure has become increasingly prominent. A courier from the original issue to reach the hands of customers, through multiple links, from information input to the parcel sorting, then to express delivery and every link may result in information disclosure, the end of the distribution was not perfect and face new challenges. The end of the logistics distribution mode of joint distribution as a new, scientific, feasibility has been recognized by experts in the field, is expected to break the last mile problem, but in practice, the common distribution pattern at the end of the logistics enterprise adoption rate is very low. The reason is that the contradiction of alliance formation and operation efficiency is low, cost sharing, unequal distribution of benefits and problems to be solved. The research at home and abroad joint distribution alliance related end cost allocation is not deep enough, and the electricity supplier logistics enterprises to solve the distribution problem is imminent, so it is very important for the study of allocation of joint distribution alliance cost. Based on this, the electricity supplier logistics terminal joint distribution cost allocation as the research object, mainly includes four aspects: (1) focus on the analysis of the relationship between electronic commerce and logistics, terminal distribution and joint distribution, summed up the electricity supplier logistics bottleneck at the end of the distribution, then the status of the end of the distribution, analysis of existing problems and patterns in. (2) joint distribution alliance, combing driving factors and explore the alliance operation process, operation mode, coordination mechanism and lay the foundation for the effective promotion of joint distribution terminal. (3) proposed the enterprise personalized delivery service, encourage members of the alliance service innovation. The existing literature mainly from the enterprise Enterprise resource value, delivery time delay risk, technology risk borne by enterprises, enterprise annual distribution quantity of cost allocation problem, according to the new era of the end consumer logistics service differentiation strong demand, timely put forward the enterprise personalized delivery service. (4) reviews the joint distribution cost allocation of existing electricity supplier logistics terminal the problem, and the advantages and disadvantages of existing cost allocation model analysis, finally puts forward the construction cost allocation model of integrated Shapley value method based on negotiation model. In alliance cost allocation volume as objective function, the value of enterprise resources, enterprise distribution time delay risk, technology risk borne by enterprises, enterprise annual distribution quantity, distribution of individual enterprises serve as constraints, and to make up for the defects of Shapley contribution rate of equalization, using AHP analysis method and 1~9 index method to determine the result In weight, finally construct the comprehensive cost allocation model Shapley value method based on negotiation, and by introducing the example of empirical analysis, using MATLAB 7 software to solve scientific model validation and allocation results. Through the above research, draw the following conclusions: (1) the total amount of the cost of operation cost distribution alliance alliance the total cost of distribution cost amount is less than before the formation of the alliance, the alliance of joint distribution contribute to the overall promotion of economic benefit alliance. (2) the distribution cost per share of union members are less than the amount before the alliance cost distribution cost alone, the formation of alliances is conducive to enhancing the economic benefit of the individual. (3) in the alliance each member is no longer equal to cost sharing, alliance member contribution share basis, done for the league, the greater the rate of the cost reduction more. Such as alliance members in the personalized delivery service Outstanding contributions, then the members of the larger cost reduction, and finally through the contribution cost allocation quantity association way, ensure fairness between individuals, stimulate innovation power distribution alliance members. Finally, based on above conclusions put forward the following suggestions: (1) management to encourage enterprises to joint distribution alliance, lowering cost and improving the economic and social benefits; (2) alliance and the members of the consultative distribution optimization scheme, save the alliance member delivery time; (3) mining electricity supplier logistics market demand, distribution service system innovation personality, improve customer stickiness; (4) improve the evaluation index, ensure the benefit of member enterprises Fair.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.6;F252;F715.5
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