控股股東在定向增發(fā)中的認購動機與獲利手段的實證研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-22 12:11
【摘要】：我國學術界一直致力于控股股東行為的研究。對控股股東行為相關研究發(fā)現(xiàn)控股股東利用其對上市公司影響力為其輸送利益�？毓晒蓶|直接或間接的參與上市公司決策,在上市公司整個決策過程中控股股東利用其控制權能力注入其主觀意愿,使上市公司做出有利于控股股東的決策。所以,出于保護中小股東的利益,對上市公司控股股東行為的研究是必不可缺的。 定向增發(fā)融資方式深受上市公司歡迎,其被采用次數(shù)已經(jīng)超過配股以及公開增發(fā)。定向增發(fā)逐漸成為上市公司普遍采用的再融資方式。定向增發(fā)中控股股東認購次數(shù)較多,認購比例較大,這—現(xiàn)象與控股股東在配股及公開增發(fā)中的表現(xiàn)截然不同。定向增發(fā)不僅滿足上市公司募集項目資金需求,而且使控股股東的其他資產(chǎn)得以上市。從市場表現(xiàn)看,控股股東認購通常帶來股價正的效應�？毓晒蓶|積極參與定向增發(fā),是否預示控股股東在定向增發(fā)中將會有新的表現(xiàn)?其利益動機以及用來獲取利益的手段是否與公開增發(fā)、配股不同?這需要進一步的研究。本文認為,對于控股股東在定向增發(fā)中的行為研究還不夠充分�？毓晒蓶|在定向增發(fā)中表現(xiàn)出來的行為與以往有著明顯不同。在這樣的情況下,本文試圖挖掘現(xiàn)有文獻的不足,深入探討定向增發(fā)這種再融資方式中控股股東行為背后的利益動機與利益獲取手段,豐富現(xiàn)有理論的不足,使廣大投資者能更清楚的了解定向增發(fā)中控股股東的行為。 本文以2009年-2011年286家成功完成定向增發(fā)的樣本以及84家控股股東以非現(xiàn)金資產(chǎn)認購的定向增發(fā)樣本,試圖回答以下問題：控股股東是否出于提高控制權比例、獲得股權價值增值等利益而做出認購決策?控股股東在做出認購決策后,是否利用定價手段(增發(fā)定價手段以及資產(chǎn)定價手段)獲得利益? 本文各章節(jié)安排如下： 第一章引言 本章詳細的闡述了本文的研究背景,從而確定了本文研究思路,為后文搭建整個研究框架。本章還闡述了本文研究的理論意義與現(xiàn)實意義,并對研究樣本及研究方法進行了說明。 第2章文獻綜述 本章對國內外關于定向增發(fā)的相關文獻進行了梳理,回顧了控股股東在定向增發(fā)中的行為表現(xiàn)以及行為導致的結果。本章主要從兩個角度總結定向增發(fā)相關文獻：(1),控股股東認購行為導致的市場反應；(2),控股股東認購與定向增發(fā)價格的關系。本章為后文實證分析提供了理論基礎。 第3章定向增發(fā)機制與現(xiàn)狀分析 本章對定向增發(fā)相關制度進行梳理,目的在于闡述定向增發(fā)概念以及其重要性。本章不僅描述定向增發(fā)制度,而且闡述了定向增發(fā)在我過資本市場的現(xiàn)狀。本章亦對以募集資金或資產(chǎn)重組為目的的定向增發(fā)進行了對比,重點闡述二者定價機制的不同。本文正是圍繞定向增發(fā)特殊的政策制度展開研究,因此本章是后文研究的前提。 第4章定向增發(fā)中控股股東行為 本章主要對控股股東在定向增發(fā)中認購行為背后的利益動機及獲利手段進行理論分析。首先總結控股股東三種利益動機,正是基于這三種利益動機才導致了控股股東做出認購決策,從而進一步的闡述控股股東在定向增發(fā)中采用定價手段進行獲利。本章梳理了控股股東在定向增發(fā)中行為背后的利益鏈條,本章的理論分析是后文實證分析的最直接理論基礎。 第5章定向增發(fā)中控股股東認購利益動機 本章以實證研究手段對控股股東兩方面的利益動機進行了研究：第一,控股股東是否出于提高控制權比例而認購股份?第二,以資產(chǎn)回報率衡量上市公司業(yè)績、市場回報率衡量股權價值增值程度,分析控股股東認購行為對業(yè)績變化,市場回報率是否有影響?試圖以本章的研究佐證控股股東利益動機假說。 第6章定向增發(fā)中控股股東的獲利手段 本章以實證研究手段對控股股東在認購股份后是否會利用增發(fā)定價、資產(chǎn)定價手段進行獲利進行分析。本章以增發(fā)折價率衡量定向增發(fā)價格,分析控股股東認購行為與增發(fā)折價率的關系,以及控股股東認購比例是否會提高控股股東獲利的積極性。