本文選題：影子銀行業(yè)務(wù) + 商業(yè)銀行��； 參考：《中國海洋大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：自2008年美國次貸危機(jī)以來，影子銀行的風(fēng)險及監(jiān)管問題已經(jīng)引起了全世界的關(guān)注。我國的商業(yè)銀行出于自身經(jīng)營發(fā)展的考慮，也推出了大量的高于商業(yè)銀行傳統(tǒng)存款業(yè)務(wù)投資回報率的影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)，并且在短時期內(nèi)得到迅速擴(kuò)張。這些影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)通過商業(yè)銀行信用中介作用的發(fā)揮，為融資活動提供了杠桿與期限轉(zhuǎn)換的可能，將傳統(tǒng)的銀行表內(nèi)資產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)移到表外，規(guī)避監(jiān)管，積累了大量的金融風(fēng)險，也給整個金融系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定帶來了重大影響，需要對其加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管。而商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)作為一種金融創(chuàng)新，反映了客觀上存在的供給和需求，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)該正視商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展的合理性，對于其發(fā)展程度以及是否脫離了實體經(jīng)濟(jì)也應(yīng)該有準(zhǔn)確的認(rèn)識，通過審慎監(jiān)管和鼓勵創(chuàng)新來引導(dǎo)其健康發(fā)展。 本文以商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的監(jiān)管過程為研究對象，首先闡述了此項業(yè)務(wù)的涵義及特點，并分別對銀信合作、理財產(chǎn)品等各類商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的表現(xiàn)形式進(jìn)行了分析，結(jié)合我國商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的監(jiān)管現(xiàn)狀，探討其存在的問題。然后根據(jù)上述問題以及國外有關(guān)影子銀行的監(jiān)管理論和監(jiān)管模式，運(yùn)用演化博弈論建立了基于影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)創(chuàng)新行為的商業(yè)銀行與監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間的演化博弈模型進(jìn)行監(jiān)管均衡分析。根據(jù)均衡結(jié)果，為了進(jìn)一步提高監(jiān)管效率，利用委托代理理論設(shè)計了政府對于商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管人員的激勵約束機(jī)制，使其努力工作、認(rèn)真監(jiān)管。最后，通過構(gòu)建基于預(yù)先承諾制的商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)審慎監(jiān)管機(jī)制來加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)經(jīng)營者的激勵，使其監(jiān)管行為符合商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)營目標(biāo)，促進(jìn)商業(yè)銀行更好地服從監(jiān)管。通過研究，獲得了以下的研究成果和研究結(jié)論： 首先，根據(jù)商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的特點建立了基于業(yè)務(wù)創(chuàng)新行為的商業(yè)銀行與監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間的演化博弈模型。對于商業(yè)銀行而言，如果遵守市場及法律規(guī)范獲得的正面的聲譽(yù)收益越大，而為了防范影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)生風(fēng)險而產(chǎn)生的成本C1越小，并且由于被檢查出對影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)進(jìn)行違規(guī)創(chuàng)新而受到監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的懲罰F越大，那么商業(yè)銀行就會傾向于對影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)進(jìn)行合規(guī)創(chuàng)新，從而促進(jìn)商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的健康發(fā)展；而對于監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)而言，，如果其對商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)創(chuàng)新行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)管的成本C2越小，而監(jiān)管后獲得的隱性收益M越大，并且當(dāng)商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)生安全問題時，上級政府部門對監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的懲罰D越大，那么監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)就會傾向于對商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)認(rèn)真監(jiān)管，從而有效地防范商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的風(fēng)險。 其次，建立了政府部門對商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管人員的激勵模型。在對稱信息條件下，商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管人員不承擔(dān)任何風(fēng)險，并且其收入恰好等于監(jiān)管人員的保留收入與努力成本之和；在非對稱信息條件下，商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管人員需要承擔(dān)一定的風(fēng)險，其努力程度和固定工資與對稱信息條件下的情況相比都有所下降；政府部門的期望收益也出現(xiàn)了下降。因此需要設(shè)計相應(yīng)的激勵方案督促商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管人員選擇最優(yōu)的努力程度，并建議將問責(zé)制納入到商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管考核中來。 再次，在非對稱信息條件下，政府部門和商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管人員的收益與影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管人員自身的綜合素質(zhì)水平以及系統(tǒng)的總風(fēng)險相關(guān)，同時也影響著雙方的理性行為與決策。一個具有高素質(zhì)水平的商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)監(jiān)管人員不僅能提高政府部門的期望收益，還能增加自己的收入，進(jìn)而實現(xiàn)政府的監(jiān)管目標(biāo)，努力查處商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)違規(guī)創(chuàng)新行為。因此，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)應(yīng)著力提高監(jiān)管人員的綜合素質(zhì)水平，以應(yīng)對不斷發(fā)展變化的商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)。 最后，將我國的商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)納入到審慎監(jiān)管的框架中來，構(gòu)建了監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)審慎監(jiān)管過程的一般模型以及基于預(yù)先承諾制的商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)審慎監(jiān)管模型。商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的審慎監(jiān)管機(jī)制應(yīng)該是在尊重商業(yè)銀行的經(jīng)營自主權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)上建立起來的，避免對商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的經(jīng)營活動進(jìn)行過多的干預(yù)和管制，在業(yè)務(wù)創(chuàng)新與定價等方面也應(yīng)給予足夠的自由權(quán)，在機(jī)制設(shè)計中體現(xiàn)出激勵相容的原則；另外，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)還要對商業(yè)銀行影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的最低審慎經(jīng)營標(biāo)準(zhǔn)作出規(guī)定，確保商業(yè)銀行在影子銀行業(yè)務(wù)的日常經(jīng)營過程中自覺地進(jìn)行審慎操作。
[Abstract]:Since the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis in the United States, the risk and supervision of the shadow banks have attracted the attention of the whole world. Some shadow banking services, through the role of commercial banks' credit intermediation, provide the possibility of leverage and time limit for financing activities, transfer the assets of traditional bank statements to the outside of the table, avoid supervision, accumulate a lot of financial risks, and have a great impact on the stability of the whole financial system, and need to strengthen the supervision. As a kind of financial innovation, the shadow banking business of the industry bank reflects the objective supply and demand. The regulatory agency should face the rationality of the development of the shadow banking business of commercial banks. It should also have an accurate understanding of its development and whether it is divorced from the real economy, and guide its health through prudent supervision and encouragement of innovation. The development of Kang.
