本文選題：信用評級 + NRSROs　； 參考：《山東大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版)》2012年06期

【摘要】：從2001年的"安然丑聞"到2007年的金融危機(jī),美國信用評級行業(yè)高度集中的市場結(jié)構(gòu)一直廣受詬病。許多學(xué)者指出,競爭不足是導(dǎo)致信用評級結(jié)果缺乏準(zhǔn)確性和可靠性的主要原因,監(jiān)管者應(yīng)在評級行業(yè)中引入競爭機(jī)制,從而打破行業(yè)壟斷、提高行業(yè)效率。然而,也有部分學(xué)者對此持反對態(tài)度,認(rèn)為"聲譽(yù)機(jī)制"可以替代競爭機(jī)制,對評級機(jī)構(gòu)的違規(guī)行為施加有效的約束,而增強(qiáng)競爭將是弊大于利。為了打破美國信用評級行業(yè)的自由競爭悖論,監(jiān)管者應(yīng)對新加入的評級機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行扶持,進(jìn)一步提高評級行為的透明度,并增強(qiáng)評級機(jī)構(gòu)的法律責(zé)任。
[Abstract]:From the "Enron scandal" in 2001 to the financial crisis in 2007, the highly concentrated market structure of the U.S. credit rating industry has been widely criticized. Many scholars have pointed out that the lack of competition is the main reason for the lack of accuracy and reliability of credit rating results. Regulators should introduce competition mechanism into the rating industry so as to break the industry monopoly and improve industry efficiency. However, some scholars are opposed to this, saying that "reputation mechanism" can replace the competition mechanism, and impose effective restrictions on the irregularities of rating agencies, and enhancing competition will do more harm than good. In order to break the paradox of free competition in the U.S. credit rating industry, regulators should support new rating agencies, further improve the transparency of rating practices, and enhance the legal responsibility of rating agencies.
【作者單位】： 山東大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院;山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)金融學(xué)院;
【分類號】：F837.12

【共引文獻(xiàn)】

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