本文選題：特許權(quán)價值 + 風(fēng)險行為�。� 參考：《南京大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：特許權(quán)價值是銀行利用各種特許經(jīng)營優(yōu)勢獲得的超額收益的現(xiàn)值總和,這些優(yōu)勢具體包括銀行在這個市場的各種特有優(yōu)勢,但銀行本身的經(jīng)營效率也能夠放大銀行的特許權(quán)價值。根據(jù)傳統(tǒng)理論,特許權(quán)價值對銀行的風(fēng)險行為具有約束作用,因為當(dāng)銀行過度冒險經(jīng)營導(dǎo)致破產(chǎn)時,“特許權(quán)”這一部分銀行價值會隨之喪失,因此銀行會自發(fā)性地規(guī)避風(fēng)險行為。國內(nèi)外的許多學(xué)者進(jìn)一步提出證明：特許權(quán)價值高的銀行相比特許權(quán)價值低的銀行更有謹(jǐn)慎經(jīng)營的動機,因此應(yīng)該鼓勵銀行增加自身的特許權(quán)價值,利用特許權(quán)價值的自律效用抑制銀行的冒險動機。但是美國金融危機的爆發(fā)卻暴露了特許權(quán)價值“自律效用”理論的漏洞,美國市場上那些特許權(quán)價極高的超級銀行,并沒有比特許權(quán)價值低的小銀行選擇更為穩(wěn)健的經(jīng)營路線,事實上這些銀行過分涉入高風(fēng)險業(yè)務(wù)最終禍至整個銀行體系的崩潰。美國銀行業(yè)的教訓(xùn)為我國商業(yè)銀行敲響了警鐘,本文旨在通過系統(tǒng)梳理特許權(quán)價值的理論來探尋特許權(quán)價值的合理量化方式,并結(jié)合現(xiàn)實尋求新時期下影響銀行風(fēng)險行為的因素以修正風(fēng)險計量模型,得到后危機時代我國商業(yè)銀行特許權(quán)價值和風(fēng)險行為之間的關(guān)系。經(jīng)過分析,本文最終以托賓Q值計量銀行的特許權(quán)價值,綜合考慮隱性保險、行業(yè)競爭、產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新和混業(yè)經(jīng)營等四個方面的影響因素,構(gòu)建了面板數(shù)據(jù)計量模型,以我國16家上市銀行為研究對象,選取2007年第四季度至2013年第三季度(共計24個季度)為樣本區(qū)間,得出以下結(jié)論：首先,我國商業(yè)銀行的特許權(quán)價值和風(fēng)險水平正向相關(guān),特許權(quán)價值的風(fēng)險約束作用在我國同樣失效；其次,隱性保險、行業(yè)競爭增加了我國銀行的冒險動機,而產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新使銀行的收入趨于多元化,有助于降低風(fēng)險；最后,混業(yè)經(jīng)營對我國銀行的風(fēng)險行為具有不同的影響,其中銀保合作、銀基合作有利于銀行降低風(fēng)險,而銀信合作則會提升銀行承擔(dān)風(fēng)險的水平。基于研究結(jié)論,本文提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議：第一,規(guī)范股份制商業(yè)銀行的經(jīng)營方式,強調(diào)銀行對實體經(jīng)濟(jì)的服務(wù)力度；第二,遏制銀行市場的惡性競爭行為,提倡銀行培養(yǎng)自身的核心競爭力；第三,.鼓勵銀行在范圍內(nèi)適度開展創(chuàng)新活動,尤其是風(fēng)險管理方面的金融創(chuàng)新；第四,鞏固發(fā)展傳統(tǒng)混業(yè)經(jīng)營模式,重點關(guān)注新型混業(yè)經(jīng)營模式。
[Abstract]:The value of the concession is the sum of the present value of the excess income obtained by the banks using various franchise advantages, which include specific advantages of the bank in this market. But the efficiency of the bank itself can also amplify the franchise value of the bank. According to the traditional theory, the concession value has a binding effect on the bank's risk behavior, because when the bank takes too much risk, the "concession" part of the bank value will be lost. Therefore, banks will spontaneously avoid risk behavior. Many scholars at home and abroad have further proved that banks with high franchise value have more incentive to operate cautiously than those with lower franchise value, so banks should be encouraged to increase their franchise value. The use of the self-regulatory utility of the franchise value inhibits the banks' incentive to take risks. However, the outbreak of the financial crisis in the United States has exposed a loophole in the theory of the "self-regulatory utility" of franchise value. In fact, these banks were too involved in risky business and eventually the collapse of the entire banking system. The lessons of American banking have sounded the alarm for Chinese commercial banks. This paper aims to explore the reasonable quantification way of franchise value by systematically combing the theory of franchise value. Combining with the reality, we seek the factors that affect the risk behavior of the banks in the new period to modify the risk measurement model, and get the relationship between the concession value and the risk behavior of the commercial banks in the post-crisis era. Through the analysis, this paper uses Tobin Q value to measure the concession value of the bank, synthetically considers the four influencing factors of hidden insurance, industry competition, product innovation and mixed operation, and constructs the panel data measurement model. Taking 16 listed banks in China as the research object, this paper selects the fourth quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2013 (24 quarters in total) as the sample interval, and draws the following conclusions: first, the concession value and risk level of commercial banks in China are positively correlated. The risk constraint of franchise value is also ineffective in China. Secondly, implicit insurance and industry competition increase the risk-taking motivation of Chinese banks, while product innovation makes banks' income more diversified, which helps to reduce the risk. Mixed operation has different influence on the risk behavior of Chinese banks, in which the cooperation of bank and insurance, the cooperation of bank and the cooperation of bank base will help the banks to reduce the risk, while the cooperation of bank and credit will enhance the level of the banks to bear the risk. Based on the conclusions of the study, this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations: first, standardizing the management mode of joint-stock commercial banks, emphasizing the service strength of banks to the real economy; second, curbing the vicious competition behavior in the banking market. Promote banks to cultivate their core competitiveness; third. Banks should be encouraged to carry out innovative activities within the scope, especially financial innovation in risk management. Fourth, consolidate and develop the traditional mixed operation mode, focusing on the new mixed business model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.33

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