本文選題：國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行 + 產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)��； 參考：《南開大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：金融體系作為現(xiàn)代市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的核心，其穩(wěn)定與否直接影響著國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)安全和社會(huì)穩(wěn)定，這也是金融安全的真諦所在。鑒于金融體系在國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)安全中的重要性以及金融危機(jī)給世界各國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)所帶來(lái)的嚴(yán)重威脅，中國(guó)政府決定全面推進(jìn)金融體制改革。而國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行作為我國(guó)金融體系的最重要組成部分，無(wú)疑成為金融體制改革中的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)。四大國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行自成立以來(lái)，在促進(jìn)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展、保持宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定以及維護(hù)社會(huì)穩(wěn)定等方面都作出了巨大貢獻(xiàn)。但由于歷史及現(xiàn)實(shí)的原因，四大國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行在產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)等方面仍存在一些問(wèn)題，如果它們不進(jìn)行結(jié)構(gòu)和機(jī)制創(chuàng)新，將影響金融體系的安全與穩(wěn)定，進(jìn)而對(duì)國(guó)家金融安全和經(jīng)濟(jì)安全產(chǎn)生威脅。因此，有必要深入探究國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)和治理結(jié)構(gòu)中存在的問(wèn)題，進(jìn)行產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)創(chuàng)新，從根本上促進(jìn)四大國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行穩(wěn)健經(jīng)營(yíng)和可持續(xù)發(fā)展，維護(hù)國(guó)家金融穩(wěn)定和經(jīng)濟(jì)安全。 論文以國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)改革遺留和產(chǎn)生的問(wèn)題為切入點(diǎn)，以馬克思主義經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的基本原理為指導(dǎo)，在批判、借鑒西方產(chǎn)權(quán)與公司治理理論的基礎(chǔ)上，研究了國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中的國(guó)有股與非國(guó)有股、國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行的內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)的綜合績(jī)效評(píng)估標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，分析了產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)存問(wèn)題的成因，提出了解決這些問(wèn)題的思路和舉措。在研究過(guò)程中，論文綜合運(yùn)用了馬克思主義歷史與邏輯相統(tǒng)一的方法、規(guī)范分析與實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合法、歸納分析法、文獻(xiàn)研究法等多種研究方法，遵循“提出問(wèn)題--分析問(wèn)題--解決問(wèn)題”的研究思路，主要取得了以下研究成果： 論文以國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)多元化改革為研究對(duì)象，指出由生產(chǎn)力與生產(chǎn)關(guān)系矛盾運(yùn)動(dòng)規(guī)律所決定，，國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)多元化改革必須保證國(guó)家絕對(duì)控股，股權(quán)多元化改革的關(guān)鍵不是國(guó)家應(yīng)不應(yīng)放棄絕對(duì)控股地位，而是如何確定國(guó)家絕對(duì)控股前提下的國(guó)有股最佳控股方式和比重，通過(guò)這種方式和比重既能保證國(guó)家控制金融命脈，又能充分調(diào)動(dòng)非國(guó)有股東的積極性，以最大限度地發(fā)揮國(guó)有股東與非國(guó)有股東的協(xié)同效應(yīng)。針對(duì)這一問(wèn)題，筆者在比較分析四種國(guó)有股產(chǎn)權(quán)持有主體設(shè)計(jì)方案的基礎(chǔ)上，提出了以下觀點(diǎn)：應(yīng)組建專門的國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行國(guó)有資本運(yùn)營(yíng)公司來(lái)代表國(guó)家行使絕對(duì)控股權(quán)（賦予其管資本權(quán)、管人權(quán)、管事權(quán)，落實(shí)國(guó)有股東權(quán)利），并采用“財(cái)政部--國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行國(guó)有資本運(yùn)營(yíng)公司--國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行”的三層管理模式來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)政企分開、政資分開、所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)分開；提出國(guó)有股比重應(yīng)不低于51%，以最大程度的發(fā)揮其控制力和影響力。 論文以國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行引進(jìn)非國(guó)有股所產(chǎn)生的問(wèn)題為研究對(duì)象，指出國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行引進(jìn)非國(guó)有股有其客觀必要性，通過(guò)引進(jìn)非國(guó)有股可以堅(jiān)持和完善我國(guó)基本經(jīng)濟(jì)制度、充實(shí)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行的資本充足率、提升國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行的綜合創(chuàng)新能力和國(guó)際化水平、促進(jìn)我國(guó)金融業(yè)監(jiān)管水平的提高，但引進(jìn)非國(guó)有股所產(chǎn)生的金融安全問(wèn)題和戰(zhàn)略投資者蛻變?yōu)樨?cái)務(wù)投資者問(wèn)題也不容忽視。引進(jìn)非國(guó)有股所產(chǎn)生問(wèn)題的根本原因在于私有資本的逐利本性，主要原因在于引資對(duì)象的偏失，因而解決問(wèn)題的關(guān)鍵在于引進(jìn)合格的非國(guó)有股東，并施以有效管控。針對(duì)這一問(wèn)題，筆者在對(duì)中國(guó)銀行的戰(zhàn)略引資行為進(jìn)行案例分析和反思的基礎(chǔ)上，明確了非國(guó)有股東的引進(jìn)類型、選擇標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以及引進(jìn)方式，提出了引進(jìn)非國(guó)有股的配套措施。 論文以國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部治理存在的問(wèn)題為研究對(duì)象，指出國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司治理現(xiàn)存問(wèn)題是公司治理機(jī)制不完善導(dǎo)致的，因而解決問(wèn)題的關(guān)鍵在于構(gòu)建出科學(xué)高效的決策機(jī)制、公平合理的激勵(lì)機(jī)制、強(qiáng)有力的監(jiān)督機(jī)制。針對(duì)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司治理的現(xiàn)存問(wèn)題，論文提出了以下解決思路和措施：第一，設(shè)計(jì)了以類別表決制與民主集中制相結(jié)合為主的國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行決策機(jī)制，該機(jī)制采取累積投票制來(lái)選舉國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行決策主體，以保證非控股股東獲得一定比例的決策層席位，使其有機(jī)會(huì)和途徑表達(dá)他們的利益訴求，對(duì)于特定情形下國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行日常經(jīng)營(yíng)性決策采用類別表決法和“董事會(huì)--決策監(jiān)督委員會(huì)--監(jiān)事會(huì)”三級(jí)決議異議處理方法，以提高國(guó)有商銀行決策的科學(xué)性和決策效率。第二，設(shè)計(jì)了以差異化薪酬為核心的國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制，該機(jī)制以公平與效率相結(jié)合原則為指導(dǎo)，在對(duì)銀行高管進(jìn)行分類的基礎(chǔ)上，構(gòu)建了國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行激勵(lì)考核標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和薪酬激勵(lì)手段，以提高激勵(lì)機(jī)制的公平合理性。第三，設(shè)計(jì)了以監(jiān)事會(huì)為核心的國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行監(jiān)控機(jī)制，該機(jī)制在重新界定內(nèi)部治理權(quán)利結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)上，構(gòu)建了以監(jiān)事會(huì)為核心的監(jiān)控機(jī)制，以保障所有者所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)相統(tǒng)一，進(jìn)而防范和解決內(nèi)部人控制問(wèn)題。 