本文關(guān)鍵詞： 信息披露政策 信息透明度 信息不對(duì)稱 真實(shí)盈余管理　出處：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在國(guó)內(nèi)外理論界乃至實(shí)務(wù)界,信息披露與盈余管理的關(guān)系研究都一直備受關(guān)注。公司管理層與外部投資者之間存在的信息不對(duì)稱,為公司進(jìn)行盈余管理以達(dá)到特定盈余目的提供了一定的空間,而充分可靠的信息披露在某種程度上可以降低這種信息不對(duì)稱,提高投資者識(shí)別管理層盈余管理行為的能力,從而有利于減少管理層進(jìn)行盈余管理的可能性。一般來(lái)說(shuō),盈余管理沒(méi)有超越會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的范圍,適當(dāng)?shù)挠喙芾聿⒉皇菈氖?但是盈余管理可能隱含著機(jī)會(huì)主義行為傾向,長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看可能損害公司價(jià)值,會(huì)粉飾或模糊公司的真實(shí)業(yè)績(jī)水平,使投資者難以通過(guò)“修飾”后的報(bào)告盈余做出有效的投資決策,不利于投資者等利益相關(guān)者的利益保護(hù)。因此,外部監(jiān)管者需要制定信息披露政策規(guī)范上市公司的信息披露行為,對(duì)管理層形成一種有力的外部約束和監(jiān)督機(jī)制,從而在一定程度上抑制管理層的盈余管理行為,保護(hù)外部投資者的利益,促進(jìn)公句健康持續(xù)發(fā)展,最終有利于資本市場(chǎng)的穩(wěn)定和發(fā)展。 經(jīng)過(guò)多年的發(fā)展,我國(guó)相關(guān)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和部門已逐步建立和完善上市公司信息披露體系,深圳證券交易所制定了《深圳證券交易所上市公司信息披露工作考核辦法》,我國(guó)上市公司信息透明度總體上得到提高,但是仍然存在某些上市公司違規(guī)披露信息或降低信息透明度以配合其盈余管理的現(xiàn)象。因此,研究信息披露與盈余管理的關(guān)系并根據(jù)研究結(jié)果采取相應(yīng)的措施來(lái)規(guī)范上市公司信息披露行為,將對(duì)提高信息透明度、遏制盈余管理行為具有重要的理論意義和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 關(guān)于兩者關(guān)系的研究,國(guó)外文獻(xiàn)較為豐富,國(guó)內(nèi)文獻(xiàn)相對(duì)欠缺,且現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)基本一致認(rèn)為信息透明度與盈余管理具有負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,即信息透明度越高,盈余管理程度越低,高質(zhì)量的信息披露對(duì)公司盈余管理行為具有一定的抑制作用。這些文獻(xiàn)主要從應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的視角進(jìn)行研究,而較少涉及真實(shí)盈余管理的研究。 近年來(lái),學(xué)者們研究發(fā)現(xiàn),管理層在進(jìn)行盈余管理時(shí),除了操控應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目外,還可能操控投資、籌資、經(jīng)營(yíng)等實(shí)際交易活動(dòng),而這種通過(guò)操控企業(yè)真實(shí)的交易活動(dòng)(例如,異常降價(jià)促銷、削減研發(fā)費(fèi)用、過(guò)量生產(chǎn))來(lái)達(dá)到盈余目的的盈余操控行為被學(xué)界稱為真實(shí)盈余管理。相比應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理,真實(shí)盈余管理更難以被利益相關(guān)者識(shí)別,更具有隱蔽性,面臨的審查風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和訴訟風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也更低。 那么,在外部監(jiān)管逐漸加強(qiáng)、資本市場(chǎng)和法律制度逐步健全的外部環(huán)境下,在信息披露政策逐漸改善、信息披露更加透明的情況下,管理層是否可能從實(shí)施應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理轉(zhuǎn)而實(shí)施風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更小、隱蔽程度更高的真實(shí)盈余管理呢?抑或管理層又是否可能因外部監(jiān)管壓力而減少真實(shí)盈余管理行為呢?這是一個(gè)值得思考的問(wèn)題。但從現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)來(lái)看,較少涉及信息披露對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理的影響研究,尤其很少有文章從政策有效性方面進(jìn)行考慮,從而引發(fā)了本文的研究,即以真實(shí)盈余管理為視角研究信息披露政策對(duì)盈余管理的影響。一般而言,會(huì)計(jì)上所謂政策屬于公司范疇,并非外部宏觀制度,而本文以深交所的信息披露考評(píng)結(jié)果來(lái)衡量信息披露政策指標(biāo),因此本文的信息披露政策特指外部監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)上市公司信息披露行為進(jìn)行的規(guī)范或制定的制度等。 