本文關(guān)鍵詞：我國(guó)股份制商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬激勵(lì)問題研究　出處：《重慶理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：財(cái)政部于2009年初下發(fā)了關(guān)于限定金融業(yè)高管薪酬的指引——《金融類國(guó)有及國(guó)有控股企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬管理辦法》，文中提出金融機(jī)構(gòu)要將280萬定為高管薪酬的“漲停板”，由此可見，以銀行為主的金融業(yè)高管薪酬已經(jīng)引起了國(guó)家的重視。有鑒于此，我們應(yīng)深入研究商業(yè)銀行高管人員的薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制，制定出符合我國(guó)銀行業(yè)現(xiàn)狀的薪酬激勵(lì)制度，使薪酬制度既能將銀行高管薪酬與銀行績(jī)效相聯(lián)系，又能使高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制切實(shí)促進(jìn)銀行業(yè)的長(zhǎng)足發(fā)展。在現(xiàn)階段對(duì)銀行高管薪酬制度的研究不僅有利于增強(qiáng)銀行的核心競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力、完善銀行的薪酬治理結(jié)構(gòu)，同時(shí)也能推進(jìn)銀行業(yè)管理效率與水平。 本文選擇對(duì)上市股份制商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬進(jìn)行研究，其目的在于：相對(duì)于大型國(guó)有獨(dú)資銀行而言，股份制商業(yè)銀行組建時(shí)間不長(zhǎng)，人員配備，特別是高級(jí)管理人才需求較大；而另一方面,由于股份制商業(yè)銀具有無歷史包袱、經(jīng)營(yíng)機(jī)制較靈活、經(jīng)營(yíng)效益相對(duì)較好和因規(guī)模小便于優(yōu)化管理的優(yōu)勢(shì)，使得股份制商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬較高，薪酬問題一直備受社會(huì)關(guān)注，并存在很大爭(zhēng)議，因此值得我們?nèi)ド钊胙芯俊?本文先闡述了薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的理論基礎(chǔ)，，分析當(dāng)前國(guó)內(nèi)外在高管薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制運(yùn)行中的特點(diǎn)；其次，以研究股份制商業(yè)銀行的高管薪酬激勵(lì)制度為出發(fā)點(diǎn)，選取8家已上市的股份制商業(yè)銀行，通過數(shù)據(jù)的收集和整合，將股份制商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬水平放在整個(gè)行業(yè)間進(jìn)行對(duì)比，同時(shí)分析銀行高管與普通員工的薪酬差距，從而得出股份制商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬水平過高的問題。另外，通過近三年出具的高管薪酬數(shù)據(jù)，與銀行資產(chǎn)收益率、不良貸款率、利潤(rùn)總額等財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)進(jìn)行對(duì)比，得出股份制商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬水平與業(yè)績(jī)關(guān)聯(lián)度不明顯。再次，收集了股份制商業(yè)銀行高管在銀行中的持股數(shù)和占股比例，得出銀行高管目前還是以發(fā)放現(xiàn)金形式的短期薪酬激勵(lì)為主，缺乏長(zhǎng)期薪酬激勵(lì)。因此本論文針對(duì)上述問題分析，提出了相應(yīng)的建議與對(duì)策，以期對(duì)股份制銀行薪酬激勵(lì)制度的建設(shè)、完善，提供一定參考。
[Abstract]:In early 2009, the Ministry of Finance issued a guideline on limiting the executive compensation of the financial sector-"measures for the Management of the compensation of the Heads of State-Owned and State-owned holding Enterprises in Finance". This paper proposes that financial institutions should set 2.8 million as the "stop board" of executive compensation, so it can be seen that the bank-oriented financial industry executives' compensation has attracted the attention of the state. We should deeply study the compensation incentive mechanism of senior executives in commercial banks, and formulate a compensation incentive system in line with the present situation of our banking industry, so that the compensation system can not only link the compensation of bank executives with bank performance. At the present stage, the study on the executive compensation system is not only conducive to strengthening the core competitiveness of banks, and improve the governance structure of bank compensation. At the same time can also promote the efficiency and level of banking management. This paper chooses to study the executive compensation of listed joint-stock commercial banks, the purpose of which is: compared with the large state-owned banks, joint-stock commercial banks do not have a long time to set up and staffing. In particular, the demand for senior management personnel is great; On the other hand, because the joint-stock commercial bank has no historical burden, the management mechanism is more flexible, the operating efficiency is relatively good and the small scale is easy to optimize the management, it makes the executive compensation of joint-stock commercial banks higher. The issue of compensation has been concerned by the community, and there is a lot of controversy, so it is worth our in-depth study. This paper first expounds the theoretical basis of the compensation incentive mechanism, and analyzes the characteristics of the executive compensation incentive mechanism at home and abroad. Secondly, in order to study the executive compensation incentive system of joint-stock commercial banks as a starting point, select 8 listed joint-stock commercial banks, through the collection and integration of data. The level of executive compensation of joint-stock commercial banks is compared in the whole industry, and the pay gap between bank executives and ordinary employees is analyzed. In addition, through the data of executive compensation issued in the past three years, it compares with the financial indicators such as the rate of return on assets, the ratio of non-performing loans, the total profits and other financial indicators. It is concluded that the compensation level of senior executives in joint-stock commercial banks is not significantly related to their performance. Thirdly, the paper collects the number of shareholding and the proportion of shares held by senior executives of joint-stock commercial banks in banks. It is concluded that bank executives are mainly short-term salary incentive in the form of cash, and lack of long-term compensation incentive. Therefore, this paper analyzes the above problems and puts forward the corresponding suggestions and countermeasures. In order to share-stock bank compensation incentive system construction, perfect, provide certain reference.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F276.6;F272.92

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