本文選題：創(chuàng)新型中小企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：融資約束　出處：《經(jīng)濟(jì)評(píng)論》2012年01期

【摘要】：創(chuàng)新型中小企業(yè)融資難由來已久,特別是在以間接融資為主的金融環(huán)境下如何明晰銀企關(guān)系,形成與之匹配的信貸策略,是化解企業(yè)融資約束的關(guān)鍵。本文首先建立銀企演化博弈的理論框架,對(duì)創(chuàng)新型中小企業(yè)與商業(yè)銀行的信貸行為演化過程及演化穩(wěn)定性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行探討,并從創(chuàng)新風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與監(jiān)管獎(jiǎng)懲兩個(gè)維度構(gòu)建銀企演化博弈模型,分析兩類群體在長(zhǎng)期信貸博弈中的演化穩(wěn)定策略。結(jié)果表明,銀企雙方均對(duì)高收益策略有模仿傾向,但創(chuàng)新型中小企業(yè)在與銀行的長(zhǎng)期合作中會(huì)對(duì)少數(shù)企業(yè)的違約行為具有抵御性;研發(fā)創(chuàng)業(yè)期企業(yè)所受融資約束最高,當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)創(chuàng)新成功率高于最小下限時(shí),商業(yè)銀行才考慮與企業(yè)發(fā)生信貸關(guān)系;政府、信用擔(dān)保等外部力量與內(nèi)生要素的相互制衡對(duì)實(shí)現(xiàn)銀企信貸穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)具有重要作用。
[Abstract]:Innovative SME financing has a long history, especially how to clarify the relationship between banks and enterprises in the financial environment dominated by indirect financing, and form a matching credit strategy, which is the key to resolve the financing constraints of enterprises.This paper first establishes the theoretical framework of the evolution game between banks and enterprises, and probes into the evolution process of credit behavior and the criteria of evolution stability of innovative small and medium-sized enterprises and commercial banks.From the two dimensions of innovation risk and regulatory rewards and punishments, the evolution game model of banks and enterprises is constructed, and the evolutionary stability strategies of the two groups in the long-term credit game are analyzed.The results show that both banks and enterprises have the tendency to imitate the high-yield strategy, but the innovative SMEs will resist the default behavior of a few enterprises in the long-term cooperation with the bank.If and only when the success rate of innovation is higher than the minimum limit, the commercial banks will consider the credit relationship with enterprises. The checks and balances between external forces and endogenous factors such as government and credit guarantee play an important role in realizing the credit stability of banks and enterprises.
【作者單位】： 山東大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“基于企業(yè)基因的創(chuàng)新型中小企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):11BJY078) 教育部人文社科研究規(guī)劃基金項(xiàng)目“中國(guó)低碳自主創(chuàng)新模式選擇與對(duì)策研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):10YJA630211)的資助
【分類號(hào)】：F276.3;F832.4;F224.32

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