【摘要】：隨著智能手機(jī)和平板電腦的普及,網(wǎng)購(gòu)早已成為消費(fèi)者新的消費(fèi)習(xí)慣。越來(lái)越多的商家開(kāi)通電子商務(wù)平臺(tái)向消費(fèi)者銷(xiāo)售商品。為了更好更快地?fù)屨季W(wǎng)絡(luò)銷(xiāo)售市場(chǎng)和客戶群體,和以往傳統(tǒng)的線下企業(yè)一樣,電商企業(yè)在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)戰(zhàn)略中不約而同的都選擇了價(jià)格戰(zhàn)這一策略。價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是一面“雙刃劍”,在對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展帶來(lái)積極影響的同時(shí),也不能忽視價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的負(fù)面影響,尤其是當(dāng)價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不是基于效率時(shí)。 企業(yè)間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)方式包括價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和非價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng),傳統(tǒng)行業(yè)的企業(yè)間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)以價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)為主,國(guó)內(nèi)外不少學(xué)者都把研究重點(diǎn)集中在某個(gè)行業(yè)或某類產(chǎn)品的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)領(lǐng)域。在電子商務(wù)這一新興經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)的出現(xiàn)后,我國(guó)電子商務(wù)企業(yè)采用的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)模式主要是價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。2012年8月15日的電器巨頭京東、蘇寧等企業(yè)更是將這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)推向史無(wú)前例額的白熱化狀態(tài)。在價(jià)格戰(zhàn)中,不論是電商平臺(tái)本身、消費(fèi)者還是貨源市場(chǎng),都受到一定程度的沖擊和影響。按照博弈的理論,如果電商企業(yè)拼死堅(jiān)持價(jià)格戰(zhàn),則有可能導(dǎo)致一個(gè)零和博弈的結(jié)局。 本文以“8·15電商價(jià)格戰(zhàn)”中的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)主體電商平臺(tái)、消費(fèi)者、供應(yīng)商市場(chǎng)為研究案例,以電商領(lǐng)域的價(jià)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略為研究?jī)?nèi)容,綜合國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)電商競(jìng)爭(zhēng)策略的理論,利用波特的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)論、博弈論和供求均衡理論詳盡分析了電商企業(yè)進(jìn)行價(jià)格戰(zhàn)的現(xiàn)狀及特點(diǎn),對(duì)我國(guó)電商價(jià)格戰(zhàn)現(xiàn)狀及其發(fā)生的原因進(jìn)行探究；分析了第三方平臺(tái)商的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為所可能出現(xiàn)的結(jié)果、電商價(jià)格戰(zhàn)所爭(zhēng)奪的消費(fèi)者全體特征和面對(duì)價(jià)格戰(zhàn)的反應(yīng),及價(jià)格戰(zhàn)給供應(yīng)商帶來(lái)的影響；并針對(duì)在價(jià)格戰(zhàn)中體現(xiàn)的種種弊端,提出了規(guī)避惡性價(jià)格戰(zhàn)的相關(guān)對(duì)策。 研究顯示,作為價(jià)格戰(zhàn)本身,確實(shí)能在短時(shí)間吸引流量,達(dá)到電商平臺(tái)目的的有效手段,但要是不能發(fā)現(xiàn)價(jià)格戰(zhàn)帶來(lái)的利弊就會(huì)盲目的錯(cuò)估市場(chǎng)的反應(yīng)和結(jié)果的預(yù)期,得到的只能是血本無(wú)歸的結(jié)局。消費(fèi)者在這場(chǎng)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)中無(wú)疑是喜憂參半,低廉的價(jià)格使他們受益,但同時(shí)伴隨而來(lái)的質(zhì)量、物流、售后等一系列因素也讓每個(gè)消費(fèi)者對(duì)于低價(jià)促銷(xiāo)這個(gè)形式開(kāi)始質(zhì)疑,電商連番轟炸式的降價(jià)措施已經(jīng)造成了消費(fèi)市場(chǎng)的麻木和混亂。作為商品的供貨商,自身在入駐平臺(tái)之前就應(yīng)該權(quán)衡利弊,深入思考。 以戰(zhàn)略差異化發(fā)展的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)論為基礎(chǔ),確立企業(yè)的成本領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢(shì),不斷創(chuàng)新,生產(chǎn)差異性的產(chǎn)品或增加產(chǎn)品的客戶體驗(yàn)服務(wù)或附加價(jià)值,以及選擇準(zhǔn)確、有效的投資決策,才是電商企業(yè)應(yīng)對(duì)市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的最佳應(yīng)對(duì)策略。
[Abstract]:With the popularity of smartphones and tablets, online shopping has become a new consumer habit. More and more merchants open e-commerce platform to sell goods to consumers. In order to seize the network sales market and customer group better and faster, like the traditional offline enterprises, e-commerce enterprises have chosen the price war strategy in the competition strategy. Price competition is a "double-edged sword", which not only has a positive impact on economic development, but also can not ignore the negative impact of price competition, especially when price competition is not based on efficiency. The competition between enterprises includes price competition and non-price competition. The competition among enterprises in traditional industries is dominated by price competition. Many scholars at home and abroad have focused on the field of price competition in a certain industry or a certain kind of products. After the emergence of e-commerce as a new economic activity, the competition mode adopted by Chinese e-commerce enterprises is mainly price competition. On August 15, 2012, the electronics giant JingDong, Su Ning and other enterprises are pushing the war to unprecedented white-hot state. In the price war, both the e-commerce platform itself, consumers and the source market are affected to a certain extent. According to the game theory, if e-commerce enterprises persist in price war, it may lead to a zero-sum game. In this paper, the main body of the competition in the "815 e-commerce price war", the e-commerce platform, consumers, suppliers market as a case study, e-commerce field of price competition strategy as the research content, synthesizing the domestic and foreign theory of e-commerce competition strategy. By using Porter's theory of competition, game theory and supply and demand equilibrium theory, this paper analyzes in detail the current situation and characteristics of the price war carried out by e-commerce enterprises, and probes into the present situation and the causes of the e-commerce price war in China. This paper analyzes the possible results of the competitive behavior of the third-party platform vendors, the characteristics of the consumers competing for the e-commerce price war and the reaction to the price war, and the impact of the price war on the suppliers. In allusion to the malpractice in the price war, the paper puts forward some countermeasures to avoid the vicious price war. Studies have shown that, as a price war itself, it is indeed an effective means to attract traffic in a short period of time and achieve the purpose of an e-commerce platform. However, if the advantages and disadvantages of price warfare are not found, the market reaction and outcome expectations will be blindly misestimated. What can only be achieved is the result of the loss of money. Consumers are undoubtedly mixed in this war. They benefit from low prices, but at the same time, a series of factors, such as quality, logistics, after-sale and so on, also make every consumer begin to question the form of low price promotion. E-commerce's bombardment of price cuts has caused numbness and confusion in the consumer market. As a commodity supplier, one should weigh the pros and cons and think deeply before entering the platform. Based on the competitive theory of strategic differentiation development, we establish the cost leading advantage of enterprises, innovate constantly, produce different products or increase customer experience service or added value of products, and choose accurate and effective investment decisions. It is the best strategy for e-commerce enterprises to deal with market competition.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F272;F724.6

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