政治關聯(lián)、銀企關系與企業(yè)績效
[Abstract]:After more than 30 years of reform and opening up, the small and medium-sized enterprises in our country have gradually become the mainstay of our national economy. Small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in promoting economic growth, stimulating employment, speeding up innovation and driving economic system reform. In recent years, due to the depression of the external economic environment and the slowdown of the internal economic growth rate, the problems existing in the development of small and medium-sized enterprises have been gradually exposed, such as the heavy burden of taxes and fees, the weak protection of property rights, and the difficulty of financing, and so on. This will undoubtedly limit the further growth of small and medium-sized enterprises in China. Under the background of China's economic transformation, this paper points out that the key to the above problems lies in the lack of perfect legal environment and effective financial system. Institutional weaknesses require small and medium-sized enterprises to establish political connections to make up for the deficiencies of the formal system and to protect their own development. Therefore, it is of great significance to actively pay attention to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises, to improve the management of small and medium-sized enterprises in our country, to promote the performance of enterprises and to promote the economic growth of our country. Under the above background, this paper makes a detailed review of the current situation of the research on political correlation, the relationship between banks and enterprises, and firm performance, and puts forward the relevant research hypotheses based on the theoretical basis of the three theories. This paper tries to prove that on the one hand, the small and medium-sized enterprises in our country can help them evade government regulation, obtain scarce resources, and directly improve the performance of enterprises, on the other hand, they can help them to improve the relationship between banks and enterprises, and take the relationship between banks and enterprises as the intermediary variable. To further affect corporate performance. In the empirical analysis, this paper first studies the mechanism of political association on enterprise performance, and concludes that political association has a significant role in promoting corporate performance; after further differentiating the types of political association, The research shows that compared with the local political background, the central political connection background can promote enterprise performance more. Secondly, this paper studies the mechanism of political association on the relationship between banks and enterprises. The conclusion shows that political association can improve the scale of bank loans, and the term structure of the loans is short term loans. This paper studies the mechanism of the relationship between banks and enterprises on corporate performance. The conclusion shows that the scale of bank loans has a negative impact on corporate performance, and short-term loans have a significant positive impact on corporate performance. Finally, the paper tests the intermediary effect of the relationship between banks and enterprises, and concludes that the scale of bank loans has a negative intermediary effect in the process of political connection to firm performance, while short-term loans and long-term loans play a positive intermediary effect. According to the conclusion of the empirical study, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions to promote the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in China, such as transforming government functions, perfecting the legal system and creating a good financial environment. In addition, this paper also pointed out the shortcomings of the study and the direction of further research.
【學位授予單位】:中國礦業(yè)大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F276.3;F832.4
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