本文選題：協(xié)同創(chuàng)新 + 激勵機制�。� 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：協(xié)同創(chuàng)新因能給企業(yè)帶來有效利用外部優(yōu)勢創(chuàng)新資源、分擔(dān)成本和風(fēng)險、形成協(xié)同優(yōu)勢等諸多好處，成為了企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的重要方式。同時，協(xié)同創(chuàng)新也得到政府的大力支持。2013年11月黨的十八屆三中全會指出，要建立“產(chǎn)學(xué)研用”協(xié)同創(chuàng)新機制，促進(jìn)企業(yè)成為創(chuàng)新主體。 但是由于資金缺乏、逆向選擇、利益分配不合理和道德風(fēng)險等原因，協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的成功率一直不高。對于資金缺乏問題，我國政府以往一般采取直接財政資助模式對協(xié)同創(chuàng)新活動進(jìn)行支持。然而，在該模式下，由于信息不對稱和專業(yè)知識的缺乏，政府很難準(zhǔn)確選出資助對象。因此，借助于創(chuàng)業(yè)投資公司在項目選擇上的專門才能，由政府出資成立引導(dǎo)基金，并以此為杠桿撬動社會資本成立創(chuàng)新投資基金，對協(xié)同創(chuàng)新進(jìn)行間接資助成為我國政府支持科技創(chuàng)新的重要模式。 然而，從實際運作的情況看，雖然創(chuàng)新投資基金在創(chuàng)新項目選擇及投資上擁有專業(yè)技能，取得了一定的成效，但因信息不對稱帶來的逆向選擇等問題仍然沒有從根本上得到解決。此外，產(chǎn)、學(xué)、研在合作過程中不按契約進(jìn)行投入，通過減少投資甚至“搭便車”來獲取不當(dāng)利益的道德風(fēng)險，以及合作收益的分配不合理等也是阻礙我國協(xié)同創(chuàng)新規(guī)模擴大和效率提升的重要因素之一。如何解決逆向選擇、道德風(fēng)險和利益分配不合理等問題，仍然是投資基金模式下協(xié)同創(chuàng)新成功運行的關(guān)鍵問題。 針對逆向選擇、道德風(fēng)險和利益分配不合理導(dǎo)致我國協(xié)同創(chuàng)新成功率低下，甚至無法達(dá)成的問題，論文通過對協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中利益分配機制、對賭機制的研究，設(shè)計了協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中防范逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險的激勵機制，促使協(xié)同創(chuàng)新成員如實披露私人信息、提高創(chuàng)新投入，促進(jìn)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的成功，為投資基金、企業(yè)、科研機構(gòu)、高校以及政府管理部門制定相關(guān)策略提供決策借鑒。 論文主要研究內(nèi)容如下： ①解決逆向選擇的協(xié)同創(chuàng)新對賭機制設(shè)計 本部分由第3章“投資基金與企業(yè)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新對賭機制設(shè)計”構(gòu)成�？紤]創(chuàng)新企業(yè)計劃實施一個市場前景好的創(chuàng)新項目，由于資金限制，創(chuàng)新企業(yè)希望尋求投資基金進(jìn)行協(xié)同創(chuàng)新，通過構(gòu)建創(chuàng)新企業(yè)與投資基金的對賭博弈模型，研究了創(chuàng)新企業(yè)如何通過對賭協(xié)議的設(shè)計，解決協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中因信息不對稱導(dǎo)致的逆向選擇問題，促進(jìn)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新形成，并通過理論及仿真分析得出創(chuàng)新企業(yè)與投資基金協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的形成條件及最優(yōu)對賭協(xié)議。 ②協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中合理的利益分配機制設(shè)計 本部分由第4章“多委托-多代理下協(xié)同創(chuàng)新利益分配機制設(shè)計”、第5章“投資基金模式下協(xié)同創(chuàng)新討價還價分配機制設(shè)計”組成。 第4章考慮兩家企業(yè)分別委托不同的外部獨立機構(gòu)開發(fā)新產(chǎn)品，且承包方之間由于存在著創(chuàng)新技術(shù)人員的溝通、交流或流動，或研發(fā)信息、技術(shù)的交換等導(dǎo)致的創(chuàng)新投資溢出，構(gòu)建了存在投資溢出環(huán)境下的多委托-多代理協(xié)同創(chuàng)新模型，研究了創(chuàng)新發(fā)包方與承包方的合作決策，得出了發(fā)包方的最優(yōu)合作策略以及承包方的最優(yōu)創(chuàng)新投資策略，并在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了投資溢出對承包方創(chuàng)新投入的影響。 