本文選題：中小投資者法律保護(hù) + 股權(quán)集中度��； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：資本市場的發(fā)展與國家對投資者利益保護(hù)程度息息相關(guān)。隨著國家對投資者利益保護(hù)水平的提高,推動著資本市場朝著健康的方向發(fā)展。縱觀歐美成熟證券市場的發(fā)展歷程,在股權(quán)全部流通的情況下,法律制度已然成為保護(hù)投資者的有力手段。雖然我國的股權(quán)分置改革基本實現(xiàn),但上市公司的控股股東、高級管理人員、機構(gòu)投資者等仍然擁有十分明顯的股權(quán)優(yōu)勢、資金優(yōu)勢、專業(yè)技術(shù)優(yōu)勢和信息優(yōu)勢,這加深了資本市場信息不對稱的矛盾。而中小投資者由于其持股份額較小且較為分散,很難參與公司的內(nèi)部治理。當(dāng)上市公司大股東所掌握的控制權(quán)超過現(xiàn)金流權(quán)時,其選擇有損于中小投資者利益行為的可能性很大,進(jìn)而會侵害中小投資者利益(Franks,1997)。這種侵害將會使公司的運營效率降低且會抑制潛在投資者的進(jìn)入,最終會嚴(yán)重影響資本市場的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。因此,在我國資本市場的相關(guān)制度不健全的背景下,完善投資者法律保護(hù),既可穩(wěn)固我國資本市場的基礎(chǔ),又能保證上市公司順利進(jìn)行股權(quán)融資。 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是有效安排公司剩余控制權(quán)和剩余索取權(quán)的重要基礎(chǔ),并且也是公司治理的基礎(chǔ)。股東所持有股份的大小在一定程度上影響了公司治理的水平。在公司股權(quán)比較分散的情況下,有關(guān)公司治理的矛盾主要體現(xiàn)在管理層與股東之間。大股東持股比例不斷增加,其對公司的控制權(quán)也逐漸加強,導(dǎo)致控股股東與中小投資者之間也產(chǎn)生矛盾。由于中小投資者持股比例低且較為分散,基于成本收益原則,其沒有動力和能力維護(hù)自身利益。然而,根據(jù)國外資本市場的發(fā)展和相關(guān)學(xué)者的研究,國家對中小投資者保護(hù)的相關(guān)法律的完善程度,直接影響了中小投資者的利益,法律越是完善,對中小投資者的保護(hù)力度越大(LLSV,1998)�？梢�,法律在保護(hù)中小投資者利益中扮演了重要的角色。在我國,對中小投資者利益保護(hù)的相關(guān)法律出臺較晚,1994年實施的《公司法》針對中小投資者保護(hù),制定了具體的規(guī)定(如中小股東表決權(quán)等)。截止到2010年1月,我國已經(jīng)出臺了九十四部涉及中小投資者利益保護(hù)方面的法律法規(guī),累計一百八十三條。由此可見,在立法方面,我國對中小投資者的保護(hù)在不斷加強。 有關(guān)投資者法律保護(hù)與股權(quán)集中度之間關(guān)系的研究,主要存在兩種觀點。一種是以LLSV (1999)為代表提出的“替代假說”觀點。“替代假說”主要關(guān)注公司管理層同股東間的利益制衡,而忽視了大部分國家的上市公司因控股股東和中小股東間的利益摩擦而引起的代理問題。另一種是“結(jié)果模型”Bebchuk (1999),持這一觀點的學(xué)者認(rèn)為公司內(nèi)部人士能獲得多少控制權(quán)私人收益取決于投資者法律保護(hù)狀況的好壞,從而有關(guān)投資者保護(hù)的法律間接影響了公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。在實證研究方面,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)通過證明法律制度立法變量與投資者股權(quán)集中程度負(fù)相關(guān),說明了股權(quán)集中度替代作用的存在性。而“結(jié)果模型”則多是通過描述性統(tǒng)計和建立理論模型來進(jìn)行證明,尚未提供足夠多的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)。本文將從替代和結(jié)果兩個角度比較全面地實證分析股權(quán)集中度與法律保護(hù)之間的關(guān)系。 本文主要采用了理論分析與實證分析相結(jié)合的方法來進(jìn)行研究。借鑒法與金融、所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司治理等一系列研究成果(LLSV,1997,1998,1999,2000),并基于雙重代理理論,將股權(quán)集中度、中小投資者法律保護(hù)與控制權(quán)私人收益置于一個研究框架中進(jìn)行分析。 本文共分為五個部分,通過理論和實證研究分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、中小投資者法律保護(hù)與控制權(quán)私人收益三者之間的關(guān)系。具體內(nèi)容如下： 第一章,緒論。介紹本文的選題背景和研究意義,依據(jù)研究思路組織邏輯框架,明確研究方法,并闡述研究的貢獻(xiàn)及存在的不足。 第二章,文獻(xiàn)綜述。