論文以國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)績(jī)效評(píng)估標(biāo)準(zhǔn)為研究對(duì)象，指出現(xiàn)有的商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)績(jī)效評(píng)估標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不能客觀的反映國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)的績(jī)效水平，因而有必要設(shè)計(jì)一套涵蓋宏觀績(jī)效、中觀績(jī)效和微觀績(jī)效三個(gè)層次的綜合績(jī)效評(píng)估體系。針對(duì)這一問(wèn)題，筆者在吸收、借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外主要商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)績(jī)效評(píng)估體系的基礎(chǔ)上，設(shè)計(jì)了國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)綜合績(jī)效評(píng)估標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，該標(biāo)準(zhǔn)突出了宏觀績(jī)效考核和中觀績(jī)效考核，以全面的反映國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行產(chǎn)權(quán)與治理結(jié)構(gòu)的真實(shí)績(jī)效水平。
[Abstract]:As the core of the modern market economy, the financial system has a direct impact on the economic security and social stability of the country. This is the true meaning of the financial security. In view of the importance of the financial system in the national economic security and the serious threat to the economies of the world, the Chinese government has decided to promote it in an all-round way. As the most important part of our financial system, the state-owned commercial banks have undoubtedly become the key link in the reform of the financial system. Since the establishment of the four state-owned commercial banks, they have made great contributions to promoting the development of the national economy, maintaining the stability of the macro-economy and maintaining the stability of the society. The four major state-owned commercial banks still have some problems in property rights and governance structure. If they do not carry out the structure and mechanism innovation, they will affect the security and stability of the financial system, and then threaten the national financial security and economic security. The problems existing in the governance structure and the innovation of property rights and governance structure will fundamentally promote the steady operation and sustainable development of the four state-owned commercial banks, and maintain the national financial stability and economic security.
On the basis of the theory of western property rights and corporate governance, the thesis takes the basic principles of Marx's economics as the guide, and studies the internal and non-state-owned shares of state-owned commercial banks, and the internal commercial banks in the property rights structure of state-owned commercial banks. The comprehensive performance evaluation standard of the Ministry governing structure and the property right and the governance structure, analyses the causes of the existing problems of the property right and the governance structure, and puts forward the ideas and measures to solve these problems. In the course of the study, the paper uses the method of unification of Marx's history and logic, the normative analysis and the empirical research. Many research methods, such as inductive analysis, literature research and so on, follow the research ideas of "putting forward questions - analyzing problems - solving problems", and the following research results are obtained.
The paper takes the reform of the ownership diversification of the state-owned commercial banks as the research object, and points out that the ownership diversification reform of the state-owned commercial banks must guarantee the absolute holding of the state. The key to the reform of the ownership diversification is not that the country should not abandon the absolute holding position, but how to determine the state's overwhelming majority. The best way and proportion of the state-owned shares under the precondition of holding can not only guarantee the state to control the financial lifeline, but also fully mobilize the enthusiasm of the non state-owned shareholders, so as to maximize the synergy between the state-owned and non-state shareholders. In this case, the author compares and analyzes four kinds of property rights of state-owned shares. On the basis of holding the main design scheme, the following views are put forward: a special state-owned commercial bank state capital operation company should be set up to represent the state to exercise the absolute controlling power (giving it the right to manage capital, managing human rights, managing the right to carry out the rights of the state-owned shareholders), and adopting the "Ministry of Finance - state owned commercial bank state capital operation company - state - state - state" The three layer management mode of commercial banks can separate the government from the enterprises, separate the government and capital, and separate the ownership from the management. The proportion of the state-owned shares should not be less than 51%, so as to exert its control and influence to the greatest extent.
