本文選題：管理層收購 + 整體上市��； 參考：《蘇州大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：過去十幾年，我國國有企業(yè)改革取得了一定的成績，但是仍然存在所有者缺位、產(chǎn)權(quán)不清、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不合理、上市公司和母公司之間利益輸送等歷史問題，阻礙了我國市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的健康發(fā)展。黨的十八屆三中全會提出繼續(xù)深化經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革，堅持建立現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度�，F(xiàn)代企業(yè)的特征是所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)兩權(quán)分離，，而這導(dǎo)致了委托-代理問題，代理成本的存在降低了公司的績效。 管理層收購作為一種制度創(chuàng)新，能夠明晰產(chǎn)權(quán)、將企業(yè)剩余控制權(quán)和剩余索取權(quán)的都賦予管理層，從而強(qiáng)化激勵機(jī)制，對于企業(yè)的有效整合、降低代理成本和提高經(jīng)營管理效率都有著重大的意義。然而由于中國法律制度的缺失，管理層收購在應(yīng)用過程中產(chǎn)生了一系列問題，其中又以控股股東與中小股東的利益沖突最為突出，控股股東即管理層容易通過關(guān)聯(lián)交易等手段侵害中小股東利益。通過整體上市，把主業(yè)資產(chǎn)都注入到上市公司，可以減少關(guān)聯(lián)交易，改善公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，提高公司績效。本文以雙匯公司為例，介紹了雙匯管理層收購和整體上市的過程，通過對財務(wù)指標(biāo)的分析研究雙匯模式對公司治理的影響，總結(jié)了適用雙匯模式的企業(yè)特征，最后針對雙匯模式可能產(chǎn)生的新的問題提出對策建議。
[Abstract]:In the past decade or so, some achievements have been made in the reform of state-owned enterprises in our country, but there still exist historical problems such as the absence of owners, unclear property rights, unreasonable property rights structure, the transmission of interests between listed companies and their parent companies, etc. It hinders the healthy development of our market economy. The third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee proposed to continue to deepen the reform of the economic system and adhere to the establishment of a modern enterprise system. The characteristics of modern enterprises are the separation of ownership and management rights, which leads to the principal-agent problem, and the existence of agency cost reduces the performance of the company. As a kind of system innovation, MBO can clarify the property right, endow the management with the residual control right and residual claim right, so as to strengthen the incentive mechanism and effectively integrate the enterprise. It is of great significance to reduce agency cost and improve management efficiency. However, due to the lack of Chinese legal system, a series of problems arise in the application of MBO, among which the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is the most prominent. Controlling shareholders, that is, management, are apt to infringe on the interests of minority shareholders by means of related party transactions. Through the whole listing, the main business assets are injected into the listed companies, which can reduce the related party transactions, improve the corporate governance structure, and improve the corporate performance. Taking Shuanghui Company as an example, this paper introduces the process of Shuanghui MBO and the whole listing. Through the analysis of the financial index, the influence of Shuanghui model on corporate governance is analyzed, and the enterprise characteristics applicable to Shuanghui Mode are summarized. Finally, some countermeasures and suggestions are put forward for the new problems that may arise in the Shuanghui Model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘇州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F271;F275;F426.82

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