本章又以資產(chǎn)評估增值率衡量資產(chǎn)價值高低,并引入第三方獨立機構,分析控股股東利用資產(chǎn)定價手段獲利的決定性因素與其獲利渠道。 第7章研究結論與研究局限性 本章對前文研究結果進行總結,并對本文研究的局限性進行說明。 本文的主要結論如下： (1)控股股東在定向增發(fā)中出于三種利益動機而做出認購股份的決策�？毓晒蓶|認購明顯導致了其控制權比例的增加。定向增發(fā)前控制權比例較低的控股股東認購股份的意愿相對于定向增發(fā)前控制權比例較高的控股股東更加強烈,促使控股股東認購更多的規(guī)模以提高控制權比例。對于股權價值增值利益動機來說,控股股東認購股份能夠提高上市公司業(yè)績,從而進一步提升上市公司股權價值。 (2)控股股東認購股份行為促使其利用控制權影響上市公司定向增發(fā)定價決策,從而獲得較低的增發(fā)價格。控股股東認購股份越多,其利用控制權進行獲利的可能性越大,也即控制權比例越大的控股股東在定向增發(fā)中利用其控制權影響定價的積極性越高。所以,控股股東認購導致了較高的折價率。 (3)控股股東認購與資產(chǎn)評估增值率呈正的相關關系,也即控股股東認購相對于控股股東不認購導致了更高的資產(chǎn)評估增值率。本文的研究結論揭示了控股股東利用資產(chǎn)定價獲利的途徑。當控股股東以資產(chǎn)認購股份時,控股股東將會利用其控制權影響上市公司選擇資產(chǎn)評估機構決策,進而選擇對其有利的資產(chǎn)評估機構。資產(chǎn)評估機構的聲譽的好壞與其出具的資產(chǎn)評估報告質量的高低呈顯著正相關關系,也即聲譽較差資產(chǎn)評估機構出具質量較低的資產(chǎn)評估報告的可能性越高。 本文主要貢獻如下： (1)本文以控股股東認購行為背后的利益動機為視角分析控股股東在定向增發(fā)中認購股份的決定性因素,并將定向增發(fā)定價與資產(chǎn)定價看作控股股東在定向增發(fā)中的兩種獲利手段,從而闡述了控股股東在定向增發(fā)中決策的利益鏈條。本文對控股股東在定向增發(fā)中認購行為動機以及獲利手段的研究,拓寬了對控股股東行為研究的層面,對控股股東行為理論研究具有重大貢獻。 (2)學術界很少涉及對控股股東在定向增發(fā)中采用資產(chǎn)定價進行獲利以及資產(chǎn)定價獲利渠道的研究。因此本文的研究豐富了現(xiàn)有文獻,為學者研究我國定向增發(fā)中控股股東以資產(chǎn)認購股份現(xiàn)象提供了一個新的視角。 本文研究存在以下不足： (1)本文缺乏對定向增發(fā)中重要的投資者——機構投資者研究。機構投資者在定向增發(fā)中所代表的利益是與控股股東一致,還是會對控股股東產(chǎn)生一定制衡。本文對此沒有展開研究,因此缺乏這對這一重要投資者的研究,使得本文的研究具有一定局限性。 (2)本文缺乏對定向增發(fā)中公司治理作用的研究。本文僅僅以控股股東控制權的主導地位對定向增發(fā)決策的影響進行研究。但在實際中,控股股東在資產(chǎn)定價,增發(fā)定價過程中應該進行回避表決,獨立董事機制作用日益明顯,公司治理水平漸漸提高,累計投票制等都對控股股東控制權產(chǎn)生了一定制約。公司治理如何在定向增發(fā)中產(chǎn)生作用,甚至對控股股東行為產(chǎn)生一定影響值得進一步研究。 (3)本文研究樣本存在一定缺陷。由于數(shù)據(jù)搜集時間成本,本文僅僅選用了2009年-2011年成功定向增發(fā)的樣本,沒有囊括成功定向增發(fā)的所有樣本,所以本文研究結論有一定局限性。
[Abstract]:The academic circles of our country have been devoted to the study of the behavior of the controlling shareholders. Subjective will makes listed companies make decisions that are conducive to controlling shareholders. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders, it is necessary to study the behavior of controlling shareholders of listed companies.
