本文選題：制度變遷　切入點(diǎn)：政治關(guān)聯(lián)　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年博士論文

【摘要】：2013年黨的十八屆三中全會(huì)的提出了：“經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革是全面深化改革的重點(diǎn),核心問(wèn)題是處理好政府和市場(chǎng)的關(guān)系,使市場(chǎng)在資源配置中起決定性作用和更好發(fā)揮政府作用�！边@一發(fā)展觀念不僅契合了新中國(guó)建立之后尤其是改革開(kāi)放后我國(guó)政治制度與經(jīng)濟(jì)體制自我變遷的客觀規(guī)律,更是反映出我國(guó)制度結(jié)構(gòu)下的當(dāng)今及未來(lái)社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的需要。從新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和制度金融學(xué)視角看,一國(guó)的制度安排對(duì)該國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和金融發(fā)展具有奠基性的影響。金融作為經(jīng)濟(jì)體中經(jīng)營(yíng)和創(chuàng)造信用的特殊行業(yè)受到不同金融制度的規(guī)制。在此意義上分析,一國(guó)基本制度的變遷必會(huì)影響到金融制度的變遷,因此基本經(jīng)濟(jì)制度乃至金融制度的變遷及其形成的具體制度安排對(duì)一國(guó)金融行業(yè)具體運(yùn)行存在至關(guān)重要的影響。而基于基礎(chǔ)制度安排及經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)行機(jī)制產(chǎn)生的存在于我國(guó)銀行業(yè)內(nèi)部的非正式制度安排：政治關(guān)聯(lián)對(duì)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行運(yùn)行的影響性態(tài)是當(dāng)前理論界面臨迫切問(wèn)題。歷次金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)所呈現(xiàn)出來(lái)的巨大破壞性及對(duì)實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)侵染性凸顯了銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)誘因及其渠道效應(yīng)研究的必要性。而作為基礎(chǔ)性因素的制度及銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道在既有以上問(wèn)題的研究中并沒(méi)有得到系統(tǒng)全面的體現(xiàn)。 鑒于此,本文基于新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和制度金融學(xué)的研究視角,圍繞“我國(guó)制度結(jié)構(gòu)及變遷特征”——“政治關(guān)聯(lián)路徑形成動(dòng)機(jī)、形式及效能”——“銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)”——“銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道影響性態(tài)”四個(gè)問(wèn)題梯次推進(jìn),從經(jīng)驗(yàn)論證和理論均衡分析兩個(gè)維度研究了我國(guó)制度結(jié)構(gòu)及其動(dòng)態(tài)變遷背景下銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道存在性及其效應(yīng),并得出一些有益結(jié)論。具體而言,文章緊緊圍繞著政治關(guān)聯(lián)產(chǎn)生的基礎(chǔ)制度因素、政治關(guān)聯(lián)形式及銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道影響性態(tài)進(jìn)行分析。重點(diǎn)解決的基本問(wèn)題有：第一,我國(guó)基礎(chǔ)制度因素對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響性態(tài)；第二,以高管政治背景、政府實(shí)際控制和銀行國(guó)有股權(quán)性質(zhì)為主要形式的銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的顯性政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道的影響性態(tài)；第三,基于政府、銀行兩方博弈所形成的銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的隱性政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道的影響性態(tài)；第四,基于政府、國(guó)有企業(yè)、銀行三方博弈所形成的銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的隱性政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道影響性態(tài)。結(jié)合研究思路和思想,本文融合了新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、制度金融學(xué)、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)及金融學(xué)等學(xué)科知識(shí),采用理論研究和經(jīng)驗(yàn)論證相結(jié)合的研究方法。理論研究的方法主要體現(xiàn)在三個(gè)方面：一是基本理論推理與演繹歸納；二是構(gòu)建理論均衡模型進(jìn)行比較靜態(tài)分析；三是在均衡分析過(guò)程中,采用逐步放松約束條件進(jìn)而提高研究結(jié)論普適性的論證邏輯。經(jīng)驗(yàn)論證方法主要體現(xiàn)在三個(gè)方面：一是基于我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)金融運(yùn)行現(xiàn)狀,收集并整理有關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行基本統(tǒng)計(jì)單變量分析；二是在單變量統(tǒng)計(jì)分析基礎(chǔ)上構(gòu)建銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)組合模型和銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道檢驗(yàn)組合模型,在嚴(yán)格按照經(jīng)典計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)原理和相關(guān)模型構(gòu)建原理基礎(chǔ)上,利用收集數(shù)據(jù)組成非平衡面板數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行多元擬合回歸；三是在具體經(jīng)驗(yàn)分析中采用遞進(jìn)研究邏輯和對(duì)比分析的思想對(duì)相關(guān)問(wèn)題進(jìn)行研究。盡可能的完善研究邏輯并提高研究結(jié)論的可信性。 