D公司管理人員薪酬體系優(yōu)化設(shè)計
發(fā)布時間:2018-04-30 09:05
本文選題:國有企業(yè) + 管理人員 ; 參考:《蘭州交通大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文
【摘要】:在社會主義市場經(jīng)濟背景下,人力資源管理所起到的作用越來越大,薪酬管理作為人力資源的重要組成部分,它的主要作用是傳遞公司的價值導(dǎo)向。我國大型央企都是集團式的組織形式,目前薪酬分配體系大體上可以分為兩類,為單控模式和雙控模式。文中介紹了中石油近年薪酬制度改革的情況,并從第一視角進(jìn)行了分析和探討,希望給各類國有大型企業(yè)的相關(guān)改革提供交流借鑒。2014年8月,中共中央政治局審議通過了《中央管理企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人薪酬制度改革方案》,方案將于2015年年初開始實施。此次改革較為關(guān)切的問題包括:薪酬改革是否就是蔣欣?員工是否“受牽連”層層降薪?是否導(dǎo)致人才出走影響國企經(jīng)營等;趪覍π匠旮母锓桨傅某雠_,本論文對D公司管理人員薪酬體系優(yōu)化設(shè)計案例進(jìn)行分析,并擬實施。本論文以D公司的薪酬體系為基礎(chǔ),結(jié)合了薪酬相關(guān)的理論知識,利用對案例的描述和分析等方法,使用理論研究和實證研究的方式,描述了D公司現(xiàn)行的薪酬體系和其產(chǎn)生的影響,其薪酬體系的弊端造成的結(jié)果即:擁有高學(xué)歷、高技能的管理人員紛紛離職,多年來公司員工的離職率較高,且長此以往將會不利于公司的健康發(fā)展。同時,優(yōu)化方案的施行會存在許多的實際困難,根據(jù)公司的員工構(gòu)架和薪酬體系,從優(yōu)化方案中拉大工資差別,如果沒有公司對于工資總額擴充的批準(zhǔn),那么此次方案中絕大部分的員工的收入會降低,實際增加收入的員工則很少;如果收入比預(yù)期減少的時候,對于外部競爭力也減退,從而會流失一些高素質(zhì)的員工,論文中以福利政策作為支撐;并在員工的考核上,要求領(lǐng)導(dǎo)干部提高重視,保證基礎(chǔ)環(huán)節(jié)不遺漏或缺失,真正使考核的成為一個公平的績效考核。通過對現(xiàn)在薪酬體系的優(yōu)化,如增加學(xué)歷工資、年工津貼以及員工可以選擇的福利待遇等擬調(diào)整優(yōu)化內(nèi)容,配以實施保障措施,并將優(yōu)化后的薪酬體系結(jié)果預(yù)測與原薪酬體系的前后進(jìn)行對比分析。
[Abstract]:Under the background of socialist market economy, human resource management plays a more and more important role. As an important part of human resources, salary management plays an important role in transmitting the value orientation of the company. The large central enterprises in our country are all organized in groups. At present, the salary distribution system can be divided into two types: single control mode and double control mode. This paper introduces the situation of CNPC's salary system reform in recent years, and analyzes and discusses it from the first angle of view, hoping to provide a reference for the relevant reform of various large state-owned enterprises. The Politburo of the CPC Central Committee deliberated and approved the plan for the reform of the compensation system for persons in charge of central management enterprises, which will be implemented in early 2015. The reform concerns include: is the pay reform Jiang Xin? Are employees "implicated" in their pay cuts? Whether leads to the talented person to leave affects the state-owned enterprise management and so on. Based on the introduction of the national salary reform scheme, this paper analyzes the case of the optimization design of the executive compensation system of company D, and proposes to implement it. Based on the compensation system of company D, this paper combines the theory knowledge of compensation, using the method of case description and analysis, using the way of theoretical research and empirical research. This paper describes the current salary system of company D and its impact. The result of the malpractice of the compensation system is that the managers with high education and skills have left their jobs, and the turnover rate of employees in the company has been high for many years. And the long term will not be conducive to the healthy development of the company. At the same time, there will be many practical difficulties in the implementation of the optimization scheme. According to the employee structure and salary system of the company, the wage difference can be widened from the optimization scheme, without the approval of the company for the increase in the total amount of wages, Well, the income of the vast majority of employees in this program will be reduced, while the actual increase in income will be very small. If the income is lower than expected, the external competitiveness will also decline, thus losing some highly qualified employees. In this paper, welfare policy is taken as the support, and the leading cadres are required to pay more attention to the assessment of employees, to ensure that the basic links are not missing or missing, so that the appraisal becomes a fair performance appraisal. Through the optimization of the current salary system, such as increasing the academic background salary, the annual allowance and the benefits and benefits that employees can choose, and so on, they are matched with the implementation of safeguard measures. The results of the optimized compensation system are compared with that of the original compensation system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:蘭州交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F272.92;F426.22
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