本文關(guān)鍵詞： C2B 承諾契約 產(chǎn)能協(xié)調(diào) 供應(yīng)鏈 定價(jià)策略　出處：《浙江工商大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展、新技術(shù)的應(yīng)用以及人們消費(fèi)觀念的轉(zhuǎn)變,消費(fèi)者開始對商品的質(zhì)量、樣式和價(jià)格等方面提出更多的要求,期望能購買到個(gè)性化、獨(dú)一無二的產(chǎn)品。而傳統(tǒng)電子商務(wù)模式(B2B、B2C、C2C)越來越不能滿足消費(fèi)者復(fù)雜多變的個(gè)性化需求,新興的電子商務(wù)模式隨之產(chǎn)生,最具代表性的是C2B(Customers To Bussiness)模式。C2B模式是以消費(fèi)者為主導(dǎo),滿足了消費(fèi)者的個(gè)性化需求,提高了消費(fèi)者在購物中的主導(dǎo)地位。C2B模式雖然能夠更好地滿足顧客個(gè)性化的需求,并最大限度地降低庫存,但也對企業(yè)的供應(yīng)鏈管理水平提出了更高的要求。一方面,在C2B模式下,市場需求的不確定性和較長的提前期使得需求預(yù)測非常困難,很容易出現(xiàn)產(chǎn)能不足或過剩的情況;另一方面,企業(yè)為了滿足消費(fèi)者個(gè)性化定制需要付出高額成本,而顧客不可能為個(gè)性化支付過高的費(fèi)用,因此,企業(yè)需要在不大幅提升價(jià)格的前提下聚合消費(fèi)者需求實(shí)現(xiàn)定制化生產(chǎn)。這些對于踐行C2B模式的企業(yè)來說是巨大的挑戰(zhàn)�；谝陨犀F(xiàn)實(shí)背景,本文運(yùn)用承諾契約、產(chǎn)能準(zhǔn)備機(jī)制、價(jià)格折扣契約、成本分擔(dān)契約以及博弈論等工具和研究方法,針對C2B模式下存在的產(chǎn)能沖突問題和定價(jià)策略進(jìn)行深入分析。本文首先對C2B電子商務(wù)的研究現(xiàn)狀、供應(yīng)鏈產(chǎn)能協(xié)調(diào)研究、電子商務(wù)環(huán)境下產(chǎn)品定價(jià)策略以及供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制的研究現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行較為詳細(xì)地綜述;其次,構(gòu)建了基于訂購量承諾契約產(chǎn)能決策模型,分析了集中決策、分散決策以及訂購量承諾契約協(xié)調(diào)三種情況下供應(yīng)鏈成員的博弈均衡,并考察了平臺商對個(gè)性化產(chǎn)品需求量的預(yù)測、承諾訂購比例等重要參數(shù)對供應(yīng)鏈總體及成員收益的影響。研究表明,訂購量承諾契約對C2B情景下的供應(yīng)鏈產(chǎn)能決策有良好的協(xié)調(diào)效果,平臺商應(yīng)合理設(shè)置契約參數(shù)以更好地發(fā)揮其積極作用。然后,針對個(gè)性化定制產(chǎn)品的特點(diǎn),構(gòu)建了基于價(jià)格折扣契約的產(chǎn)品定價(jià)模型,分析了集中決策、分散決策以及成本分擔(dān)契約協(xié)調(diào)三種情況下供應(yīng)鏈成員的博弈均衡,并考察了價(jià)格需求敏感系數(shù)和定制成本系數(shù)等參數(shù)對供應(yīng)鏈成員收益的影響。研究表明,成本分擔(dān)契約對C2B情景下的供應(yīng)鏈成員的定價(jià)策略有良好的協(xié)調(diào)效果,一定條件下能較好的改善供應(yīng)鏈成員的收益。但供應(yīng)商要合理的使用成本分擔(dān)契約以更好地發(fā)揮其積極作用。最后對本文的一些重要結(jié)論進(jìn)行總結(jié),并指出本研究的不足以及未來的研究方向。
[Abstract]:With the development of economy, the application of new technology and the change of people's consumption concept, consumers begin to put forward more demands on the quality, style and price of goods, and expect to buy individualized goods. A unique product. But the traditional e-commerce model B2BU B2C2C2C) can not meet the complex and changeable needs of consumers more and more, the emerging e-commerce model has come into being, the most representative of which is the C2BU customers to Bussiness.C2B model is consumer-oriented. It can meet the individual needs of consumers, improve the dominant position of consumers in shopping. C2B model can better meet the individual needs of customers, and reduce the inventory to the maximum extent. On the one hand, under the C2B model, the uncertainty of market demand and the long lead time make it very difficult to forecast the demand. On the other hand, enterprises have to pay high cost in order to satisfy individual customization, and customers can't pay too much for individuation, so, Enterprises need to aggregate consumer demand to achieve customized production without substantially increasing prices. These are great challenges for enterprises practicing C2B model. Based on the above realistic background, this paper uses commitment contract and capacity preparation mechanism. Price discount contract, cost sharing contract, game theory and other tools and research methods, aiming at the problem of capacity conflict and pricing strategy in C2B mode, are analyzed in depth. Supply chain capacity coordination research, product pricing strategy under e-commerce environment and supply chain contract coordination mechanism are reviewed in detail. Secondly, a capacity decision model based on order volume commitment contract is constructed. This paper analyzes the game equilibrium of supply chain members under the conditions of centralized decision, decentralized decision and contract coordination of order quantity commitment, and investigates the forecast of demand for personalized products by platform vendors. The effect of commitment ratio and other important parameters on supply chain total and member income. The research shows that the contract of commitment of order quantity has a good coordination effect on capacity decision of supply chain under C2B scenario. The platform vendor should set the contract parameters reasonably in order to play its positive role. Secondly, according to the characteristics of the customized products, the pricing model based on the price discount contract is constructed, and the centralized decision is analyzed. The game equilibrium of supply chain members under the conditions of decentralized decision and coordination of cost sharing contract is studied. The effects of price demand sensitivity coefficient and customization cost coefficient on the benefit of supply chain members are investigated. Cost-sharing contract has a good coordination effect on the pricing strategy of supply chain members under C2B scenario. Under certain conditions, the profit of supply chain members can be improved better. However, suppliers should use cost sharing contract reasonably to play a positive role. Finally, some important conclusions of this paper are summarized. And pointed out the deficiency of this study and the future research direction.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江工商大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 馮華;龐美;劉開軍;王天予;;戰(zhàn)略性轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)承諾策略下的供應(yīng)商選擇柔性研究[J];中國管理科學(xué);2016年02期