文章緊緊圍繞著基本問(wèn)題和研究核心,依據(jù)理論演繹歸納、經(jīng)驗(yàn)論證及均衡分析得出如下基本結(jié)論： (1)基本經(jīng)濟(jì)制度因素推動(dòng)了銀行三種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平；產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)制度因素和社會(huì)基本意識(shí)性態(tài)因素對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)影響呈現(xiàn)微弱且基本不顯著性態(tài)；表征基本金融制度因素的信貸資金分配市場(chǎng)化程度因素在計(jì)量意義上較為顯著的提升銀行系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的承擔(dān)水平,而對(duì)總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平影響并不顯著,金融市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)因素顯著加劇了銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)。 (2)在控制基本制度因素的背景下,外部宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)層面的房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)景氣因素對(duì)銀行的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)影響微弱并且不顯著；經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)因素符合降低銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平的預(yù)期。同時(shí),樣本商業(yè)銀行層面的凈利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)率因素和規(guī)模因素對(duì)銀行不同類(lèi)型風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)存在一定影響并且顯著,銀行規(guī)模反而會(huì)積極推動(dòng)銀行三種類(lèi)型的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平,而凈利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)因素顯著降低系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)卻整體提升非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平。 (3)以高管的政治背景為主要特征的顯性政治關(guān)聯(lián)路徑并沒(méi)有顯著改變基礎(chǔ)制度因素和其余控制變量對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響性態(tài),但其本身對(duì)銀行三類(lèi)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)行為存在影響且顯著,即使這種影響程度并不高。其中,高管的政治背景對(duì)銀行系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的積極影響程度高于其對(duì)總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響程度。同時(shí),在其他控制條件不變的情況下,基于高管政治背景而形成的政治關(guān)聯(lián)所引致的銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平越高,銀行就越注重調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)組合使其趨于穩(wěn)健。具體而言,銀行總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)、系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)與非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)在計(jì)量意義上均有效的降低銀行杠桿水平并且顯著,尤其是總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平的上升對(duì)銀行杠桿水平抑制效應(yīng)更為顯著,也即是說(shuō)有效引致銀行調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)組合使其趨于穩(wěn)健。 (4)政府實(shí)際控制因素對(duì)銀行的三種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響微弱并且不顯著；銀行國(guó)有股權(quán)性質(zhì)因素對(duì)銀行各類(lèi)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)存在一定影響并且顯著。整體而言,國(guó)有股權(quán)因素提升了銀行總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)程度,但降低了銀行系統(tǒng)和非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平。同時(shí),在其他控制條件不變的情況下,基于政府股權(quán)和政府實(shí)際控制因素而形成的政治關(guān)聯(lián)所引致的銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平越高,銀行就越注重調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)組合使其趨于穩(wěn)健。具體而言,銀行總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)、系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)與非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)在計(jì)量意義上均有效的降低銀行杠桿水平并且顯著,具體而言,三類(lèi)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)效應(yīng)均有效抑制銀行杠桿水平,而總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道而引致的銀行資產(chǎn)組合調(diào)整進(jìn)而抑制銀行過(guò)高的杠桿水平的程度更為積極顯著,也即是說(shuō)有效引致銀行調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)組合使其趨于穩(wěn)健。 (5)高管政治背景與政府實(shí)際控制共同作用因素顯著降低銀行系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平和非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平,但對(duì)銀行總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平影響并不顯著,并且二者的共同作用顯著的放大了兩種因素所形成的政治關(guān)聯(lián)路徑對(duì)銀行系統(tǒng)和非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響程度,尤其是顯著加劇了銀行系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平。同時(shí),在其他控制條件不變的情況下,基于二者交叉因素而形成的政治關(guān)聯(lián)所引致的銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平越高,銀行就越注重調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)組合使其趨于穩(wěn)健,尤其是所引起的銀行系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平越高,銀行也就越傾向于調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)組合借以抑制銀行杠桿水平。