本文采取規(guī)范研究和實(shí)證研究相結(jié)合的研究方法,通過(guò)從真實(shí)盈余管理這一新的研究視角分析信息披露政策對(duì)盈余管理的影響,以期豐富相關(guān)理論研究,同時(shí)提醒投資者關(guān)注和重視,并為相關(guān)政策制定者和監(jiān)管者提供證據(jù)支持和政策建議。從內(nèi)容來(lái)看,本文包括以下六章： 第一章：導(dǎo)論。主要介紹本文的研究背景、研究目的和意義、研究思路和方法、研究框架以及研究創(chuàng)新。 第二章：文獻(xiàn)綜述。通過(guò)對(duì)信息不對(duì)稱與信息披露、盈余管理與信息不對(duì)稱以及信息披露與盈余管理的相關(guān)國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行回顧、梳理和述評(píng),發(fā)現(xiàn)信息披露與盈余管理的關(guān)系研究主要集中在應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的視角上,并較少考慮信息披露政策的有效性,從而引發(fā)了本文的研究,即信息披露政策對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理的影響研究。 第三章：理論基礎(chǔ)與理論分析。首先對(duì)委托代理理論、信息不對(duì)稱理論和有效市場(chǎng)理論等進(jìn)行闡釋和分析,然后對(duì)信息披露政策和真實(shí)盈余管理的相關(guān)概念進(jìn)行概念界定,最后對(duì)信息披露政策如何影響真實(shí)盈余管理進(jìn)行理論分析。 第四章：研究設(shè)計(jì)。首先根據(jù)上一章的理論分析提出本文的研究假設(shè),即信息披露政策越完善,真實(shí)盈余管理程度越低,并進(jìn)一步探討真實(shí)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)以及產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對(duì)兩者關(guān)系的影響。然后,將2009-2012年深交所A股上市公司作為研究樣本,以Roychowdhury(2006)模型衡量真實(shí)盈余管理程度,以深交所的信息披露考評(píng)結(jié)果作為信息披露政策的替代指標(biāo),同時(shí)將可能對(duì)回歸結(jié)果產(chǎn)生影響的變量作為控制變量,最后針對(duì)研究假設(shè)設(shè)計(jì)實(shí)證模型。 第五章：實(shí)證結(jié)果及分析。首先對(duì)各變量進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì),然后采用Pearson系數(shù)進(jìn)行簡(jiǎn)單的相關(guān)性分析,初步判定被解釋變量和解釋變量之間的相關(guān)關(guān)系,并通過(guò)方差膨脹因子法檢驗(yàn)回歸模型是否具有多重共線性,接著通過(guò)stata11.0軟件對(duì)回歸模型進(jìn)行多元回歸分析,最后進(jìn)行穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)。 第六章：研究結(jié)論、政策建議、局限性及研究展望。根據(jù)本文的實(shí)證研究得出研究結(jié)論,并從外部監(jiān)管和內(nèi)部治理兩大方面提出相應(yīng)的政策建議。同時(shí),指出本文的局限性,并對(duì)有關(guān)信息披露與真實(shí)盈余管理的研究進(jìn)行未來(lái)展望。 通過(guò)實(shí)證研究,本文得出如下結(jié)論： 第一,通過(guò)全樣本回歸發(fā)現(xiàn),信息披露政策對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理具有一定的抑制作用,但是對(duì)不同真實(shí)盈余管理方式的影響程度不同,其中對(duì)費(fèi)用操控具有顯著的抑制作用,但對(duì)銷售和生產(chǎn)操控并沒(méi)有起到明顯的抑制作用。結(jié)果表明,信息披露政策對(duì)抑制真實(shí)盈余管理方面具有一定的有效性,但是這種有效性尚未發(fā)揮完全的作用。 第二,本文根據(jù)真實(shí)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)將樣本企業(yè)分為微利企業(yè)和非微利企業(yè),結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)非微利企業(yè)顯著影響了信息披露政策對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理的抑制效果。 第三,本文根據(jù)產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)將樣本企業(yè)分為國(guó)有企業(yè)和非國(guó)有企業(yè),結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)國(guó)有企業(yè)顯著影響了信息披露政策對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理的抑制效果。 總之,信息披露政策對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理具有顯著的抑制作用,但對(duì)于不同真實(shí)盈余管理行為產(chǎn)生的效果不同,而且真實(shí)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)和產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)能夠顯著影響信息披露政策對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理的抑制效果。即信息披露政策具有一定的有效性,但是這種有效性尚未得到完全發(fā)揮。 