2 朱燕;;C2B新型電商模式運(yùn)作效率及對社會福利影響研究[J];商業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2015年28期

3 王碧云;;C2B模式中消費(fèi)者購買影響因素研究[J];電子商務(wù);2015年09期

4 鄭振飛;;來自“C2B模式”的啟發(fā)和思考[J];中國房地產(chǎn);2015年26期

5 劉曉文;韓冰;蔣永輝;于瑾;;支持需求聚合的C2B旅游電子商務(wù)自動(dòng)談判系統(tǒng)研究[J];計(jì)算機(jī)應(yīng)用與軟件;2015年08期

6 康博涵;趙杰麗;;C2B—開啟大規(guī)模量身定制的金鑰匙[J];商場現(xiàn)代化;2015年19期

7 牟雅婷;張文德;;C2B電子商務(wù)模式的發(fā)展研究[J];現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)信息;2015年10期

8 邱勇;趙容;;餐飲業(yè)即時(shí)團(tuán)購業(yè)務(wù)模式探索[J];中國商論;2015年Z1期

9 吳勇毅;;“互聯(lián)網(wǎng)+”加速信息化升級 C2B將成家電物流業(yè)新藍(lán)海[J];家用電器;2015年05期

10 彭鴻廣;駱建文;;不對稱信息下供應(yīng)鏈成本分擔(dān)激勵(lì)契約設(shè)計(jì)[J];系統(tǒng)管理學(xué)報(bào);2015年02期

，

本文編號：1509394