本文選題：合同研究組織　切入點(diǎn)：制藥企業(yè)　出處：《中國新藥雜志》2015年17期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：制藥企業(yè)與醫(yī)藥研發(fā)外包企業(yè)之間存在信息不對稱,容易出現(xiàn)醫(yī)藥研發(fā)外包企業(yè)的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題。本研究運(yùn)用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)矩陣法對合同研究組織(CRO)企業(yè)的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行評估,發(fā)現(xiàn)研發(fā)努力程度、信息泄露和隱藏風(fēng)險(xiǎn)對研發(fā)外包項(xiàng)目的影響程度都很高。本文針對研發(fā)外包企業(yè)可能發(fā)生的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),建議在研發(fā)第一階段采用固定支付和收益共享合同激勵CRO企業(yè),并提出了在研發(fā)第2階段根據(jù)道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)發(fā)生的概率,調(diào)整收益共享系數(shù)和決定是否配置控制權(quán),從而降低CRO企業(yè)的信息泄露和隱藏風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的對策。
[Abstract]:There is information asymmetry between pharmaceutical enterprises and pharmaceutical R & D outsourcing enterprises, which is prone to the moral hazard of pharmaceutical R & D outsourcing enterprises. In this study, the risk matrix method is used to evaluate the moral hazard of CRO (a contract research organization). It is found that the degree of R & D efforts, information leakage and hidden risks have a high impact on R & D outsourcing projects. In the first stage of R & D, it is suggested that CRO enterprises should be encouraged by fixed payment and revenue-sharing contracts. In the second stage of R & D, the income sharing coefficient should be adjusted according to the probability of moral hazard and the decision on whether to allocate control power should be made. In order to reduce the CRO enterprise information leakage and hidden risk countermeasures.
【作者單位】： 安徽中醫(yī)藥大學(xué)醫(yī)藥經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：安徽省高校人文社科研究重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目(SK2014A292)
【分類號】：F426.72;R95

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