本文可能的創(chuàng)新之處有： 第一,以往有關(guān)信息披露對(duì)盈余管理的影響研究主要側(cè)重于對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的影響,而近年來(lái)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)盈余管理方法還包括真實(shí)盈余管理,信息披露對(duì)不同盈余管理方法的影響程度可能不同,因此本文從真實(shí)盈余管理這一新的視角出發(fā)研究信息披露對(duì)其的影響,具有研究視角上的創(chuàng)新,同時(shí)也拓展了信息披露與盈余管理的相關(guān)研究,豐富了這方面的研究成果。 第二,本文從產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)這一新視角考察信息披露政策對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理的影響,這為理解我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)中信息披露與真實(shí)盈余管理的關(guān)系提供了新的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。 第三,根據(jù)信息披露對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理三種操控方式的不同影響程度,分析信息披露政策的有效性,并且對(duì)信息披露政策未能完全發(fā)揮作用進(jìn)行原因探討。本文的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)有助于監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)重新審視已有的信息披露政策是否有助于約束管理層的真實(shí)盈余管理行為。 本文可能的不足之處有： 第一,樣本選擇的局限性。由于受制于信息透明度指標(biāo)的選擇,本文僅將深交所A股上市公司作為研究樣本,沒(méi)有考慮到上交所上市公司,也沒(méi)有考慮到B股、H股、交叉股等上市公司,這可能導(dǎo)致本文的研究結(jié)論不能完全適用于我國(guó)所有上市公司的整體情況。 第二,變量和模型設(shè)計(jì)的局限性。本文采用深交所信息披露考評(píng)結(jié)果衡量信息披露政策指標(biāo),雖然這個(gè)結(jié)果具有一定的權(quán)威性和客觀性,但在設(shè)置評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)時(shí)難免存在主觀性從而影響結(jié)果的準(zhǔn)確性,這個(gè)考評(píng)結(jié)果是否能完全替代信息披露政策指標(biāo)還有待進(jìn)一步研究的證實(shí)。
[Abstract]:In the domestic and international theory and practice, research on the relationship between information disclosure and earnings management have been a major concern. The information asymmetry between managers and outside investors, in order to achieve a specific purpose of earnings provides enough space for the company's earnings management, and fully reliable information disclosure to some extent can reduce this information asymmetry, improve the ability of investors to identify the earnings management behavior, which is conducive to reducing the possibility OFEARNINGS management. In general, the scope of earnings management is not beyond accounting standards, appropriate earnings management is not a bad thing, but earnings management may imply opportunism behavior tendency, the long term may damage the value of the company, will whitewash or obscure the true performance of the company level, making it difficult for investors to through the "modified" after the earnings report to make effective The investment decision is not conducive to protecting the interests of investors and other stakeholders. Therefore, regulators need external information disclosure of information disclosure of listed companies to develop policies and regulations, the formation of a strong external restriction and supervision mechanism of management, so as to inhibit the earnings management behavior to a certain extent, protect the interests of outside investors the public, to promote the healthy and sustainable development of the final sentence, conducive to the stability and development of the capital market.
