本文關(guān)鍵詞：信用貸款擠兌模型　出處：《管理科學(xué)學(xué)報》2012年10期 　論文類型：期刊論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 信用貸款擠兌 先到先服務(wù)規(guī)則 串謀均衡

【摘要】：自Diamond and Dybvig(1983)以來,貸款擠兌作為公司金融領(lǐng)域的一種流動性危機,一直被認(rèn)為是銀行擠兌的另一版本.然而貸款擠兌中企業(yè)并不完全遵守銀行擠兌文獻中的前提假設(shè),即"先到先服務(wù)"規(guī)則.盡管銀行認(rèn)為企業(yè)應(yīng)該如此,但企業(yè)在應(yīng)對擠兌時出于自利會重新調(diào)整還貸順序,并利用這種選擇權(quán)與銀行進行私下協(xié)商,達成串謀均衡以求終止擠兌.與以往的銀行擠兌文獻不同,信用貸款擠兌中不僅存在共贏均衡和擠兌均衡,而且還存在介于兩者之間的串謀均衡.企業(yè)與部分銀行能否實現(xiàn)串謀,關(guān)鍵在于企業(yè)能否追加足夠的信用保證.本文解釋了貸款擠兌的機制,將Diamond-Dybvig的銀行擠兌范式擴展到了不滿足順次服務(wù)約束時三方博弈的情形.當(dāng)企業(yè)完全遵循"先到先服務(wù)"規(guī)則或無法實現(xiàn)串謀時,結(jié)果與Diamond-Dybvig模型相同.
[Abstract]:Since the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) has a liquidity crisis loan runs as corporate finance, has been considered to be another version of bank runs. However the enterprise loan runs does not fully comply with the assumption that the bank runs in the literature, "first come first serve rule. Although the bank believes that enterprises should be so however, corporate self-interest will adjust in response to the order owing on the run, and use this option with the bank for the privately negotiated, a conspiracy to terminate the run. Different from the previous literature on bank runs, and runs a balanced win-win equilibrium not only the existence of credit loan runs, but there is also a conspiracy between enterprises. And some banks can achieve collusion, the key lies in the enterprise can add enough credit guarantee. This paper explains the mechanism of loan run, Diamond-Dybvig bank runs The extension paradigm is extended to the three party game which does not meet the sequential service constraints. When the enterprise fully follows the "first come first served" rule or fails to achieve collusion, the result is the same as the Diamond-Dybvig model.

【作者單位】： 西安交通大學(xué)公共政策與管理學(xué)院;西安交通大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項目(70673077;71071127)
【分類號】：F832.4;F224
【正文快照】： 0引言銀行作為金融中介一方面接納儲戶的存款并支付利息;另一方面也向企業(yè)提供貸款以便獲得貸款收益.當(dāng)銀行遭遇隨機性外部沖擊時,儲戶會蜂擁而至擠提存款,銀行遭遇的這種流動性危機稱為銀行擠兌(bank runs)或存款擠兌;同樣,當(dāng)企業(yè)遭遇隨機性外部沖擊時,為企業(yè)提供貸款的多家

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前9條

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本文編號：1426262