具體而言,銀行總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)、系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)與非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)在計(jì)量意義上均有效的降低銀行杠桿水平并且顯著,三類(lèi)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)均有效抑制銀行杠桿水平,而系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道而引致的銀行資產(chǎn)組合調(diào)整進(jìn)而抑制銀行過(guò)高的杠桿水平的程度更為顯著。 (6)存在政府干預(yù)和外部制度約束條件既定的情形下,基于政府控制而形成的隱性契約和銀行經(jīng)理人個(gè)體利益訴求的共同作用塑造銀行經(jīng)理人兩種策略：合作策略與非合作策略。政府代理人和銀行經(jīng)理人合作框架下的均衡收益揭示二者合作是其占優(yōu)策略選擇,這種合作收益提供了銀行經(jīng)理人積極構(gòu)建隱性政治關(guān)聯(lián)路徑內(nèi)在激勵(lì)。但這種基于合作而形成的隱性政治關(guān)聯(lián)路徑所引致的銀行經(jīng)理人的尋租行為和政府補(bǔ)貼行為會(huì)加劇銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)。同時(shí),從銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道層面來(lái)看,理性的銀行代理人傾向于選擇合作框架下的行為并獲得其均衡收益,這一合作框架潛在關(guān)鍵條件就是銀行代理人積極構(gòu)建并維持政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道的存在,這種政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道會(huì)誘發(fā)銀行經(jīng)理人道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)而引致銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān),同時(shí)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)改變就會(huì)通過(guò)銀行信貸資金的配給行為于銀行資產(chǎn)組合的變動(dòng)。 (7)政府、銀行與國(guó)有企業(yè)三方博弈的均衡結(jié)論揭示,存在于商業(yè)銀行、國(guó)有企業(yè)與政府之間的隱性政治關(guān)聯(lián)路徑直接或間接形成以政府和政府項(xiàng)目為中心的銀行、國(guó)有企業(yè)和政府之問(wèn)的緊密關(guān)聯(lián)�，F(xiàn)行制度約束條件下,基于隱性政治關(guān)聯(lián)路徑之上的銀行經(jīng)理人、國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)理人及政府代理人的均衡策略選擇不僅共同激化了銀行信貸擴(kuò)張,更是加劇了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平。同時(shí),從銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道層面來(lái)看,政府、銀行與國(guó)有企業(yè)三方博弈框架下各自均衡收益表明,三方合作是其占優(yōu)合作策略。而這種合作策略就形成了圍繞政府及政府項(xiàng)目為中心并以隱性契約為核心的政治關(guān)聯(lián)紐帶的運(yùn)作機(jī)制,但預(yù)期存在的隱性政府信用擔(dān)保就會(huì)誘發(fā)銀行道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并加劇銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān),進(jìn)而會(huì)通過(guò)這種隱性政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道作用于銀行以信貸配給為主要誘因的資產(chǎn)組合波動(dòng)。 結(jié)合本文的研究?jī)?nèi)容和既有的相關(guān)研究,本文的創(chuàng)新主要體現(xiàn)在如下方面： (1)文章結(jié)合Coase創(chuàng)立的新古典關(guān)于制度變遷的比較靜態(tài)分析和Hayek等關(guān)于制度變遷的動(dòng)態(tài)演化分析范式,在制度變遷動(dòng)態(tài)演進(jìn)理論框架內(nèi)探索中國(guó)銀行業(yè)內(nèi)政治關(guān)聯(lián)產(chǎn)生的制度基礎(chǔ)及形式,并重點(diǎn)分析銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道影響性態(tài),最終通過(guò)理論研究和合理的經(jīng)驗(yàn)論證得出銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道的影響性態(tài)和適應(yīng)率評(píng)價(jià)。 (2)在文章理論均衡分析部分,突破既有相關(guān)研究中先驗(yàn)性的制度外生假定,通過(guò)合理的假設(shè)將基礎(chǔ)制度安排和政治關(guān)聯(lián)為代表的非正式制度內(nèi)生到均衡模型中,最終圍繞政治關(guān)聯(lián)形式與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道之間動(dòng)態(tài)均衡分析得出銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道影響性態(tài)。 (3)系統(tǒng)分析基本制度結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)一國(guó)制度變遷的影響、制度變遷與具體制度安排(經(jīng)濟(jì)體制和金融制度)之間關(guān)聯(lián),為本文的政治關(guān)聯(lián)產(chǎn)生、路徑及對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的影響提供研究的理論基礎(chǔ)。并從理論上演繹政治關(guān)聯(lián)作為一種非正式制度與正式制度之間的“反饋循環(huán)(Feedbeck Loop)"動(dòng)態(tài)作用機(jī)制。 (4)文章突破了傳統(tǒng)基于貨幣政策、利率、銀行公司治理、市場(chǎng)約束等層面對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)影響的研究,從政治關(guān)聯(lián)的層面全面系統(tǒng)地論證銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)的政治關(guān)聯(lián)渠道存在性及其影響性態(tài)。
[Abstract]:The reform of economic system is the focus of comprehensive deepening reform . The core issue is to deal with the relationship between the government and the market , to make the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources and to better play the role of the government .