The paper takes the problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares by state-owned commercial banks, and points out that the introduction of non-state owned shares by state-owned commercial banks has its objective necessity. Through the introduction of non-state-owned shares, the basic economic system can be adhered to and perfected in China, the rate of capital filling of state-owned commercial banks can be enriched and the comprehensive innovation of state-owned commercial banks can be promoted. The level of force and internationalization promotes the improvement of the level of financial supervision in China. However, the financial security problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares and the transformation of strategic investors into financial investors can not be ignored. The fundamental reason for the problems arising from the introduction of non state owned shares lies in the nature of profit seeking of private capital, mainly due to the bias of the target. The key to solve the problem lies in the introduction of qualified non state shareholders and effective control. On this issue, on the basis of the case analysis and Reflection on the strategic investment behavior of the Bank of China, the author clarifies the types of non state shareholders, the selection criteria and the way of introduction, and puts forward the introduction of non state owned shares. Set measures.
The paper takes the problems existing in the internal governance of the state-owned commercial banks as the research object, points out that the existing problems of the corporate governance of the state-owned commercial banks are caused by the imperfect corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the key to solving the problem lies in the construction of a scientific and efficient decision-making mechanism, a fair and reasonable incentive mechanism and a strong supervision mechanism. The following solutions and measures are put forward in the paper. First, the decision mechanism of the state-owned commercial banks is designed by the combination of category voting system and democratic centralism. The mechanism adopts the cumulative voting system to elect the decision-makers of the state-owned commercial banks, so as to ensure a certain proportion of the non controlling shareholders. The policy layer seats make them have the opportunity and way to express their interest demands, and adopt the class voting method and the "board of directors - the supervisory committee - the board of supervisors" three resolution dissenting methods for the daily operational decision of the state-owned commercial banks to improve the scientific and decision-making efficiency of the state-owned commercial banks' decision. Second, Taking the differential compensation as the core, the incentive mechanism of executive compensation of the state-owned commercial banks is taken as the core. The mechanism is guided by the principle of combining fairness and efficiency. On the basis of the classification of the bank executives, the incentive assessment standard and salary incentive means are constructed to raise the fairness and rationality of the high incentive mechanism. Third, the design is designed. The supervisory mechanism of the state-owned commercial banks, which is the core of the board of supervisors, is based on the redefinition of the structure of the internal governance rights. The monitoring mechanism is built on the core of the board of supervisors to ensure the unity of ownership and control, and then to prevent and solve the problem of insider control.
This paper studies the performance evaluation standards of property rights and governance structures of state-owned commercial banks, and points out that the existing performance evaluation standards of commercial banks' property rights and governance structures can not objectively reflect the performance level of property rights and governance structures of state-owned commercial banks. Therefore, it is necessary to design a set of macro performance, medium performance and micro performance. On the basis of absorbing, drawing on the performance evaluation system of property rights and governance structure of major commercial banks both at home and abroad, the author designs a comprehensive performance evaluation standard for property rights and governance structure of state-owned commercial banks. The standard shows the macro performance assessment and the medium performance assessment, which is based on the overall performance evaluation system. It reflects the real performance level of state-owned commercial banks' property rights and governance structure.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F271

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 于曉東;;國(guó)有銀行引進(jìn)外國(guó)戰(zhàn)略投資者成效分析[J];財(cái)經(jīng)科學(xué);2011年10期

2 于然;;新時(shí)期下我國(guó)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行的治理結(jié)構(gòu)[J];當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟(jì);2009年10期

3 周怡丹;蘇暢;;關(guān)于國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行引進(jìn)戰(zhàn)略投資者的思考[J];改革與開放;2009年10期

4 楊曉麗;;基于公司治理理論的國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行治理風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分析[J];管理現(xiàn)代化;2012年02期

5 張浩;張鵬;;我國(guó)國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)問(wèn)題研究[J];區(qū)域金融研究;2009年05期

6 常玉春;徐松之;;利用金股模式推進(jìn)公共事業(yè)改革[J];上海國(guó)資;2008年11期

7 李鑫;;國(guó)有商業(yè)銀行超越產(chǎn)權(quán)范疇的公司治理思路探析[J];河南師范大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)版);2009年01期

8 項(xiàng)衛(wèi)星;李s

本文編號(hào)：1982202