【摘要】：IPO盈余管理一直以來都是重要的研究課題,投資者會因被粉飾的財務報告而做出錯誤的股票估價和買賣決定。由于風險投資不僅為被投資公司注入資金,同時還會提供一系列的增值服務、對企業(yè)進行治理,即風險投資具有理論上的監(jiān)督作用。本文通過實證研究,考察了風險投資是否具有財務報告監(jiān)督作用,即風險投資是否能夠抑制被投資公司的IPO盈余管理。 本文研究了IPO附近的三個時期：IPO前一年、IPO當年、IPO后一年。本文的研究對象為創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場,考慮到金融危機這一特殊宏觀時期的干擾,剔除了2009年上市的公司,最終選取了2010-2012年上市的319家公司為研究樣本。本文首先運用截面修正瓊斯模型分年度回歸計算得出了樣本公司的操控性應計利潤,以此作為盈余管理程度的衡量指標。接著,本文考慮了可能影響盈余管理程度的公司規(guī)模、財務杠桿、成長性、現(xiàn)金流充裕情況等因素,同時將有無風險投資背景作為虛擬變量,建立了多元回歸模型,驗證有風險投資背景的公司與無風險投資背景的公司相比,是否有更低的盈余管理程度。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：成功IPO對我國風險投資機構(gòu)有很大的利益誘惑,在IPO前風險投資表現(xiàn)出了道德風險,風險投資不能抑制盈余管理,甚至有輕微助長盈余管理的嫌疑；而鑒于風險投資機構(gòu)在前期進行了謹慎、詳細的項目評估,風險投資機構(gòu)在IPO成功后完全可以預期公司上市后的良好的市場表現(xiàn),此時道德風險動機小,而能支持監(jiān)督假說,風險投資開始發(fā)揮對盈余管理的抑制作用。但這種監(jiān)督和抑制作用亦有其時限性,在IPO后一年,由于部分風險投資機構(gòu)即將退出,因此其監(jiān)督積極性不高,表現(xiàn)為監(jiān)督作用不顯著。 上述發(fā)現(xiàn)表明,風險投資機構(gòu)一定程度上看重誠實的高質(zhì)量的財務報告,本身有意識影響財務報告的質(zhì)量,但風險投資對財務報告進行監(jiān)督的意愿和積極性并不強,在與短期利益發(fā)生沖突時,風險投資不能顯著抑制盈余管理,甚至有可能助長盈余管理行為。因此,目前需要監(jiān)管層理順體制機制,從制度上激發(fā)風險投資機構(gòu)提供增值服務的積極性,并通過獎懲機制給予風險投資機構(gòu)正確的引導。從而使風險投資機構(gòu)更好地發(fā)揮其作為專業(yè)投資機構(gòu)的職業(yè)能力,促進我國資本市場的健康發(fā)展。 本文研究風險投資與IPO盈余管理的關(guān)系,拓展研究了盈余管理的抑制問題；并驗證了風險投資的財務報告監(jiān)督作用,為風險投資的研究提供了“財務報告監(jiān)督”這樣一個有益的視角；同時也對促進我國資本市場和風險投資的健康發(fā)展有重要意義。
[Abstract]:IPO earnings management has always been an important research topic, investors will make wrong stock valuation and trading decisions because of whitewashed financial reports. Because venture capital not only injects funds into the invested company, but also provides a series of value-added services to govern the enterprise, that is, venture capital has a theoretical supervision role. Through empirical research, this paper examines whether venture capital has the role of financial reporting supervision, that is, whether venture capital can inhibit the IPO earnings management of invested companies. This paper studies three periods near IPO: the year before IPO, the year after IPO, and the year after IPO. The research object of this paper is gem. Considering the interference of the financial crisis in this special macro period, the listed companies in 2009 are eliminated, and 319 listed companies from 2010 to 2012 are selected as the research samples. In this paper, the operational accrual profit of the sample company is calculated by using the cross section modified Jones model by annual regression, which is used as the index to measure the degree of earnings management. Then, this paper takes into account the factors that may affect the degree of earnings management, such as the size of the company, financial leverage, growth, cash flow adequacy and so on. At the same time, taking the background of venture capital as a virtual variable, a multiple regression model is established. Verify that companies with venture capital background have lower level of earnings management than those without venture capital background. It is found that successful IPO has great interest temptation to venture capital institutions in our country, and venture capital shows moral hazard before IPO. Venture capital can not restrain earnings management, and even slightly contribute to earnings management. In view of the cautious and detailed project evaluation of venture capital institutions in the early stage, venture capital institutions can fully expect the good market performance of the company after the IPO is successful, at this time, the motivation of moral hazard is small, and it can support the supervision hypothesis. Venture capital began to play a role in curbing earnings management. However, this kind of supervision and inhibition also has its time limit. One year after IPO, because some venture capital institutions are about to withdraw, their supervision enthusiasm is not high, which shows that the supervision role is not significant. The above findings show that venture capital institutions value honest and high quality financial reports to a certain extent and consciously affect the quality of financial reports, but the willingness and enthusiasm of venture capital to supervise financial reports is not strong. In the case of conflict with short-term interests, venture capital can not significantly inhibit earnings management, and may even contribute to earnings management behavior. Therefore, at present, it is necessary for the regulatory level to straighten out the institutional mechanism, stimulate the enthusiasm of venture capital institutions to provide value-added services from the system, and give the venture capital institutions the correct guidance through the reward and punishment mechanism. So that venture capital institutions can give full play to their professional ability as professional investment institutions and promote the healthy development of China's capital market. This paper studies the relationship between venture capital and IPO earnings management, and expands and studies the suppression of earnings management. It also verifies the role of financial reporting supervision of venture capital, which provides a useful perspective for the study of venture capital, and is also of great significance to promote the healthy development of capital market and venture capital in China.
【學位授予單位】：財政部財政科學研究所
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51;F276.6

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