本文關鍵詞： 發(fā)電側電力市場 差價合約模式 有限競價模式 博弈均衡　出處：《東南大學》2004年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：2002 年底,國家電力公司正式“廠網分開”,新成立了五大發(fā)電集團和兩 家電網公司,為實行發(fā)電商競價上網奠定了堅實的基礎,標志著中國電力市場化 改革已邁出了關鍵的一步。在競價上網的過程中,所有的發(fā)電公司都想使自身的 收益最大化,而電網公司卻想使購電費用最小化。在建立電力市場過程中,找到 一種有效合理的競價模式就顯得很重要,既激勵發(fā)電企業(yè)強化管理、提高效率, 從而降低了上網電價,又要考慮到電力改革的市場風險與平穩(wěn)過渡。 本文對國內試點的兩種競價模式(差價合約模式與有限競價模式)進行了深 入研究與分析,揭示了兩種競價模式的本質區(qū)別在于發(fā)電商的上網電量小于合約 電量時收益的結算差別;運用博弈論、微觀經濟學、電力市場理論的相關部分分 析了在發(fā)電側電力市場中,各發(fā)電公司和電網公司面對兩種競價模式的博弈行 為,基于發(fā)電商競價是完全信息博弈模型,相繼分析了一次性博弈和重復博弈的 均衡;在分析重復博弈時,研究了發(fā)電商合作的必要條件,為競價規(guī)則的設計提 供了防止發(fā)電商合謀的思路;在完全信息靜態(tài)博弈的基礎上,建立了在兩種競價 模式下,由多個發(fā)電商參加的產量博弈模型,并給出了數學解;最后在綜合比較 兩種競價模式的基礎上,本文提出了某個區(qū)域電網的電源結構對選擇競價模式的 影響。 本文主要是為當前的中國電力市場改革的實施提供一些理論支持,希望通過 對競價模式的理論研究,深化對中國電力工業(yè)市場化改革的認識。
[Abstract]:In end of 2002, the State Power Company officially "separated the power plant and network", and set up five major power generation groups and two new power generation groups. The home appliance network company has laid a solid foundation for the implementation of power generation companies bidding for the Internet, marking the marketization of electricity in China. The reform has taken a crucial step. In the bidding process, all the power generation companies want to make their own While grid companies want to minimize the cost of buying electricity, they want to maximize revenue. In the process of building a power market, find An effective and reasonable bidding model is very important, which not only motivates power generation enterprises to strengthen management, but also improves efficiency. Therefore, the electricity price is reduced, and the market risk and smooth transition of electric power reform should be taken into account. In this paper, two bidding modes (contract for difference model and limited bidding model) are discussed in detail. Through research and analysis, it is revealed that the essential difference between the two bidding modes lies in the fact that the power on the net of the generator is less than the contract. The difference of income between electricity and electricity; applying Game Theory, Microeconomics, and relevant parts of electricity Market Theory In the generation side electricity market, each generation company and the power grid company face the game of two bidding modes. Based on the complete information game model, the one-off game and the repeated game are analyzed one after another. In the analysis of repeated game, the necessary condition of power generation cooperation is studied, which is proposed for the design of bidding rules. On the basis of static game of complete information, two kinds of bidding are established. In this paper, the output game model with the participation of multiple generators is given, and the mathematical solution is given. Finally, a comprehensive comparison is made On the basis of two bidding modes, this paper proposes a new method for selecting bidding modes in a regional power grid. Influence This paper is mainly to provide some theoretical support for the implementation of the current reform of China's electricity market. The theoretical research on the bidding mode, deepening the understanding of the market-oriented reform of China's electric power industry.
【學位授予單位】：東南大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2004
【分類號】：F407.61

【引證文獻】

相關碩士學位論文 前7條

1 顧洪超;基于演化博弈論的發(fā)電商競價行為的研究[D];華北電力大學（北京）;2011年

2 鄧琳瑋;我國電力價格兩部制競價上網機制研究[D];北京工商大學;2010年

3 楊根;水電廠發(fā)電報價策略及其輔助決策系統(tǒng)研究[D];貴州大學;2006年

4 劉建良;水電廠報價決策支持系統(tǒng)研究[D];貴州大學;2007年

5 朱江艷;基于Repast仿真平臺的發(fā)電商演化博弈競價策略研究[D];華北電力大學（北京）;2010年

6 李海澎;企業(yè)電力負荷特性及需求側管理技術措施的研究[D];華北電力大學（河北）;2009年

7 朱維瑩;隨機演化博弈模型在發(fā)電市場的應用及分析[D];華北電力大學;2012年

，

本文編號：1471672