This paper, taking the supervision process of the shadow banking business of commercial banks as the research object, first expounds the meaning and characteristics of the business, and analyzes the manifestations of the shadow banking business of all kinds of commercial banks, such as silver letter cooperation and financial products, and discusses the existing situation of the shadow banking business in China's commercial banks. Then, based on the above problems and the supervision theory and supervision model of the shadow banking abroad, the evolutionary game theory is used to establish an evolutionary game model between the commercial banks and the regulators based on the creative behavior of the shadow banking business. The principal-agent theory designed the incentive and constraint mechanism of the government to the shadow banking regulator of commercial banks, and make it work hard and supervise it carefully. Finally, through the construction of the prudent supervision mechanism of the shadow banking business of commercial banks based on the pre commitment system, the incentive of the regulatory agencies to the shadow banking operators of commercial banks is strengthened. The following research results and conclusions are obtained by making the supervision behavior conform to the business target of the commercial bank's shadow banking business and promote the commercial banks to obey the supervision better.
First, according to the characteristics of the commercial banks' shadow banking business, the evolutionary game model between commercial banks and regulators based on business innovation behavior is established. For commercial banks, the greater the positive reputation gains that are obtained by compliance with the market and the legal norms, and to prevent the risk of the shadow banking business from happening. The smaller the C1, and the greater the regulatory penalty for the supervision of the shadow banking business, the greater the F, the commercial banks will be inclined to innovate the shadow banking business to promote the healthy development of the commercial banks' shadow banking business; for regulators, if they are to commercial banks The smaller the cost of the supervision of the shadow banking innovation behavior is, the smaller the C2 is, the greater the hidden income M is obtained after the supervision. And when the shadow banking business of the commercial bank has a security problem, the greater the penalty D of the higher government department is to the regulatory agency, the regulatory agency will be inclined to supervise the shadow banking business of commercial banks. Effectively prevent the risk of shadow banking of commercial banks.
Secondly, the incentive model for the shadow banking regulator of commercial banks is established by the government departments. Under symmetric information, the shadow banking supervisors of commercial banks do not take any risks, and their income is just equal to the sum of the supervisor's retained earnings and the effort cost. Sub banking regulators need to undertake certain risks, and their efforts and fixed wages have decreased compared with the conditions under symmetric information; the expected earnings of the government departments have also declined. Therefore, a corresponding incentive scheme is needed to supervise the best endeavor of the shadow banking regulators in commercial banks. It also suggests that the accountability system should be incorporated into the supervision and assessment of shadow banking in commercial banks.
Thirdly, under the asymmetric information conditions, the revenue of the shadow banking regulators of the government departments and commercial banks is related to the overall quality of the shadow banking regulator and the overall risk of the system. It also affects the rational behavior and decision-making of the two sides. A commercial bank with high quality is the shadow banking industry. The supervisory staff can not only improve the expected income of the government departments, but also increase their income, and then realize the government's regulatory objectives, and try to investigate and deal with the illegal and innovative behavior of the commercial banks' shadow banking business. Therefore, the regulators should make efforts to improve the comprehensive quality of the supervisors to cope with the shadow of the changing commercial banks. Banking business.
Finally, the shadow banking business of commercial banks in China is brought into the framework of prudential supervision, the general model of the prudential supervision process of the shadow banking business of commercial banks and the prudent supervision model of the shadow banking business of commercial banks based on the pre commitment system are constructed. The prudential supervision and supervision of the shadow banking business of commercial banks The mechanism should be established on the basis of respect for the management autonomy of commercial banks, avoid excessive interference and control on the business activities of the commercial banks' shadow banking business, and should give sufficient freedom in business innovation and pricing, and embody the principle of incentive compatibility in the design of the mechanism; in addition, the regulatory machine It also stipulates the minimum Prudential management standards for the shadow banking business of commercial banks to ensure that commercial banks operate conscientiously in the day-to-day operation of the shadow banking business.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.1;F832.39

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