Based on the research perspective of the new institutional economics and institutional finance , this paper studies the existence and the effect of the political relation between the institutional structure and the changing characteristics of our country , the motive , form and effectiveness of the political association path , and analyses the existence and the effect of the political relation channel borne by the bank risk under the background of the bank risk , and draws some useful conclusions .
Secondly , based on the high political background , the actual control of the government and the nature of the bank ' s state - owned equity as the main forms of bank risk , the influence of the dominant political association channel is affected ;
Third , based on the government , the bank ' s two - party game , the bank risk assumes the influence of the hidden political association channel ;
Fourthly , based on the hidden political association channel influenced by the bank risk formed by the government , state - owned enterprise and bank tripartite game , the author combines the research methods of new system economics , system finance , economics and finance .
secondly , constructing a theoretical equilibrium model to carry out comparative static analysis ;
Third , in the process of equilibrium analysis , the demonstration logic of gradually releasing the constraint conditions and improving the universality of the research conclusion is adopted . The experience demonstration method is mainly embodied in three aspects : firstly , based on the current situation of the economic and financial operation in China , collecting and arranging the relevant data to carry out basic statistical single variable analysis ;
Secondly , on the basis of single variable statistical analysis , the author constructs a combination model of bank risk and bank risk . Based on the theory of classical econometrics and the construction principle of relevant model , the data of non - balance panel is used to make multi - fitting regression based on the collected data .
The third is to study the related problems by using the thought of progressive research logic and comparative analysis in the concrete experience analysis , perfect the research logic as much as possible and improve the credibility of the research conclusion .