第5章考慮由于資本約束，企業(yè)將技術(shù)創(chuàng)新活動交給外部科研組織的同時，尋求與創(chuàng)新投資基金進(jìn)行合作，由其出資參與協(xié)同創(chuàng)新，針對協(xié)同創(chuàng)新參與各方通過討價還價進(jìn)行合作及收益分配的本質(zhì)特征，通過構(gòu)建投資基金參與下的協(xié)同創(chuàng)新討價還價合作博弈模型，研究了創(chuàng)新投資基金、企業(yè)及高�；蚩蒲袡C構(gòu)間的分配策略，并分析了參與各方討價還價能力等相關(guān)因素對分配策略的影響，并通過理論及仿真分析，得出了協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的最優(yōu)分配方案。 ③協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中防范道德風(fēng)險的利益分配機制及投資機制設(shè)計 本部分由第6章“投資基金模式下協(xié)同創(chuàng)新利益分配及投資機制設(shè)計”構(gòu)成�？紤]企業(yè)將新產(chǎn)品開發(fā)活動以契約形式外包給創(chuàng)新承包方，且引入創(chuàng)新投資基金投資參與協(xié)同創(chuàng)新，構(gòu)建了創(chuàng)新投資基金主導(dǎo)下的協(xié)同創(chuàng)新博弈模型，研究了創(chuàng)新投資基金如何通過協(xié)同創(chuàng)新利益分配機制及基金投資策略的設(shè)計，激勵企業(yè)和創(chuàng)新承包方提高協(xié)同創(chuàng)新投入，提升協(xié)同創(chuàng)新投資規(guī)模和績效，并通過理論和仿真分析得出了引導(dǎo)基金主導(dǎo)下協(xié)同創(chuàng)新最優(yōu)分配機制和基金投資策略。 論文具有以下理論和方法上的創(chuàng)新： ①構(gòu)建創(chuàng)新企業(yè)與投資基金的對賭博弈模型，研究了創(chuàng)新企業(yè)如何通過對賭協(xié)議的設(shè)計，解決協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中因信息不對稱導(dǎo)致的逆向選擇問題 現(xiàn)有協(xié)同創(chuàng)新研究中，多是由信息劣勢方采用信息甄別的方式，解決逆向選擇問題。本文則考慮由信息優(yōu)勢方(即企業(yè))采用信號傳遞的方式（即提出對賭協(xié)議），使投資基金確信自己傳遞的是真實私人信息，以此解決協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中的逆向選擇問題，促進(jìn)協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的形成，并通過理論及仿真分析得出創(chuàng)新企業(yè)與投資基金協(xié)同創(chuàng)新的形成條件及最優(yōu)對賭協(xié)議。 ②分別構(gòu)建存在基于投資溢出效應(yīng)的多委托-多代理協(xié)同創(chuàng)新博弈模型，以及構(gòu)建投資基金模式下的協(xié)同創(chuàng)新討價還價合作博弈模型，設(shè)計出合理的協(xié)同創(chuàng)新利益分配機制，解決利益分配不合理問題 考慮同一產(chǎn)品市場上有兩家企業(yè)分別委托不同的外部研發(fā)組織開發(fā)同一新產(chǎn)品，且創(chuàng)新存在投資溢出效應(yīng)，通過構(gòu)建存在基于投資溢出效應(yīng)的多委托-多代理協(xié)同創(chuàng)新博弈模型，設(shè)計出企業(yè)的最優(yōu)合作及利益分配策略以及研發(fā)組織的最優(yōu)創(chuàng)新投資策略，并在此基礎(chǔ)上分析了投資溢出對承包方創(chuàng)新投入的影響；接著針對現(xiàn)有研究多采用Cournot或Stackelberg等非合作博弈分析協(xié)同創(chuàng)新合作博弈，，以及現(xiàn)實中協(xié)同創(chuàng)新各方一般是通過討價還價達(dá)成合作協(xié)議，通過構(gòu)建投資基金模式下的協(xié)同創(chuàng)新討價還價合作博弈模型，研究了創(chuàng)新投資基金、企業(yè)及研發(fā)機構(gòu)間的分配策略，并分析了參與各方討價還價能力等相關(guān)因素對分配策略的影響。 ③構(gòu)建創(chuàng)新投資基金模式下協(xié)同創(chuàng)新博弈模型，設(shè)計出協(xié)同創(chuàng)新利益分配和分階段投資機制，防范道德風(fēng)險問題 通過構(gòu)建創(chuàng)新投資基金、企業(yè)、研發(fā)機構(gòu)間的協(xié)同創(chuàng)新博弈模型，研究了創(chuàng)新投資基金如何通過協(xié)同創(chuàng)新利益分配機制及基金階段性投資策略的設(shè)計，激勵企業(yè)和創(chuàng)新承包方提高協(xié)同創(chuàng)新投入，提升協(xié)同創(chuàng)新投資規(guī)模和績效，為基金、企業(yè)、研發(fā)機構(gòu)間通過協(xié)同創(chuàng)新分階段投資機制設(shè)計，防范企業(yè)和研發(fā)機構(gòu)的道德風(fēng)險提供新思路和新方法。
[Abstract]:In November 2013 , the Party ' s 18th Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee pointed out that it is necessary to establish a cooperative innovation mechanism for the production of research and research and promote the enterprise to become the main body of innovation .

