本文選題：WTO爭端解決機制 + 出口限制��； 參考：《西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著中國經(jīng)濟持續(xù)的高速發(fā)展,中國對于資源性產(chǎn)品的需求也越來越大,許多資源需要進口才能滿足本國的需求,比如石油和鐵礦石。但是仍然存在少數(shù)的資源性產(chǎn)品,中國的存儲量排在世界前列,比如稀土等。巨大儲蓄量使得中國在這類產(chǎn)品上一直處于出口的態(tài)勢。最近幾年,隨著其他一些國家逐漸減少國內(nèi)戰(zhàn)略性資源的開采量,國際資源性產(chǎn)品的價格逐漸上升。由此帶來的結(jié)果是中國在稀土等戰(zhàn)略性資源產(chǎn)品的開采量上逐漸增大,比如說稀土的開采量已經(jīng)占到世界總的開采量的95%以上。雖然這些資源性產(chǎn)品的出口能夠在一定程度上帶動經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,但是因為不合理的開采使得開采地的環(huán)境遭到嚴重破壞。同時,中國政府逐漸意識到以稀土為代表的戰(zhàn)略性資源產(chǎn)品對于我國經(jīng)濟的可持續(xù)發(fā)展、政治和軍事安全的重要作用。正是基于這種認識,中國政府采取了各種法律和行政法規(guī)措施來限制資源性產(chǎn)品的開采量,例如對資源的出口實施配額和征收關(guān)稅等。中國政府的這些措施在一定程度上減少了資源的開采量,保護了國內(nèi)的環(huán)境和資源,但是歐美等發(fā)達國家卻申訴到WTO,認為中國政府的限制措施損害了他們的利益,違反了WTO的相關(guān)規(guī)則。WTO成員國之間的紛爭通常都會通過WTO爭端解決機制解決,而WTO爭端解決機制能夠用動態(tài)博弈解釋。同時資源性產(chǎn)品出口限制案件在WTO爭端解決機制下同樣能夠用動態(tài)博弈的方法分析,因此本文利用動態(tài)博弈的方法結(jié)合WTO爭端解決機制來分析中國的資源出口限制管理。對于中國的資源出口限制管理,多數(shù)的國內(nèi)學(xué)者也是利用理論的方法來分析,而本文則采用案例分析的形式來研究中國的資源性產(chǎn)品出口限制管理,并對其提出具體的政策建議。在涉及中國資源性產(chǎn)品出口限制的案件中,又以歐盟、美國和墨西哥申訴中國原材料出口限制案和稀土案最為典型,.所以本文以中國原材料出口限制案和稀土案作為案例分析的對象。 在描述和分析中國資源性產(chǎn)品的出口限制措施現(xiàn)狀的基礎(chǔ)上,本文利用動態(tài)博弈分析了WTO爭端解決機制,并求出了爭端當事雙方的最優(yōu)策略解,以及在爭端解決機制的每一階段當事雙方在不同環(huán)境下的行為選擇。接下來本文結(jié)合中國原材料出口限制案和稀土案件分析了中國在該機制條件下的行為選擇是否合理。 在經(jīng)過上述分析之后,本文得到了如下有關(guān)結(jié)論：(1)一般而言,WTO爭端解決機制進行到上述執(zhí)行階段就結(jié)束了,主要是因為相對執(zhí)行成本而言,不執(zhí)行WTO決議的成本要高很多；(2)在WTO爭端解決機制中,多個階段存在占優(yōu)策略,這些階段主要包括報復(fù)實施階段、上述執(zhí)行階段、以及申訴階段；(3)中國在原材料出口限制案的行為選擇是合理的,但存在不足,而在稀土案中的行為選擇就克服了這些不足。 結(jié)合運用動態(tài)博弈分析WTO爭端解決機制的結(jié)論和案例分析的結(jié)果,本文對中國資源性產(chǎn)品出口限制管理提出了如下政策建議：(1)我國利用WTO爭端解決機制的對策,比如“重視磋商”、“依法應(yīng)對”、“區(qū)別對待”、“掌握主動”和“積累經(jīng)驗”的指導(dǎo)思想,以及借鑒中國原材料出口限制案中的行為選擇,和我國應(yīng)該增強應(yīng)對WTO爭端的處置能力；(2)修改與WTO規(guī)則不符的國內(nèi)法,國內(nèi)法與WTO規(guī)則的不符是導(dǎo)致其他國家申訴我國的主要原因。 縱觀全文,本文的創(chuàng)新之處主要存在以下幾個方面：(1)在研究方法上本文采用動態(tài)博弈模型分析了WTO爭端解決機制,同時利用案例分析法研究了中國資源性產(chǎn)品的出口限制問題；(2)在進行案例分析時,本文主要分析在WTO爭端解決機制下中國行為選擇是否合理,而非前人從如何改制出口管制措施或法律的角度來研究。同時由于研究能力的限制,本文還存在如下的不足之處：(1)在設(shè)置動態(tài)博弈模型時,本文沒有考慮政治因素給模型帶來的影響,雖然引入該變量之后模型更具有解釋性,但是引入政治變量之后不一定會改變當事方的行為選擇；(2)在設(shè)置動態(tài)博弈模型時,主要是從國家層面考慮國家會有怎樣的行為,但是如果考慮國內(nèi)相關(guān)利益行業(yè)的行為,從更微觀的角度出發(fā),模型可能更加說服力；(3)在選擇案例分析時,由于沒有相關(guān)變量的數(shù)據(jù),所以案例分析的精確性較差。對于這些不足之處希望在今后的學(xué)習(xí)和研究中得到解決,也希望有關(guān)學(xué)者能夠提出批評和具有指導(dǎo)性的意見。
[Abstract]:With the continuous rapid development of China's economy, China's demand for resource products is increasing, and many resources need to be imported to meet its own needs, such as oil and iron ore. But there are still a few resource products, and China's storage capacity is ranked in the front of the world, such as rare earth. Huge savings make China here. In recent years, with the gradual reduction of the exploitation of strategic resources in other countries, the price of international resource products has increased gradually in the last few years. The result is that China has gradually increased the exploitation of strategic resource products such as rare earth, for example, the mining of rare earth has occupied the world. More than 95% of the total amount of exploitation is achieved. Although the export of these resource products can promote economic development to a certain extent, the environment of the mining area is seriously damaged because of the unreasonable exploitation. At the same time, the Chinese government is gradually aware of the strategic resource products represented by the rare earth for the sustainable development of our economy, It is the important role of political and military security. It is based on this understanding that the Chinese government has adopted various laws and administrative regulations to restrict the exploitation of resource based products, such as the implementation of quotas and tariffs on the export of resources. These measures have reduced the exploitation of resources to a certain extent and protected the domestic market. Environment and resources, but developed countries such as Europe and America complain to WTO, think the Chinese government restricts the measures to harm their interests, violates the related rules of WTO, the disputes between.WTO members are usually solved by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can be adequately explained by the dynamic game. At the same time, the export of resource products is exported. The limited case can be analyzed by the dynamic game method under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Therefore, this paper uses the dynamic game method to