本章分三節(jié)梳理國內(nèi)外有關(guān)股權(quán)集中度與投資者法律保護(hù)關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)。第一節(jié)梳理了有關(guān)股權(quán)集中度與投資者法律保護(hù)的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系文獻(xiàn),在本節(jié)又分別從替代關(guān)系角度和結(jié)果關(guān)系角度對文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行分類整理；第二節(jié)涵蓋了除負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系外其他相關(guān)關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)；第三節(jié)介紹二者間無相關(guān)關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)。最后對三方面文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行歸納和總結(jié)。 第三章,制度背景、理論基礎(chǔ)與假設(shè)建立。首先對我國中小投資者法律保護(hù)制度背景進(jìn)行了詳細(xì)的闡述。然后分別從股東同管理層之間的代理問題和大股東同中小股東之間的代理問題進(jìn)行論述,這種雙重代理問題為本文的撰寫提供理論支撐。最后根據(jù)理論基礎(chǔ)提出相關(guān)研究假設(shè)。 第四章,股權(quán)集中度與中小投資者法律保護(hù)的實證分析。介紹實證研究所需樣本來源,解釋變量的定義,并且對回歸模型進(jìn)行構(gòu)建。將兩職合一與管理層占董事會規(guī)模變量作為判斷公司第一種代理問題嚴(yán)重的特征；將兩權(quán)分離度與控制層級作為判斷公司第二種代理問題嚴(yán)重的特征。分別從兩種代理問題角度探究：公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與中小投資者法律保護(hù)立法變量的替代關(guān)系；控制權(quán)私人收益對于股權(quán)集中度的影響。 第五章,研究結(jié)論及建議。根據(jù)假設(shè)及實證結(jié)果,得出本文的研究結(jié)論,分別從加強立法進(jìn)程、提高執(zhí)法效果和完善股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)三方面提出政策建議,并為未來的研究指明方向。 本文主要的研究結(jié)論： (1)在第一類代理問題嚴(yán)重的情況下,股權(quán)集中度對于緩解投資者法律保護(hù)立法不足的問題發(fā)揮了積極作用。在宏觀立法層面,股權(quán)集中度與投資者法律保護(hù)立法變量負(fù)相關(guān),投資者立法保護(hù)的提高會降低公司的股權(quán)集中程度。 (2)在第二類代理問題嚴(yán)重的情況下,股權(quán)集中度不僅作為投資者保護(hù)立法不完善的替代變量,而且在微觀層面上是公司執(zhí)法不利的一種結(jié)果。 基于國內(nèi)外的研究現(xiàn)狀和本文的研究結(jié)果,本文的主要創(chuàng)新點表現(xiàn)如下： (1)本文在中小投資者法律保護(hù)分值體系的基礎(chǔ)上,針對“其它制度與政策”這一大類,補充了兩項與投資者法律保護(hù)相關(guān)的條款——“收購行為管理”與“會員自律”。這兩部法規(guī)與中小投資者權(quán)益保護(hù)緊密相關(guān),完善了我國中小投資者法律保護(hù)體系。并系統(tǒng)地梳理了2003年至2010年我國有關(guān)中小投資者法律保護(hù)的法律法規(guī),在46部相關(guān)法律法規(guī)中,共有91條法律條款新增加到法律分值表中。將中小投資者法律保護(hù)分值期限延長至2010年1月,擴展了法律分值的數(shù)據(jù),這對于研究中小投資者法律保護(hù)具有重要的借鑒意義。 (2)從宏觀立法角度,證明股權(quán)集中度是否能夠替代中小投資者法律保護(hù),主要取決于大股東對經(jīng)理層的監(jiān)督水平是否完善。比較全面地研究了股權(quán)集中度和投資者法律保護(hù)與公司治理的關(guān)系。公司存在嚴(yán)重的第一類代理問題時,如果中小投資者的立法保護(hù)較差,則得出集中的公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)能夠替代較弱的投資者法律保護(hù)的結(jié)論。 (3)從微觀執(zhí)法角度,證實了股權(quán)集中度的產(chǎn)生是由于公司執(zhí)法不利。股權(quán)的集中是投資者法律保護(hù)程度不高的情況下控股股東追求自身利益的結(jié)果。特別是在兩權(quán)分離度高或控制層級較多的公司當(dāng)中,上市公司的治理多體現(xiàn)為第二類代理問題。本文以現(xiàn)金股利分配率作為衡量公司投資者法律保護(hù)執(zhí)行程度高低的變量。通過實證研究得出,投資者保護(hù)程度越低(公司執(zhí)法水平越低),股權(quán)會變得越發(fā)集中。 