However , because of lack of funds , adverse selection , unreasonable distribution of interests and moral hazard , the success rate of cooperative innovation has been low . In this mode , the government has generally adopted direct financial support mode to support cooperative innovation activities . However , in this mode , the government funded the establishment of the pilot fund because of the lack of information asymmetry and professional knowledge .

However , from the actual operation , although the innovative investment fund has professional skills in innovation project selection and investment , the problem of reverse selection caused by asymmetric information is still not fundamentally solved . In addition , the problem of improper benefit ' s moral hazard and unreasonable allocation of cooperative income is one of the important factors that hinder the scale of cooperative innovation in our country .

Aiming at the adverse selection , the moral hazard and the unreasonable allocation of interests , the success rate of cooperative innovation in our country is low , and even cannot be reached . In this paper , we design the incentive mechanism of preventing adverse selection and moral hazard in the collaborative innovation through the research of the benefit distribution mechanism and the betting mechanism in the collaborative innovation .

The main contents of this thesis are as follows :

( 1 ) To solve the collaborative innovation of adverse selection and the design of the gambling mechanism

This part is composed of the third chapter " Investment Funds and the Innovation of Enterprise Synergies Innovation " . In view of the financial constraints , the innovative enterprise wants to seek the cooperation innovation of the investment fund . Through the construction of the gambling game model of the innovation enterprise and the investment fund , the paper studies how the innovation enterprise can solve the adverse selection problem caused by the asymmetric information in the collaborative innovation through the construction of the betting agreement , and finally , through the theory and the simulation analysis , the formation conditions and the optimal betting agreement between the innovative enterprise and the investment fund are obtained .

The Rational Profit Distribution Mechanism Design in Cooperative Innovation

This part is composed of Chapter 4 " Multi - Principal - Multi - Agency Coordination Innovation Benefit Distribution Mechanism Design " , Chapter 5 " Design of Cooperative Innovation in Investment Fund Model " .

Chapter 4 considers that the two enterprises entrust different external independent agencies to develop new products , and the innovation investment caused by the communication , communication or flow of creative technicians , or the exchange of R & D information , technology , etc . has been established between the contractors , and the cooperative decision of the innovative sender and the contractor is constructed . The optimal cooperation strategy of the Employer and the optimal innovation investment strategy of the Contractor are obtained .

In chapter 5 , considering the capital constraints , the enterprises seek to cooperate with the innovation investment fund , and seek to cooperate with the innovation investment fund , and participate in the cooperative innovation through the cooperative innovation of the investment fund , and analyze the distribution strategy between the innovative investment fund , the enterprise and the university or the scientific research institution , and analyze the influence of the relevant factors such as the bargaining power of the participating parties on the distribution strategy , and the optimal allocation scheme of the cooperative innovation is obtained through the theory and simulation analysis .

The Benefit Distribution Mechanism and Investment Mechanism Design of Preventing Moral Hazard in Cooperative Innovation ;

This part is composed of the coordination innovation benefit distribution and the investment mechanism design under the investment fund model of Chapter 6 . The innovation investment fund is introduced into the innovation contractor in the form of contract , and the innovation investment fund is introduced to participate in the collaborative innovation . The innovative investment fund is introduced to improve the cooperation innovation input , improve the scale and performance of the cooperative innovation , and the optimal distribution mechanism and the fund investment strategy under the guidance of the guide fund are obtained through the theory and simulation analysis .

