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產(chǎn)業(yè)集群企業(yè)合作競爭博弈機理研究

發(fā)布時間:2018-01-04 04:46

  本文關(guān)鍵詞:產(chǎn)業(yè)集群企業(yè)合作競爭博弈機理研究 出處:《廣西大學》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文


  更多相關(guān)文章: 產(chǎn)業(yè)集群 合作競爭 古諾博弈 知識創(chuàng)新“囚徒困境”博弈斯塔博格博弈


【摘要】:產(chǎn)業(yè)集群為區(qū)域經(jīng)濟的繁榮做出極大貢獻,發(fā)展成熟的產(chǎn)業(yè)集群成為地方政府乃至整個國家重要的經(jīng)濟手段之一,而能否形成有序的的合作競爭機制,則是促進整個產(chǎn)業(yè)集群效益提升關(guān)鍵。為此,本文基于博弈論理論與方法,通過構(gòu)建并創(chuàng)新相關(guān)經(jīng)典博弈模型,試圖尋求企業(yè)間能實現(xiàn)有序高效合作競爭博弈的過程和平衡點,以探尋能促進產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)企業(yè)有序合作競爭的有效措施。一方面,公平合理的利益分配機制,是實現(xiàn)產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)企業(yè)保持長期穩(wěn)定合作競爭的關(guān)鍵因素;另一方面,產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)企業(yè)合作競爭博弈主體,主要存在于同質(zhì)企業(yè)與異質(zhì)企業(yè)之間。基于此,本文研究的主要內(nèi)容包括:(1)構(gòu)建同質(zhì)企業(yè)間基于產(chǎn)量的古諾博弈模型并求解均衡解;(2)構(gòu)建同質(zhì)企業(yè)間基于知識創(chuàng)新的“囚徒困境”博弈模型并求解均衡解;(3)構(gòu)建異質(zhì)企業(yè)間(產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈上)的斯塔博格博弈模型并求解均衡解。 通過對產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)同質(zhì)企業(yè)間“基于產(chǎn)量的古諾合作競爭博弈”均衡解形成機理的研究,本文認為:完全合作的效益大于完全競爭,但單方背叛合作能實現(xiàn)短期背叛收益,要保持長期穩(wěn)定合作,必須提升博弈方對于合作收益的預期。 通過對產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)同質(zhì)企業(yè)間“基于知識創(chuàng)新的囚徒困境合作競爭博弈”均衡解形成機理的研究,本文認為:創(chuàng)新合作能夠提升創(chuàng)新力度與效果,但不完全信息下,某些企業(yè)可能會選擇模仿他人創(chuàng)新成果而不是進行聯(lián)合創(chuàng)新,導致選擇合作企業(yè)利益受損,必須降低這些模仿企業(yè)個數(shù),以及知識外溢的程度。 通過對產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)異質(zhì)企業(yè)間(產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈上)“斯塔博格合作競爭博弈”均衡解形成機理的研究,本文認為:生產(chǎn)商作為產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈上的核心企業(yè),如果暫時犧牲自己的利益來成全集體的利益,可以使整個產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈效益最大,但這種情況不能長期保持,除非選擇競爭的經(jīng)銷商能為生產(chǎn)商提供一定的補償,這個補償必須大于生產(chǎn)商選擇競爭時獲得的收益。 本文研究的最后,通過產(chǎn)業(yè)集群內(nèi)同質(zhì)企業(yè)間基于產(chǎn)量的古諾合作競爭博弈機理、同質(zhì)企業(yè)間基于知識創(chuàng)新的囚徒困境合作競爭博弈機理,以及異質(zhì)企業(yè)間 (產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈上)的斯塔博格合作競爭博弈機理,對溫州打火機、溫州柳市低壓電器以及上海汽車三個產(chǎn)業(yè)集群如何實現(xiàn)企業(yè)間的有序合作競爭,提出具體措施,以求達到理論指導實踐的研究目的。
[Abstract]:Industrial clusters have made great contributions to the prosperity of regional economy. The development of mature industrial clusters has become one of the important economic means of local governments and even the whole country, and whether or not an orderly cooperative and competitive mechanism can be formed. Therefore, based on the theory and method of game theory, this paper constructs and innovates the relevant classical game model. This paper attempts to seek the process and balance of the orderly and efficient cooperative competition game among enterprises in order to explore the effective measures to promote the orderly cooperative competition in the industrial cluster. On the one hand, it is a fair and reasonable benefit distribution mechanism. It is the key factor to realize the long-term stable cooperation and competition of the enterprises in the industrial cluster. On the other hand, the main players of cooperative competition in industrial clusters mainly exist between homogeneous enterprises and heterogeneous enterprises. The main contents of this paper include: (1) constructing the yield-based Cournot game model among homogeneous enterprises and solving the equilibrium solution; 2) constructing the "prisoner's dilemma" game model based on knowledge innovation among homogeneous enterprises and solving the equilibrium solution; Thirdly, the Stabag game model of heterogeneous enterprises (industrial chain) is constructed and the equilibrium solution is solved. Through the study of the formation mechanism of the equilibrium solution of "Cournot cooperative competition game based on output" among homogeneous enterprises in the industrial cluster, this paper holds that the benefit of complete cooperation is greater than that of complete competition. But the cooperation of unilateral betrayal can realize the short-term benefit of betrayal, and in order to maintain long-term stable cooperation, it is necessary to improve the expectation of the game side for the benefit of cooperation. Through the study of the formation mechanism of equilibrium solution of "Prisoner's Dilemma Competition Game based on knowledge Innovation" among homogeneous enterprises in industrial cluster, this paper holds that innovation cooperation can enhance innovation dynamics and effect. However, under incomplete information, some enterprises may choose to imitate others' innovation results instead of joint innovation, which results in the loss of the interests of cooperative enterprises, so the number of these imitation enterprises must be reduced. And the extent of knowledge spillover. Based on the study of the formation mechanism of the equilibrium solution of "Stabag Cooperative Competition Game" among heterogeneous enterprises in the industrial cluster, this paper holds that the producer is the core enterprise in the industrial chain. If you sacrifice your own interests temporarily to achieve the collective interests, you can make the maximum benefit of the entire industrial chain, but this situation can not be maintained for a long time, unless the choice of competitive dealers can provide a certain amount of compensation to the manufacturer. This compensation must be greater than the profit the producer receives when he chooses to compete. At the end of this paper, through the mechanism of Cournot cooperation and competition based on output among homogeneous enterprises in industrial cluster, the mechanism of prisoners' dilemma competition based on knowledge innovation among homogeneous enterprises, and the mechanism of heterogeneous enterprises' cooperation and competition. The game mechanism of Stabag cooperation and competition in the industrial chain is put forward, and some concrete measures are put forward on how to realize the orderly cooperative competition among enterprises in Wenzhou lighter, Wenzhou Liuzhou low-voltage electric appliance and Shanghai automobile industry cluster. In order to achieve the theoretical guidance of the practice of research.
【學位授予單位】:廣西大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F273.7;F271;F426.8;F426.8;F426.471

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