因個人能力與客觀條件的限制,本文的研究也存在如下的不足： (1)結(jié)果模型中樣本缺失較嚴(yán)重。針對替代模型,篩選出7146個樣本,在該樣本量的基礎(chǔ)上對結(jié)果模型進(jìn)行研究,并相應(yīng)地引入了Sep變量、Number變量和R變量,而這三個變量數(shù)據(jù)的缺失比較嚴(yán)重,導(dǎo)致結(jié)果模型僅篩選出2950個樣本,這樣對于結(jié)果模型所形成的結(jié)論可能會產(chǎn)生一定的影響。 (2)手工收集的法律保護(hù)指數(shù)存在主觀性。中小投資者法律保護(hù)指數(shù)是建立在沈藝峰(2004)法律保護(hù)指數(shù)基礎(chǔ)上,對年限做了進(jìn)一步的擴展,并另外加入了“收購行為管理”和“會員自律”這兩個法律法規(guī)因素,本文對于中小投資者法律法規(guī)的認(rèn)定具有主觀性,存在某些認(rèn)識層面的偏差,可能有未被考慮到的法律法規(guī)條款。 (3)研究樣本考慮不全面。本文雖然對國有上市公司和非國有上市公司有所考慮,但并未對它們再做進(jìn)一步的細(xì)分,對于研究結(jié)果可能會產(chǎn)生一些偏差。例如,完成上市的公司后期也許會被其他公司當(dāng)做殼資源進(jìn)行兼并收購,這些上市公司的內(nèi)部代理問題也許會與其他上市公司的有所不同,本文并未進(jìn)一步考慮這種情況。對于上市后業(yè)績狀況不佳的公司,是否又被其他公司當(dāng)作殼資源進(jìn)行并購重組,未來可以在這方面做進(jìn)一步的研究。
[Abstract]:The development of the capital market is closely related to the degree of the protection of the interests of the investors. With the improvement of the level of the protection of the interests of investors, the capital market is promoting the development of the capital market in a healthy direction. The legal system has become the protection of the investors in the full circulation of the stock rights and the development of the mature securities market in Europe and America. Although the share disposition reform is basically realized in our country, the controlling shareholders, senior managers and institutional investors of listed companies still have very obvious ownership advantage, capital advantage, professional technical advantage and information advantage, which deepens the contradiction of information asymmetry in the capital market. Smaller and more dispersed, it is difficult to participate in the internal governance of the company. When the control rights of the large shareholders of the listed company exceed the cash flow power, their choice is very likely to damage the interests of small and medium investors, and then it will infringe the interests of small and medium investors (Franks, 1997). This kind of infringement will reduce the operating efficiency of the company and will inhibit the company. The entry of potential investors will seriously affect the sustainable development of the capital market. Therefore, in the background of the imperfect related system of China's capital market, improving the legal protection of investors can not only stabilize the capital market of our country, but also guarantee the listed companies to enter the equity financing smoothly.