Private placement is popular with listed companies and has been adopted more frequently than allotment and public offering. Private placement has gradually become a common way of refinancing in listed companies. Private placement not only meets the financing needs of listed companies, but also enables the other assets of the controlling shareholders to be listed. From the market performance, the subscription of the controlling shareholders usually brings positive effect of the stock price. This paper argues that the research on the behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement is insufficient. The behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement is obviously different from that in the past. In order to enrich the deficiency of the existing theories and make the investors understand the behavior of the controlling shareholders more clearly, this paper explores the motivation and means of gaining benefits behind the behavior of the controlling shareholders in the redistribution.
Based on 286 successful private placement samples from 2009 to 2011 and 84 private placement samples from non-cash assets, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: Is the controlling shareholder making the decision to subscribe for the purpose of increasing the proportion of control rights and gaining the value of equity? Is it profitable to use pricing means (additional pricing and asset pricing)?
The chapters are arranged as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction
This chapter elaborates the research background of this paper in detail, and then determines the research ideas of this paper, and builds the whole research framework for the later part.
The second chapter is literature review.
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on directed placement at home and abroad, and reviews the behavior of controlling shareholders in directed placement and the results caused by the behavior. The relationship between prices. This chapter provides a theoretical basis for empirical analysis.
The third chapter is the mechanism and current situation of private placement.
This chapter not only describes the concept of private placement, but also describes the status quo of private placement in China's capital market. This chapter also compares the private placement for the purpose of fund raising or asset reorganization, with emphasis on the two definitions. The price mechanism is different. This paper is just around the special policy system of directional additional issuance, so this chapter is the premise of the later study.
The fourth chapter is the behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement.
This chapter mainly analyzes the interest motivation and profit-making means behind the controlling shareholder's subscription behavior in the directional offering. First, it summarizes the three interest motivations of the controlling shareholder, which lead to the decision-making of the controlling shareholder's subscription. This chapter combs the interest chain behind the behavior of controlling shareholders in the directional offering. The theoretical analysis of this chapter is the most direct theoretical basis of the empirical analysis.
The fifth chapter is about the motives of controlling shareholders to subscribe for interest in private placement.
This chapter studies the interest motivation of controlling shareholders in two aspects: first, does the controlling shareholder subscribe for the purpose of increasing the proportion of control rights? Second, the performance of listed companies is measured by the return on assets, the value-added degree of equity is measured by the return on market, and the change of performance caused by the subscription behavior of controlling shareholders is analyzed. Does the return on the field have any effect? The purpose of this chapter is to prove the motivation hypothesis of controlling shareholders' interests.
The sixth chapter is the profit making method of controlling shareholders in private placement.
This chapter uses empirical research to analyze whether the controlling shareholders will make use of additional issuance pricing and asset pricing to make profit after subscribing for shares. In this chapter, the value of assets is measured by the value-added rate of assets appraisal, and the third-party independent institutions are introduced to analyze the determinants of controlling shareholders'profit by means of asset pricing and their profit channels.
The seventh chapter is the conclusion and limitations of the study.
This chapter summarizes the results of previous studies and explains the limitations of this study.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) Controlling shareholders make the decision to subscribe for shares because of three kinds of interest motives in the private placement. Controlling shareholders'subscription obviously leads to the increase of their proportion of control rights. In order to increase the proportion of control rights, the controlling shareholders can subscribe more shares, which can improve the performance of listed companies and further enhance the equity value of listed companies.