Based on theoretical deduction , empirical demonstration and equilibrium analysis , the following basic conclusions are drawn :

( 1 ) The basic economic system factor promotes the three risk assumption level of the bank ;
The factors of property right protection system and the social basic consciousness factor affect the bank ' s risk , and have little or no significant behavior .
The factors that characterize the basic financial institutional factors are significantly higher than that of the banking system risk and the non - systemic risk in the measurement sense , but the influence of the level of the total risk is not significant , and the financial market competition factor significantly increases the risk of the bank ' s risk system .

( 2 ) In the context of controlling the basic institutional factors , the real estate market economic factors at the external macroeconomic level have little influence on the bank ' s risk and are not significant ;
At the same time , the net profit growth rate factor and the scale factor at the sample commercial bank level have a certain influence on different types of risk of the bank and obviously , the scale of the bank can actively promote the three types of risk assumption of the bank , while the net profit growth factor significantly reduces the risk of the system , but the overall promotion of the non - systematic risk and the total risk take place .

At the same time , the higher the level of the bank risk caused by the political background of the high pipe , the higher the level of the bank ' s risk caused by the political background of the high pipe , the higher the level of the bank ' s leverage , especially the increase of the overall risk assumption , is more significant to the level of the bank ' s leverage level , that is , it is said that the effective introduction of the bank ' s asset portfolio makes it more robust .

( 4 ) The effect of the actual control factors on the bank ' s three risks is weak and insignificant ;
On the whole , the higher the risk of the bank , the higher the level of the bank ' s risk , the higher the bank ' s risk is , the more positive the bank asset portfolio adjusted based on the government ' s equity and the actual control factor of the government .

The higher the risk of the banking system , the higher the risk of the banking system , the higher the risk of the banking system , the more the banks tend to adjust their portfolios to restrain the level of the bank ' s leverage . In the meantime , the higher the risk of the banks , the more the banks tend to adjust their assets portfolio to restrain the level of the bank ' s leverage .

( 6 ) Under the established conditions of government intervention and external system constraints , two strategies : cooperative strategy and non - cooperative strategy are created based on the mutual action of implicit contract formed by government control and individual interest of bank manager : the cooperation strategy and non - cooperative strategy .

( 7 ) The equilibrium conclusion of the three - way game between the government , the bank and the state - owned enterprise reveals that the implicit political association path between the state - owned enterprise and the government directly or indirectly forms the close relationship between the bank , the state - owned enterprise and the government .

Combined with the research content and related research , the innovation of this paper mainly lies in the following aspects :

( 1 ) According to the comparative static analysis of the system change created by Coase and Hayek et al . on the dynamic evolution of institutional change , the paper explores the institutional foundation and form of the political association in China ' s banking industry in the framework of the dynamic evolution of institutional change , and analyzes the influence of the political relation channel of the bank risk , and finally demonstrates the influence and the adaptation rate of the political association channel undertaken by the bank through theoretical research and reasonable empirical demonstration .

( 2 ) In the analysis of the theoretical equilibrium of the article , the paper breaks through the system exogenic assumption which has a priori knowledge in the related research , and the informal system , which is represented by the basic system arrangement and the political association , is endogenous into the equilibrium model through reasonable assumptions , and finally , the dynamic equilibrium analysis between the political association form and the political association channel undertaken by the bank is concluded , and the political relation channel of the bank risk is influenced by the dynamic equilibrium analysis .

( 3 ) Systematic analysis of the influence of the basic institutional structure on a country ' s institutional change , the relationship between the institutional change and the specific institutional arrangements ( economic system and financial system ) , provides a theoretical basis for the study of the political association , the path and the influence on the bank ' s risk . ( 4 ) The paper breaks through the research on the influence of traditional monetary policy , interest rate , bank corporate governance and market restriction on bank risk .

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.33

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條

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本文編號(hào)：1714590