After years of development, China's relevant regulatory agencies and departments have gradually establish and improve the information disclosure system of the listed company, the Shenzhen stock exchange to develop a "Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed company information disclosure assessment methods", the information transparency of Listed Companies in China generally improved, but there are still some listed companies illegal disclosure of information or reduce information with the transparency of the phenomenon of earnings management. Therefore, research on the relationship between information disclosure and earnings management according to the research results and take corresponding measures to regulate the behavior of information disclosure of listed companies, to improve the transparency of information, has important theoretical and practical significance to curb the behavior of earnings management.
Study on the relationship between the two, foreign literature is abundant, the relative lack of domestic literature, and the existing literature that information transparency and earnings management has negative correlation, namely the higher information transparency, the lower the extent of earnings management, the high quality of the information disclosure has a certain inhibitory effect on the earnings management behavior of the company. The main earnings management from the perspective, and less involved in the study of real earnings management.
In recent years, many scholars have found that, in the management of earnings management, in addition to manipulate accruals, may control investment, financing, management of actual transactions, and this by manipulating the real business transactions (for example, abnormal price promotions, reduce development costs, excessive production) to achieve earnings manipulation the purpose of the behavior of earnings is generally called real earnings management. Compared with the accrual earnings management, real earnings management is more difficult for stakeholders to identify, more subtle, facing the review of risk and litigation risk is lower.
Then, gradually strengthen the external supervision, the external environment of the capital market and gradually improve the legal system, the information disclosure policy gradually improved, more transparent information disclosure situation, whether management may favor the implementation of accrual earnings management from the implementation of less risk, hidden higher degree of real earnings management or management? It may be due to external pressure and reduce the real earnings management behavior? This is a question. But judging from the existing literature, lack of study on the effect of disclosure on real earnings management, especially a few articles to be considered from the effectiveness of the policy, which led to the research of this paper, that is the real earnings management of the information disclosure from the perspective of policy influence on earnings management. In general, the so-called accounting policy belongs to the company, not the external macro system, and based on the The results of information disclosure evaluation of Shenzhen stock exchange measure information disclosure policy indicators, so the information disclosure policy in this paper is especially the external regulatory institution's standard or formulation system for information disclosure behavior of listed companies.
This paper adopts the research method combining normative research and empirical research, through the real earnings management from the new perspective analysis of the impact of information disclosure policy on earnings management, in order to enrich the related theory research, at the same time to remind investors of concern and attention, and provide evidence to support and policy recommendations for the relevant policy makers and regulators. From the content point of view, this paper includes the following six chapters:
Chapter 1: introduction. It mainly introduces the background, purpose and significance of the study, research ideas and methods, research framework and research innovation.
The second chapter: literature review. Through the information disclosure and information asymmetry, reviewed the related literatures of earnings management and asymmetric information and information disclosure and earnings management, analysis and review, found the relationship between information disclosure and earnings management mainly focus on the accrual earnings management perspective, and seldom consider the effectiveness of information disclosure the policy, which led to the study of this paper, the study on information disclosure policy impact on real earnings management.
The third chapter: analysis of the theoretical basis and theory. Firstly, the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and efficient market theory to explain and analysis, then the relevant concepts of policy and real earnings management information disclosure was defined, at the end of the information disclosure policies such as the impact of real earnings management were analyzed.