The ownership structure is an important basis for the effective arrangement of the residual control and residual claim of the company, and it is also the basis of corporate governance. The size of the shares held by the shareholders affects the level of corporate governance to a certain extent. In the case of the decentralized ownership of the company's shares, the contradiction between the management and the shareholders is mainly reflected in the management and the shareholders. Between the controlling shareholders and the small and medium investors, the shareholding ratio of the large shareholders is increasing, which leads to the contradiction between the controlling shareholders and the small and medium investors. The study of relevant scholars, the state of the law on the protection of small and medium investors has a direct impact on the interests of small and medium investors. The more perfect the law is, the greater the protection of small and medium investors (LLSV, 1998). It is visible that the law plays an important role in protecting the interests of small and medium investors. In China, the interests of small and medium investors are in China. The relevant laws of protection are late, and the "company law" implemented in 1994 has formulated specific regulations (such as the right to vote for small and medium shareholders). By January 2010, ninety-four laws and regulations concerning the protection of the interests of small and medium investors have been issued in China, and one hundred and eighty-three. China's protection of small and medium investors is constantly strengthening.
There are two main points of view on the relationship between investor legal protection and ownership concentration. One is the "substitution hypothesis", which is represented by LLSV (1999). "Substitution hypothesis" mainly pays attention to the balance of interests between the company management and the shareholders, but neglects the listed companies in large parts of the country because of the controlling shareholders and the small and medium size. The other is the agency problem caused by the friction between shareholders. The other is the "result model" Bebchuk (1999). The scholars holding this view believe that the private income of the insider is determined by the condition of the investor's legal protection, and the investor protection law indirectly affects the company's ownership structure. In the empirical study, the existing literature shows the negative correlation between the legislative variables of the legal system and the degree of investor ownership concentration, which illustrates the existence of the substitution effect of equity concentration. The result model is mostly proved by descriptive statistics and the establishment of theoretical models, and has not provided enough empirical evidence. The relationship between ownership concentration and legal protection is comprehensively analyzed from two angles.
This paper mainly uses a combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis to study. A series of research results (LLSV, 1997199819992000) are used for reference to law and finance, ownership structure and corporate governance. Based on the dual agent theory, the concentration of equity, the legal protection of small and medium investors and the private benefits of control are put into a study. The analysis is carried out in the framework.
This article is divided into five parts. Through theoretical and empirical research, the paper analyzes the relationship between the ownership structure, the legal protection of small and medium investors and the three private income of the control right.
The first chapter, introduction, introduces the background and significance of the topic, organizes the logical framework according to the research ideas, clear the research methods, and expounds the contribution and the deficiency of the research.
The second chapter, literature review. This chapter is divided into three sections to sort out the literature about the relationship between ownership concentration and the legal protection of investors at home and abroad. The first section combs the literature on the negative correlation between ownership concentration and the legal protection of investors. In this section, the literature is classified from the angle of substitution relationship and the relationship between results; second The section covers the literature of other related relationships except the negative correlation; the third section introduces the literature between the two. Finally, the literature of the three aspects is summarized and summarized.
The third chapter, the institutional background, the theoretical basis and the hypothesis. Firstly, the background of the legal protection system of small and medium investors in China is expounded in detail. Then, the agency problem between the shareholders and the management level and the agency problem between the large shareholders and the small and medium shareholders are discussed respectively. This double agency problem provides the theory for the writing of this article. Finally, based on the theoretical basis, we put forward relevant research hypotheses.
The fourth chapter, the empirical analysis of the ownership concentration and the legal protection of the small and medium investors, introduces the sample source of the empirical research, explains the definition of the variables, and constructs the regression model. It takes the two and the management to judge the serious characteristics of the first agency problem of the company, and the separation and control of the two rights. The hierarchy is a serious feature to judge the second kinds of agency problems of the company. From the angle of two kinds of agency problems, we explore the substitution relationship between the ownership structure of the company and the legislative variables of the small and medium investors' legal protection; the influence of the private income of control right on the ownership concentration.