(2) The behavior of controlling shareholders'subscribing to shares urges them to make use of the control right to influence the pricing decision of the listed company's private placement, so as to obtain a lower additional price. The higher the price is, the higher the discount rate is.
(3) Controlling shareholder's subscription is positively related to the value-added ratio of asset valuation, that is, the higher value-added ratio of asset valuation is caused by the subscription of controlling shareholder compared with the non-subscription of controlling shareholder. The reputation of an asset appraisal institution has a significant positive correlation with the quality of its asset appraisal report, that is, the reputation of a less reputable asset appraisal institution has a lower quality of its asset appraisal report. The higher the possibility.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) This paper analyzes the decisive factors of controlling shareholders'subscription in the process of directed placement from the perspective of interest motivation behind the behavior of controlling shareholders' subscription, and regards the pricing of directed placement and asset pricing as the two profit-making methods of controlling shareholders in the process of directed placement, thus expounding the interest chain of controlling shareholders'decision-making in the process of directed placement. The study on the motive and profit-making means of the controlling shareholder's subscription behavior in the private placement has broadened the research level of the controlling shareholder's behavior and made a great contribution to the study of the controlling shareholder's behavior theory.
(2) Academia seldom involves the study of the profit-making and the profit-making channel of the controlling shareholder's asset pricing in the private placement. Therefore, this study enriches the existing literature and provides a new perspective for scholars to study the phenomenon that the controlling shareholder subscribes for shares with assets in the private placement.
This study has the following shortcomings:
(1) Institutional investors, an important investor in private placement, are lacking in this paper. Whether the interests of institutional investors in private placement are consistent with the controlling shareholders or will they produce a certain balance between the controlling shareholders, this paper does not study this issue, so there is no research on this important investor, which makes this paper study. It has certain limitations.
(2) There is a lack of research on corporate governance in private placement. This paper only studies the influence of controlling shareholder's dominant position on private placement decision. But in practice, the controlling shareholder should avoid voting in the process of asset pricing and additional placement pricing. Independent director mechanism plays an increasingly important role in corporate governance. The gradual improvement of the level and the cumulative voting system have restricted the control rights of the controlling shareholders to a certain extent.
(3) There are some shortcomings in the research sample. Because of the time cost of data collection, this paper only selects the samples of successful directional placement from 2009 to 2011, and does not include all the samples of successful directional placement.
【學位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275
本文編號：2197067
[Abstract]:The academic circles of our country have been devoted to the study of the behavior of the controlling shareholders. Subjective will makes listed companies make decisions that are conducive to controlling shareholders. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders, it is necessary to study the behavior of controlling shareholders of listed companies.
Private placement is popular with listed companies and has been adopted more frequently than allotment and public offering. Private placement has gradually become a common way of refinancing in listed companies. Private placement not only meets the financing needs of listed companies, but also enables the other assets of the controlling shareholders to be listed. From the market performance, the subscription of the controlling shareholders usually brings positive effect of the stock price. This paper argues that the research on the behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement is insufficient. The behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement is obviously different from that in the past. In order to enrich the deficiency of the existing theories and make the investors understand the behavior of the controlling shareholders more clearly, this paper explores the motivation and means of gaining benefits behind the behavior of the controlling shareholders in the redistribution.
Based on 286 successful private placement samples from 2009 to 2011 and 84 private placement samples from non-cash assets, this paper attempts to answer the following questions: Is the controlling shareholder making the decision to subscribe for the purpose of increasing the proportion of control rights and gaining the value of equity? Is it profitable to use pricing means (additional pricing and asset pricing)?
The chapters are arranged as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction
This chapter elaborates the research background of this paper in detail, and then determines the research ideas of this paper, and builds the whole research framework for the later part.
The second chapter is literature review.
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on directed placement at home and abroad, and reviews the behavior of controlling shareholders in directed placement and the results caused by the behavior. The relationship between prices. This chapter provides a theoretical basis for empirical analysis.
The third chapter is the mechanism and current situation of private placement.
This chapter not only describes the concept of private placement, but also describes the status quo of private placement in China's capital market. This chapter also compares the private placement for the purpose of fund raising or asset reorganization, with emphasis on the two definitions. The price mechanism is different. This paper is just around the special policy system of directional additional issuance, so this chapter is the premise of the later study.