combine the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to analyze China's resource export restriction management. For China's resource export restriction management, most of the domestic learners are also using the theory method to analyze, and this paper In the form of case analysis, we study the export restriction management of China's resource based products and put forward specific policy suggestions. In the cases involving the export restrictions of China's resources, the most typical case of the EU, the United States and Mexico appeals to China's export restrictions on raw materials and the case of dilute soil. Therefore, this article is based on Chinese raw materials. The export restriction case and the rare earth case are the object of the case analysis.
On the basis of describing and analyzing the current situation of export restrictions on Chinese resource products, this paper uses dynamic game to analyze the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and finds out the optimal strategic solution of the parties to the dispute, and the behavior choice of the parties under the different environment at each stage of the dispute settlement mechanism. The export restrictions of raw materials and rare earth cases have analyzed whether China's choice of behavior under the mechanism is reasonable.
After the above analysis, the following conclusions are obtained: (1) generally speaking, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is completed at the above implementation stage, mainly because of the relative execution cost, the cost of not implementing the WTO resolution is much higher; (2) in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, there are many stages dominant strategies in these stages. It mainly includes the stage of retaliation implementation, the above implementation stage, and the appeal stage; (3) the choice of China's export restrictions on raw materials is reasonable, but there is a shortage, and the choice of behavior in the rare earth case overcomes these shortcomings.
Combined with the results of the conclusion and case analysis of WTO dispute settlement mechanism by dynamic game analysis, the following policy suggestions are put forward for the export restriction management of China's resource based products: (1) the Countermeasures of using WTO dispute settlement mechanism in China, such as "paying attention to consultation", "coping with the law", "different treatment", "master initiative" and "product" The guiding ideology of "tired experience", and the choice of behavior in the case of China's raw material export restriction, and our country should strengthen the disposal ability to deal with the WTO dispute; (2) amend the domestic law which is inconsistent with the WTO rules, and the difference between the domestic law and the WTO rules is the main reason for other countries to appeal to our country.
Throughout the full text, the main innovations of this paper are as follows: (1) in this paper, the dynamic game model is used to analyze the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and the case analysis method is used to study the export restriction of Chinese resource products. (2) in the case of case analysis, this paper mainly analyzes the WTO dispute resolution machine. The choice of China's behavior is reasonable, not the study of how the predecessors have changed the export control measures or laws. At the same time, because of the limitations of the research ability, there are some shortcomings in this paper. (1) when setting up the dynamic game model, this paper does not consider the influence of the political factors to the model, although the variable is introduced. The model is more explanatory, but the introduction of political variables does not necessarily change the behavior choice of the parties. (2) when setting up a dynamic game model, it is mainly from the state level to consider what kind of behavior the country will have, but if the behavior of domestic related interests is considered, the model may be more convincing from a more micro perspective. (3) in the case of case analysis, the accuracy of case analysis is poor due to the lack of data from the relevant variables. These deficiencies are hoped to be solved in future studies and studies, and the relevant scholars are expected to be able to put forward criticism and instructive opinions.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F752.62;F426

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