The fifth chapter, research conclusions and suggestions. According to the hypothesis and the empirical results, we draw the conclusions of this paper, and put forward the policy suggestions from three aspects: strengthening the legislative process, improving the effect of law enforcement and improving the ownership structure, and point out the direction for future research.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
(1) in the case of the serious problem of the first kind of agency problem, the ownership concentration has played an active role in alleviating the shortage of the legal protection legislation of the investor. In the macro legislative level, the ownership concentration is negatively related to the legislative variables of the investor's legal protection, and the improvement of the investor's legislative protection will reduce the concentration degree of the company's equity.
(2) in the case of the second kind of agency problem, the ownership concentration is not only an alternative variable for the imperfect investor protection legislation, but also a result of the disadvantage of the company's law enforcement at the micro level.
Based on the research status at home and abroad and the research results in this paper, the main innovations of this paper are as follows:
(1) on the basis of the distribution system of the legal protection of small and medium investors, this article has supplemented two items related to the legal protection of investors, "management of purchase behavior" and "self-discipline", which are related to the legal protection of investors. These two regulations are closely related to the protection of small and medium investors' rights and interests, and the small and medium investment in China has been perfected. The legal protection system of the investors has been systematically combed and the laws and regulations concerning the legal protection of small and medium investors from 2003 to 2010 are systematically combed. In the 46 relevant laws and regulations, there are 91 legal provisions which have been newly added to the legal score table. The time limit of the legal protection of small and medium investors is extended to January 2010, which extends the data of the value of the law, It has important reference significance for studying the legal protection of small and medium investors.
(2) from the macro legislative point of view, it is proved that whether the ownership concentration can replace the legal protection of the small and medium investors depends mainly on the improvement of the supervision level of the large shareholders to the manager level. The relationship between the ownership concentration and the legal protection of the investors and the corporate governance is more comprehensive. Small investors' legislative protection is poor, and the conclusion is that centralized corporate ownership structure can replace the conclusion of weaker investors' legal protection.
(3) from the micro law enforcement point of view, it is confirmed that the ownership concentration is due to the disadvantage of the company's law enforcement. The concentration of the stock is the result of the controlling shareholders pursuing their own interests under the condition that the investor's legal protection is not high. Especially in the companies with high separation of two rights or more control levels, the governance of the listed companies is embodied in second categories. In this paper, the rate of cash dividend distribution is used as a variable to measure the level of the legal protection of corporate investors. Through empirical study, the lower the degree of investor protection (the lower the level of the law enforcement of the company), the equity will become more concentrated.
Due to the limitations of personal ability and objective conditions, there are also deficiencies in this study.
(1) the loss of sample is serious in the result model. According to the replacement model, 7146 samples are selected and the result model is studied on the basis of the sample size. The Sep variable, Number variable and R variable are introduced accordingly, and the missing data of the three variables are more serious, resulting in the result model only screening out 2950 samples, so the result is the result. The conclusion of the model may have some influence.
(2) the legal protection index of manual collection is subjective. The legal protection index of small and medium investors is based on the Shen Yifeng (2004) legal protection index, and has further expanded the number of years, and also added the two legal and regulatory factors of "purchase behavior management" and "member self-discipline". This article is on the law of small and medium investors. The cognizance of laws and regulations is subjective, and there are some deviations at the level of cognition. There may be provisions of laws and regulations which have not been considered.
(3) the research sample is not fully considered. Although this paper has some consideration on the state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies, it does not further subdivide them and may produce some deviations for the results of the study. For example, the later stage of the listed company may be merged and acquired by other companies as shell resources. The internal agency problem of the company may be different from that of other listed companies. This article does not further consider this situation. Whether companies with poor performance after the market have been reorganized by other companies as shell resources, the future can be further studied in this respect.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D922.287;F832.51;F275

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