銀企關系、銀行負債融資對國有企業(yè)過度投資的影響研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-04-20 19:33
本文選題:銀企關系 + 銀行負債融資 ; 參考:《重慶理工大學》2014年碩士論文
【摘要】:“十二五”以來,國家不斷推動加快轉變經濟發(fā)展方式,以保持經濟長期平穩(wěn)發(fā)展,提高社會資源的有效配置。這對于推進我國經濟和諧穩(wěn)定發(fā)展具有重要意義。國有企業(yè)是推進國家現(xiàn)代化、保障人民共同利益的重要推動力。十八屆三中全會提到要進一步深化國有企業(yè)改革,國有企業(yè)必須適應市場化、國際化新形勢,對優(yōu)化社會資源配置起到帶頭推動作用,以促進國民經濟長期可持續(xù)發(fā)展。目前我國證券市場的再融資功能因受到某些宏微觀因素的限制,債務融資成為了上市公司主要的融資渠道,其中銀行借款是上市公司債務融資的主要組成部分。在我國銀行業(yè)長期處于被五大國有銀行壟斷的背景下,信貸資金分配受到了較大的政策影響。隨著國內金融市場開放的步伐加快,對銀行業(yè)的深化改革越來越急迫。銀行要能夠適應信貸市場的發(fā)展,加強自身的風險控制水平,提高信貸資金的使用效率,只有這樣才能在開放的金融市場中具備核心競爭力,不被市場所淘汰。因此,研究我國銀企關系、銀行負債融資對企業(yè)過度投資影響對于銀行及企業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展都具有重大意義。 本文從銀企關系與銀行負債融資入手,選取具有企業(yè)關系的國有上市公司為樣本,再按比例選取配對樣本。以上述樣本企業(yè)2010-2012年數據作為研究樣本回歸分析檢驗了銀企關系、銀行負債融資與國有企業(yè)過度投資的相關性。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),國有企業(yè)中普遍存在非投資效率的問題,國有企業(yè)過度投資問題大量存在,個別國有企業(yè)的過度投資程度非常嚴重;銀行負債融資對國有企業(yè)過度投資具有顯著的正影響,,即銀行借款會加劇國有企業(yè)過度投資;銀企關系的存在對國有企業(yè)過度投資具有顯著的正影響,緊密型銀企關系會導致更大程度的過度投資;具有銀企關系的國有企業(yè)其負債融資對企業(yè)過度投資程度的正影響大于無銀企關系的國有企業(yè),即銀企關系會加劇國有企業(yè)中銀行借款的過度投資程度。因此,需要從銀行和企業(yè)兩個方向來提高投資效率,銀行方面需要加強貸前審批、貸中監(jiān)控與貸后問責等來強化管理,企業(yè)方面則需要從提高信息披露、加強公司治理、優(yōu)化股權結構及擴大融資渠道等來強化管理。
[Abstract]:Since the 12th Five-Year Plan, the state has been pushing to speed up the transformation of the mode of economic development in order to maintain the long-term and stable development of the economy and to improve the effective allocation of social resources. This is of great significance for promoting the harmonious and stable development of our economy. State-owned enterprises are an important driving force for promoting national modernization and safeguarding the common interests of the people. The third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee mentioned that in order to further deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises must adapt to the new situation of marketization and internationalization, and play a leading role in optimizing the allocation of social resources in order to promote the long-term sustainable development of the national economy. At present, the refinancing function of China's securities market is limited by some macro and micro factors, debt financing has become the main financing channel of listed companies, among which bank borrowing is the main component of debt financing of listed companies. Under the background of being monopolized by the five state-owned banks for a long time, the distribution of credit funds has been greatly influenced by the policy. With the rapid opening of domestic financial markets, the deepening reform of the banking industry is becoming more and more urgent. Banks should be able to adapt to the development of credit market, strengthen their own risk control level, and improve the efficiency of the use of credit funds. Only in this way can they have the core competitiveness in the open financial market and not be eliminated by the market. Therefore, it is of great significance for banks and enterprises to study the relationship between banks and enterprises, and the impact of bank debt financing on the overinvestment of enterprises. Starting with the relationship between banks and enterprises and bank debt financing, this paper selects state-owned listed companies with enterprise relations as samples, and then selects paired samples in proportion. Based on the sample data of 2010-2012, the relationship between banks and enterprises, the relationship between bank debt financing and overinvestment of state-owned enterprises is tested by regression analysis. It is found that the problem of non-investment efficiency exists generally in state-owned enterprises, the excessive investment problem of state-owned enterprises exists in a large number, and the degree of over-investment of individual state-owned enterprises is very serious. Bank debt financing has a significant positive impact on the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises, that is, bank borrowing will aggravate the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises, and the existence of the relationship between banks and enterprises has a significant positive impact on the over-investment of state-owned enterprises. The close-knit relationship between banks and enterprises leads to a greater degree of overinvestment; the debt financing of state-owned enterprises with a relationship between banks and enterprises has a more positive impact on the degree of overinvestment of enterprises than state-owned enterprises with no relationship between banks and enterprises. That is, the relationship between banks and enterprises will aggravate the degree of overinvestment of bank loans in state-owned enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the investment efficiency in both the direction of banks and enterprises, the banks need to strengthen the examination and approval before loans, the supervision in loans and accountability after loans to strengthen management, while enterprises need to enhance information disclosure and corporate governance. Optimize equity structure and expand financing channels to strengthen management.
【學位授予單位】:重慶理工大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F276.1;F832.4;F275
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