The thesis has the following theoretical and methodological innovations :

The paper studies how to design and solve the adverse selection problem caused by asymmetric information in the collaborative innovation by constructing the model of the gambling game between the innovation enterprise and the investment fund .

In the research of cooperative innovation , it is mostly the way of information selection by the information disadvantaged party to solve the adverse selection problem . In this paper , the paper considers that the information superiority party ( i.e . , the enterprise ) adopts the way of signal transmission ( i.e . , puts forward the betting agreement ) , so that the investment fund is convinced that it is the real private information , thus solving the adverse selection problem in the collaborative innovation , promoting the formation of the cooperative innovation , and obtaining the forming conditions and the optimal betting agreement between the innovative enterprise and the investment fund through theory and simulation analysis .

( 2 ) The multi - agent - multi - agent cooperative innovation game model based on the investment spillover effect is constructed , and the cooperative innovation bargaining game model under the investment fund model is constructed , and a reasonable coordination innovation benefit distribution mechanism is designed to solve the problem of unreasonable benefit distribution .

Considering that there are two enterprises in the same product market respectively entrust different external R & D organizations to develop the same new product , and the innovation has the investment spillover effect , the optimal cooperation and profit distribution strategy of the enterprise and the optimal innovation investment strategy of R & D organization are designed by constructing the multi - agent - multi - agent cooperative innovation game model based on the investment overflow effect , and the influence of the investment overflow on the innovation input of the contractor is analyzed .
Then , for the existing research , the cooperative innovation cooperation game is analyzed by Cournot or StackPower non - cooperative game , and the cooperative innovation in reality is usually negotiated through bargaining , and the distribution strategy among innovation investment funds , enterprises and R & D institutions is studied through the cooperative innovation bargaining game model under the investment fund model , and the influence of the relevant factors such as bargaining power of the participating parties on the distribution strategy is analyzed .

( 3 ) constructing the cooperative innovation game model under the innovation investment fund mode , designing the cooperative innovation benefit distribution and phased investment mechanism , and preventing the moral hazard problem ;

Through the collaborative innovation game model between innovation investment fund , enterprise and R & D institution , how to design the innovative investment fund through the cooperative innovation benefit distribution mechanism and the fund phased investment strategy are studied , so as to encourage the enterprises and the innovation contractors to improve the cooperation innovation input , improve the scale and performance of the cooperative innovation investment , and provide new ideas and new methods for designing and preventing the moral hazard of enterprises and R & D institutions through the design of cooperative innovation phased investment mechanism among the funds , enterprises and R & D institutions .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F273.1;F832.48

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 黃波;孟衛(wèi)東;李宇雨;江積海;;不確定環(huán)境下研發(fā)聯(lián)盟成員投資激勵機制研究[J];管理工程學(xué)報;2010年04期

2 黃波;孟衛(wèi)東;皮星;;基于雙邊道德風(fēng)險的研發(fā)外包激勵機制設(shè)計[J];管理工程學(xué)報;2011年02期

3 龍勇;鄭景麗;;聯(lián)盟過程管理視角的聯(lián)盟能力與聯(lián)盟治理關(guān)系研究[J];管理世界;2013年01期

4 韓煒;楊俊;張玉利;;創(chuàng)業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)混合治理機制選擇的案例研究[J];管理世界;2014年02期

5 孟衛(wèi)東;王利明;熊維勤;;創(chuàng)業(yè)投資引導(dǎo)基金中公共資本對私人資本的補償機制[J];系統(tǒng)工程理論與實踐;2010年09期

6 呂海萍,龔建立,王飛絨,衛(wèi)非;產(chǎn)學(xué)研相結(jié)合的動力—障礙機制實證分析[J];研究與發(fā)展管理;2004年02期

7 祁紅梅,黃瑞華;動態(tài)聯(lián)盟形成階段知識產(chǎn)權(quán)沖突及激勵對策研究[J];研究與發(fā)展管理;2004年04期

8 李文鶼,孫林杰,謝剛;借鑒國際經(jīng)驗 透視我國政府在中小企業(yè)產(chǎn)學(xué)研中的作用[J];研究與發(fā)展管理;2005年04期

9 黃波;孟衛(wèi)東;任玉瓏;;基于投資溢出的并行研發(fā)聯(lián)盟成員投資策略研究[J];預(yù)測;2009年02期

10 楊仕輝,熊艷,王紅玲;吸收能力、研發(fā)合作創(chuàng)新激勵與補貼政策[J];中國管理科學(xué);2003年01期

本文編號：1734392