【摘要】：建筑市場的掛靠經(jīng)營現(xiàn)象興起于我國建筑行業(yè)資質(zhì)管理制度的實施。隨著市場經(jīng)濟體制的確立，我國建筑業(yè)也得到國家的重點扶持，迅速發(fā)展，市場的繁榮也帶來行業(yè)內(nèi)競爭的加劇。為了保證建筑市場健康發(fā)展，維護公平有序的競爭，提高市場的競爭效率，以1984年出臺的《建筑企業(yè)營業(yè)管理條例》為標志，我國開始實施對建筑企業(yè)實行資質(zhì)管理的市場準入制度。在此基礎(chǔ)上，建設(shè)部在后期又對建筑企業(yè)的資質(zhì)管理進行了擴大和深化。資質(zhì)管理制度規(guī)定禁止建筑施工企業(yè)超越本企業(yè)資質(zhì)等級許可的業(yè)務(wù)范圍或者以任何形式用其他建筑施工企業(yè)的名義承攬工程。但是，從法律實施效果來看，相關(guān)規(guī)定并沒有得到很好的執(zhí)行，建筑領(lǐng)域的掛靠經(jīng)營已經(jīng)被各方所接受甚至成為行業(yè)主流。利益的驅(qū)動使大量不具備資質(zhì)條件的企業(yè)或個人爭相進入建筑行業(yè)，出現(xiàn)了建筑業(yè)市場特有的掛靠經(jīng)營現(xiàn)象，給建筑市場帶來了諸多問題。 本文以問卷調(diào)查作為研究基礎(chǔ)。首先，，從建筑市場掛靠經(jīng)營現(xiàn)象的基本特征入手，論述了掛靠經(jīng)營的來源、界定、法律特征及表現(xiàn)形式，通過實際調(diào)查分析了掛靠經(jīng)營對市場參與主體和建筑行業(yè)產(chǎn)生的各類風(fēng)險，立足于掛靠經(jīng)營現(xiàn)象的現(xiàn)狀及內(nèi)涵分析提出掛靠經(jīng)營本質(zhì)上一種降低資源配置效率的尋租行為，應(yīng)該及時進行有效治理；其次，對掛靠經(jīng)營現(xiàn)象進行了經(jīng)濟學(xué)分析，掛靠經(jīng)營是資質(zhì)作為稀缺資源在市場中合理配置的結(jié)果，符合建筑企業(yè)的利益需求。并以博弈論為基礎(chǔ)分析了掛靠經(jīng)營的形成機制，探討了掛靠雙方罔顧被政府查處的風(fēng)險接受掛靠經(jīng)營的原因；再次，比較國內(nèi)外相關(guān)國家的建筑企業(yè)管理制度的異同，得出發(fā)達國家的建筑企業(yè)管理制度對我國資質(zhì)管理制度改革的借鑒意義，結(jié)合問卷調(diào)查的內(nèi)容提出我國資質(zhì)管理制度改革的初步構(gòu)想，弱化資質(zhì)管理制度，嘗試信用體系的建設(shè)，實現(xiàn)建筑企業(yè)的動態(tài)管理；最后，通過治理機制理論分析，得出目前我國建筑承包市場掛靠經(jīng)營現(xiàn)象治理最有效的方式是第三方治理，通過第三方介入完善信息傳遞的效率和對市場違約主體的有力懲處來約束和規(guī)范市場主體，即完善市場信用體系的建設(shè)，而政府應(yīng)承擔(dān)信用體系的建設(shè)的責(zé)任。并運用治理機制理論分析了第三方信用治理下市場主體的成本收益，基于信用機制作用下市場主體的博弈策略選擇，得出市場主體掛靠經(jīng)營的影響因素是掛靠經(jīng)營被發(fā)現(xiàn)的概率和違約成本。提出了完善建筑市場信用的制度建設(shè)和信息傳遞機制等辦法，通過一系列配套制度來增加建筑市場的透明度和違法成本，從而達到遏制掛靠經(jīng)營的目的。
[Abstract]:The linked management of the construction market arises from the implementation of the qualification management system of the construction industry in China. With the establishment of the market economy system, the construction industry of our country has also been supported by the state and developed rapidly, and the prosperity of the market has also led to the aggravation of the competition in the industry. In order to ensure the healthy development of the construction market, maintain fair and orderly competition and improve the competitive efficiency of the market, it is marked by the "regulations on Business Administration of Construction Enterprises" issued in 1984. Our country begins to implement the market access system that carries out the qualification management to the construction enterprise. On this basis, the Ministry of Construction in the latter part of the construction enterprise qualification management has been expanded and deepened. The qualification management system stipulates that construction enterprises shall be prohibited from contracting projects in the name of other construction enterprises in any form or beyond the scope of business permitted by their own qualification grades. However, from the effect of the implementation of the law, the relevant provisions have not been implemented very well, the construction industry has been linked to the operation has been accepted by all parties or even become the mainstream of the industry. Driven by interests, a large number of enterprises or individuals who do not have the qualifications compete to enter the construction industry, which brings many problems to the construction market. This paper is based on questionnaire survey. First of all, starting with the basic characteristics of the phenomenon of linked management in the construction market, this paper discusses the source, definition, legal characteristics and manifestation of the linked operation. Through the actual investigation and analysis of all kinds of risks to the market participants and the construction industry caused by the linked management, based on the analysis of the current situation and connotation of the linked management phenomenon, the paper puts forward that the linked management is essentially a rent-seeking behavior that reduces the efficiency of the allocation of resources. Secondly, the phenomenon of linked management is analyzed by economics, which is the result of the rational allocation of qualification in the market as scarce resources, which is in line with the interest needs of construction enterprises. On the basis of game theory, this paper analyzes the forming mechanism of linked management, discusses the reasons why the two parties ignore the risk of being investigated by the government to accept the linked operation. Thirdly, it compares the similarities and differences of the management systems of construction enterprises in the relevant countries at home and abroad. The paper draws a conclusion that the management system of construction enterprises in developed countries can be used for reference to the reform of qualification management system in our country. Combined with the contents of questionnaire survey, this paper puts forward the preliminary conception of the reform of qualification management system in our country, and weakens the qualification management system. Finally, through the theoretical analysis of governance mechanism, it is concluded that the most effective way to manage the phenomenon of building contract market in our country is the third party governance. The third party is involved in perfecting the efficiency of information transmission and punishing the subject of market breach of contract to restrain and standardize the market subject, that is, to perfect the construction of the market credit system, and the government should bear the responsibility of the construction of the credit system. Using the theory of governance mechanism, the paper analyzes the cost and income of the market subject under the third party credit governance, and the game strategy choice of the market subject under the action of the credit mechanism. It is concluded that the influencing factors of the market main body are the probability of discovery and the cost of breach of contract. This paper puts forward some measures such as perfecting the system construction and information transmission mechanism of credit in construction market, which can increase the transparency and illegal cost of construction market through a series of supporting systems, so as to achieve the purpose of curbing the linked operation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F426.92

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