【摘要】：隨著上市公司頻繁地爆出經(jīng)營管理和財(cái)務(wù)丑聞,內(nèi)部控制早已經(jīng)成為了國內(nèi)外學(xué)術(shù)界和理論界關(guān)注的重要內(nèi)容。從世界范圍來看,內(nèi)部控制制度日趨完善,通過國內(nèi)外專家學(xué)者的不斷研究,已經(jīng)證明了公司治理、公司特征、審計(jì)委員會(huì)等因素對內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的影響,但是少有學(xué)者從內(nèi)部控制的主體——“人”的角度考慮股權(quán)激勵(lì)對內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的影響。本文以“委托代理理論”“利益趨同理論”等理論為基礎(chǔ),在理論研究的基礎(chǔ)上,建立內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量綜合評價(jià)體系。本文將2013年以及2014年滬深兩市上市公司作為研究對象,以經(jīng)營目標(biāo)、財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告目標(biāo)、合法合規(guī)目標(biāo)以及資產(chǎn)安全目標(biāo)四個(gè)目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)程度對企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制的有效性進(jìn)行衡量,然后對多變量進(jìn)行主成因分析,重新組成一組綜合變量——內(nèi)部控制指數(shù)作為表征內(nèi)部控制有效性的替代變量。實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃是否影響其內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量,并以激勵(lì)計(jì)劃股票授予數(shù)量與當(dāng)時(shí)上市公司的總股本的比例表征股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的強(qiáng)度,檢驗(yàn)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的強(qiáng)度對上市公司內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的影響。通過實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),本文得出結(jié)論:實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司的內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量明顯好于從未實(shí)施過股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的公司;實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃程度高的上市公司內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量高于實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃低的公司,即股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃增發(fā)股本數(shù)占總股本比例高的公司比比例低的公司具有更好的內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量。
[Abstract]:With the frequent occurrence of management and financial scandals in listed companies, internal control has become an important part of academic and theoretical circles at home and abroad. From a worldwide perspective, the internal control system is becoming more and more perfect. Through continuous research by experts and scholars at home and abroad, it has been proved that factors such as corporate governance, corporate characteristics, audit committees, and other factors have affected the quality of internal control. However, few scholars consider the influence of equity incentive on the quality of internal control from the point of view of the subject of internal control-"person". Based on the theory of "principal-agent theory" and "interest convergence theory", this paper establishes a comprehensive evaluation system of internal control quality on the basis of theoretical research. In this paper, the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2013 and 2014 are taken as the research objects, and the effectiveness of internal control is measured by the realization degree of the four objectives of business objectives, financial reporting objectives, legal compliance objectives and asset security objectives. Then the main causes of the multivariable are analyzed, and a set of complex variables, the internal control index, is reconstituted as a substitute variable to characterize the effectiveness of internal control. To test whether the implementation of equity incentive plan affects the internal control quality of listed company, and to characterize the intensity of equity incentive plan by the proportion of the amount of incentive plan stock awarded to the total share capital of the listed company at that time. To examine the impact of the intensity of equity incentive on the quality of internal control of listed companies. Through the empirical test, this paper draws a conclusion: the quality of internal control of listed companies implementing equity incentive plans is obviously better than that of companies that have never implemented equity incentive plans; The internal control quality of listed companies with high degree of equity incentive plan is higher than that of those with low equity incentive plan. That is to say, the companies with high share capital ratio of equity incentive plan have better internal control quality than those with low share capital ratio.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F275;F272.92;F832.51
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本文編號：2425252