本文選題：高管薪酬　切入點(diǎn)：企業(yè)績效　出處：《東華大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：長期以來,如何對高管人員進(jìn)行有效激勵一直是理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界關(guān)心的重要問題。特別是股份公司大量興起之后,伴隨公司所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離而產(chǎn)生的委托代理問題,使高管人員激勵問題受到了更廣泛的關(guān)注,激勵方式也得到了極大地發(fā)展。我國市場對激勵高管人員的探索實(shí)踐起步較晚,但最近幾年隨著公司治理的改進(jìn)以及資本市場的發(fā)展,高管人員獲得的激勵水平也開始出現(xiàn)持續(xù)增長。2006年初中國證監(jiān)會發(fā)布《上市公司股權(quán)激勵管理辦法》(試行),為我國上市公司廣泛開展股權(quán)激勵鋪平了道路。在理論研究方面,國內(nèi)部分研究者對高管人員薪酬激勵、股權(quán)激勵與公司業(yè)績的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了初步的研究,取得了有益的成果,然而這些研究各自由于可能在數(shù)據(jù)選取、樣本挑選或統(tǒng)計(jì)方法使用等方面存在一些缺陷,因此仍然不夠完善。同時(shí),在薪酬激勵、股權(quán)激勵與公司業(yè)績關(guān)系這一課題之下還可以衍生出許多細(xì)分的研究方向,過往的研究也較少涉及。 有鑒于此,本文從Wind數(shù)據(jù)庫及CSMAR數(shù)據(jù)庫獲取上市醫(yī)藥公司數(shù)據(jù),運(yùn)用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì),多元回歸分析等方法重點(diǎn)研究了四個(gè)問題,即：(1)高管薪酬激勵與上市醫(yī)藥企業(yè)業(yè)績的相關(guān)性(2)董事長是否兼任總經(jīng)理對高管薪酬與上市醫(yī)藥企業(yè)業(yè)績的相關(guān)性的影響。(3)控股股東的類型對高管薪酬與上市公司醫(yī)藥企業(yè)業(yè)績的相關(guān)性的影響。(4)不同薪酬激勵方式的效果是否存在差異。 研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)總體而言,高管年薪與上市醫(yī)藥企業(yè)短期績效顯著正相關(guān),高管持股比例與上市醫(yī)藥企業(yè)長期績效正相關(guān)。(2)相較而言,董事長兼任總經(jīng)理會使得上市醫(yī)藥企業(yè)高管薪酬激勵作用有所下降。(3)目前我國上市醫(yī)藥國企與民企中,高管激勵效果差異并不顯著。(4)上市醫(yī)藥企業(yè)中,高管年薪對短期激勵更有效,而股權(quán)激勵則更適用于長期激勵。
[Abstract]:For a long time, how to motivate executives effectively has been an important concern of the theoretical and practical circles, especially after the emergence of a large number of joint-stock companies, accompanied by the separation of corporate ownership and management of the principal-agent problem. As a result, the incentive problem of senior managers has been paid more attention to, and the incentive methods have been greatly developed. But in recent years, with the improvement of corporate governance and the development of capital markets, At the beginning of 2006, the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "measures on Stock incentive Management of listed companies", which paved the way for China's listed companies to widely carry out equity incentives. Some domestic researchers have made a preliminary study on the relationship between executive compensation incentive, equity incentive and corporate performance, and obtained useful results. However, these studies may be selected in the data. There are some defects in sample selection or the use of statistical methods, so it is still not perfect. At the same time, under the topic of compensation incentive, equity incentive and corporate performance relationship, there are still many subdivision research directions. Previous studies have also been less involved. In view of this, this article obtains the listed pharmaceutical company data from the Wind database and the CSMAR database, uses the descriptive statistics, the multivariate regression analysis and so on the method has studied the four questions emphatically, (1) the correlation between executive compensation incentives and the performance of listed pharmaceutical companies. (2) whether the chairman is concurrently the chairman of the board of directors on the relationship between executive compensation and the performance of listed pharmaceutical enterprises. 3) the type of controlling shareholders on the relationship between executive compensation and listed companies. The impact of the correlation of the performance of pharmaceutical companies. 4) whether there are differences in the effects of different compensation incentives. The study found that, in general, the annual executive salary was significantly positively correlated with the short-term performance of listed pharmaceutical companies, and the proportion of executive ownership was positively correlated with the long-term performance of listed pharmaceutical companies. The executive compensation incentive function of the listed pharmaceutical enterprises will be reduced by the chairman of the board of directors as the general manager.) at present, there is no significant difference in the effect of the executive incentive between the listed pharmaceutical state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises in our country) among the listed pharmaceutical enterprises, Annual executive pay is more effective for short-term incentives, while equity incentives are more suitable for long-term incentives.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F426.72

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