The fourth chapter: research design. According to the previous chapter of theoretical analysis this paper puts forward the research hypotheses, namely information disclosure policy more perfect, the lower the degree of real earnings management, and further explore the real motives of earnings management and the nature of property right relationship between the two. Then, 2009-2012 Shenzhen A shares of listed companies as the research sample Roychowdhury (2006) model, to measure the degree of real earnings management, the Shenzhen stock exchange information disclosure evaluation results as alternative indicators of information disclosure policy, and may affect the outcome of the regression variables as control variables, according to the research hypotheses and design of empirical model.
The fifth chapter: empirical results and analysis. First, descriptive statistics of the variables, then the Pearson coefficients of simple correlation analysis, the preliminary judgment is explained the relationship between variables and explanatory variables, and the variance inflation factor test method is multiple linear regression model, and then based on the stata11.0 software, the regression model for multivariate regression the final analysis, health inspection.
The sixth chapter: the conclusion of the study, suggestions, limitations and Prospect of the research. According to the empirical research conclusions, and put forward the corresponding policy suggestions from the external and internal supervision in two aspects. At the same time, points out the limitations of this paper, and Research on information disclosure and management of more than really Suyin future prospects.
Through the empirical study, this paper draws the following conclusions:
First, through the whole sample regression found that information disclosure policy has a certain inhibitory effect on the real earnings management, but the degree of influence of different real earnings management in different ways, which has obvious inhibitory effect on cost control, but the sales and production control and did not have obvious inhibitory effect. The results show that the disclosure of information the policy has certain effectiveness in suppressing real earnings management, but the effectiveness has yet to play a full role.
Second, according to the real earnings management motivation, the sample companies are divided into small profit enterprises and non profit enterprises. It is found that the non profit enterprises have a significant impact on the effectiveness of information disclosure policies on real earnings management.
Third, according to the nature of property right, the sample enterprises are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. It is found that state-owned enterprises significantly affect the inhibition effect of information disclosure policy on real earnings management.
In short, the information disclosure policy has a significant inhibitory effect on the real earnings management behavior, but for the different effect of real earnings management and real earnings management, motivation and property rights can significantly affect the information disclosure policy on the inhibition effect of real earnings management. Information disclosure policy has some validity, but the effectiveness of the has not yet been fully realized.
The possible innovations in this article are as follows:
First, the information disclosure focuses on the influence on the accrual earnings management research on the impact of earnings management, but recent studies have found that earnings management methods include real earnings management, the influence degree of information disclosure of different earnings management methods may be different, so this article based on the information from a new perspective of real earnings management the disclosure of its influence, innovative research perspective, research and develop information disclosure and earnings management, enrich the research achievements in this field.
Second, this paper investigates the impact of information disclosure policy on real earnings management from a new perspective of property right, which provides new empirical evidence for understanding the relationship between information disclosure and real earnings management in China's capital market.
Third, according to the information disclosure effect on real earnings management three control methods, effectiveness analysis of information disclosure policy, and the information disclosure policy has failed to fully play the role of the reason discussion. This study found that information disclosure policies help regulators to reconsider these will help to restrict the management behavior real earnings management.
The inadequacies of this article are as follows:
First, the samples are limited. Due to the information transparency index, this article only Shenzhen A shares of listed companies as the research sample, the listed companies did not pay into account, but also did not consider the B shares, H shares, shares and other cross listed companies, which may lead to the overall situation of the research conclusion of this paper can not be completely applicable to all listed companies in China.
Second, the limitations of design variables and models. In this paper, the disclosure of evaluation results to measure the information disclosure policy indicators by the Shenzhen stock exchange information, although this result has certain authority and objectivity, but in setting up the evaluation criteria of subjectivity and accurate inevitably influence the results, the evaluation results can completely replace the need further study of information disclosure policy index confirmed.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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