The fourth chapter is the behavior of controlling shareholders in private placement.
This chapter mainly analyzes the interest motivation and profit-making means behind the controlling shareholder's subscription behavior in the directional offering. First, it summarizes the three interest motivations of the controlling shareholder, which lead to the decision-making of the controlling shareholder's subscription. This chapter combs the interest chain behind the behavior of controlling shareholders in the directional offering. The theoretical analysis of this chapter is the most direct theoretical basis of the empirical analysis.
The fifth chapter is about the motives of controlling shareholders to subscribe for interest in private placement.
This chapter studies the interest motivation of controlling shareholders in two aspects: first, does the controlling shareholder subscribe for the purpose of increasing the proportion of control rights? Second, the performance of listed companies is measured by the return on assets, the value-added degree of equity is measured by the return on market, and the change of performance caused by the subscription behavior of controlling shareholders is analyzed. Does the return on the field have any effect? The purpose of this chapter is to prove the motivation hypothesis of controlling shareholders' interests.
The sixth chapter is the profit making method of controlling shareholders in private placement.
This chapter uses empirical research to analyze whether the controlling shareholders will make use of additional issuance pricing and asset pricing to make profit after subscribing for shares. In this chapter, the value of assets is measured by the value-added rate of assets appraisal, and the third-party independent institutions are introduced to analyze the determinants of controlling shareholders'profit by means of asset pricing and their profit channels.
The seventh chapter is the conclusion and limitations of the study.
This chapter summarizes the results of previous studies and explains the limitations of this study.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) Controlling shareholders make the decision to subscribe for shares because of three kinds of interest motives in the private placement. Controlling shareholders'subscription obviously leads to the increase of their proportion of control rights. In order to increase the proportion of control rights, the controlling shareholders can subscribe more shares, which can improve the performance of listed companies and further enhance the equity value of listed companies.
(2) The behavior of controlling shareholders'subscribing to shares urges them to make use of the control right to influence the pricing decision of the listed company's private placement, so as to obtain a lower additional price. The higher the price is, the higher the discount rate is.
(3) Controlling shareholder's subscription is positively related to the value-added ratio of asset valuation, that is, the higher value-added ratio of asset valuation is caused by the subscription of controlling shareholder compared with the non-subscription of controlling shareholder. The reputation of an asset appraisal institution has a significant positive correlation with the quality of its asset appraisal report, that is, the reputation of a less reputable asset appraisal institution has a lower quality of its asset appraisal report. The higher the possibility.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) This paper analyzes the decisive factors of controlling shareholders'subscription in the process of directed placement from the perspective of interest motivation behind the behavior of controlling shareholders' subscription, and regards the pricing of directed placement and asset pricing as the two profit-making methods of controlling shareholders in the process of directed placement, thus expounding the interest chain of controlling shareholders'decision-making in the process of directed placement. The study on the motive and profit-making means of the controlling shareholder's subscription behavior in the private placement has broadened the research level of the controlling shareholder's behavior and made a great contribution to the study of the controlling shareholder's behavior theory.
(2) Academia seldom involves the study of the profit-making and the profit-making channel of the controlling shareholder's asset pricing in the private placement. Therefore, this study enriches the existing literature and provides a new perspective for scholars to study the phenomenon that the controlling shareholder subscribes for shares with assets in the private placement.
This study has the following shortcomings:
(1) Institutional investors, an important investor in private placement, are lacking in this paper. Whether the interests of institutional investors in private placement are consistent with the controlling shareholders or will they produce a certain balance between the controlling shareholders, this paper does not study this issue, so there is no research on this important investor, which makes this paper study. It has certain limitations.
(2) There is a lack of research on corporate governance in private placement. This paper only studies the influence of controlling shareholder's dominant position on private placement decision. But in practice, the controlling shareholder should avoid voting in the process of asset pricing and additional placement pricing. Independent director mechanism plays an increasingly important role in corporate governance. The gradual improvement of the level and the cumulative voting system have restricted the control rights of the controlling shareholders to a certain extent.
(3) There are some shortcomings in the research sample. Because of the time cost of data collection, this paper only selects the samples of successful directional placement from 2009 to 2011, and does not include all the samples of successful directional placement.
【學位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275
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