本文關鍵詞： 雙邊市場 電子商務平臺 非對稱定價行為 產(chǎn)品搭售行為 平臺兼容行為　出處：《山東財經(jīng)大學》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：隨著產(chǎn)業(yè)組織經(jīng)濟學理論的不斷發(fā)展與深入,關于雙邊市場理論的研究也日趨完善,尤其是雙邊市場的定價與基本特征方面的理論不斷豐富,雙邊市場理論已逐漸成為產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論研究的重要方向。隨著我國“互聯(lián)網(wǎng)+”行動計劃影響的不斷深入,電子商務平臺作為雙邊市場中最具代表性的平臺企業(yè),針對平臺競爭策略性行為進行深入的研究就具有重要的現(xiàn)實意義。但是,目前關于電子商務平臺的研究方向主要集中在關于平臺廠商的均衡價格的研究,而關于平臺廠商競爭策略性行為方向的研究則相對匱乏。雙邊市場具有與單邊市場明顯區(qū)別的獨特特征,如網(wǎng)絡外部性特征等,所以,僅僅依靠傳統(tǒng)單邊市場的產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論試圖解釋雙邊市場的產(chǎn)業(yè)行為是缺乏合理性的,因此,基于雙邊市場理論的研究由其是針對電子商務平臺的研究就具有重要的理論意義。本文基于雙邊市場理論,采用經(jīng)典產(chǎn)業(yè)組織模型——Hotelling模型,在其模型基礎上進行擴展,通過分析平臺廠商的三種主要策略性行為的影響因素以及策略性行為對平臺廠商均衡定價的影響,得出的結論主要有:第一,雙邊市場平臺中雙邊用戶完全單歸屬情況下,兩個平臺的賣方用戶分別提供產(chǎn)品差異化程度不同的差異化產(chǎn)品的非對稱定價策略行為,對賣方用戶與買方用戶收取注冊費用,當平臺企業(yè)的利潤最大化時,針對雙方用戶收取的均衡價格存在唯一解,但是,均衡價格之間存在相互影響,即如果一個平臺對買方用戶降價,那么另一平臺也對買方降價。賣方的直接網(wǎng)絡效應強度對買方用戶的均衡價格是沒有影響的,但是對賣方用戶的均衡定價有影響,這種影響的好壞是與平臺上賣方用戶的用戶規(guī)模的大小決定的。在賣方用戶較多的平臺中,賣方提供差異化的產(chǎn)品是有利于賣方用戶本身的利益的。第二,在實施搭售策略行為的情況下,平臺企業(yè)對于向賣方與買方收取注冊費用,使平臺利潤最大化的均衡定價和均衡用戶數(shù)量的大小關系與額外凈效用有關。而且,額外凈效應對賣方用戶和買方用戶的影響是相反的。當額外凈效用為正時,表示平臺企業(yè)通過對雙方用戶收取的費用的總和大于平臺企業(yè)由于采取產(chǎn)品搭售策略所產(chǎn)生的固定成本,同時還會獲得更高的賣方與買方的用戶規(guī)模,而沒有實施搭售策略的平臺企業(yè)的均衡價格與用戶規(guī)模則會低于原兩平臺企業(yè)均沒有采取搭售策略時的均衡價格與市場份額。但是,搭售策略并不能一定保證能夠在產(chǎn)業(yè)競爭中為實施搭售策略的平臺企業(yè)保駕護航。只有當被搭售產(chǎn)品的額外凈效用以及兩邊用戶的兩種網(wǎng)絡外部性強度滿足一定條件時,平臺企業(yè)才能夠對雙方用戶制定合理的價格以確保自身利潤最大化。第三,在一個平臺作為新進入廠商選擇完全兼容的策略性行為的情況下,均衡時新進入平臺針對賣方用戶和買方用戶制定的價格和兩邊用戶數(shù)量都與原在位平臺企業(yè)針對雙邊用戶制定的價格以及在此基礎上形成的用戶規(guī)模有關。同時,平臺二對雙方用戶制定的均衡價格以及在此基礎上形成的用戶規(guī)模與買方用戶與賣方用戶的間接網(wǎng)絡外部性的差額有關。平臺對買方用戶與賣方用戶的間接網(wǎng)絡外部性的差對于買方定價大小的影響是與平臺一對于賣方用戶收取的價格共同發(fā)揮作用的。完全兼容策略下的均衡定價大小均與平臺的直接網(wǎng)絡外部性成負相關關系。完全兼容并不能保證平臺二在競爭中能夠獲得最大化效應,只有當采取完全兼容所產(chǎn)生的成本滿足一定條件,且兩邊用戶的網(wǎng)絡外部性強度滿足一定條件時,平臺二才能對賣方用戶與買方用戶收取較高的注冊費用。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development and deepening of industrial organization economics theory, the research on the theory of two-sided markets is becoming more and more perfect, especially in the aspect of bilateral market pricing and the basic characteristics of the theory constantly enrich the bilateral market theory has gradually become the important industrial organization theory research direction. As China's "Internet plus" action plan of deepening electronic commerce, as a platform for bilateral market in the most representative of the platform enterprise, it has important practical significance to conduct in-depth studies on the platform competition strategy behavior. However, the current research direction of e-commerce platform, mainly concentrated in the equilibrium price on the platform manufacturers, and Research on the competitive strategy of platform vendors the direction is relatively scarce. The bilateral market has the obvious difference with the unique characteristics of the single market, such as network externality, so, Only rely on the traditional market industrial organization theory attempts to explain the behavior of the bilateral market industry is the lack of rationality, therefore, the research of two-sided markets theory which is the research on e-commerce platform has the important theory significance. This paper based on the theory of two-sided markets based on the classical industrial organization model -- Hotelling model, which extended its based on the model, through the three main strategic behavior analysis platform manufacturers influence factors and strategic behavior of platform firm equilibrium pricing, the main conclusions are: first, the bilateral single user completely belonging bilateral market platform, the two platforms provide seller user asymmetric pricing strategy behavior the degree of product differentiation between different products, the seller and the buyer user registration fee for the user, when the profits of the business platform The maximum, the equilibrium price for both users for the existence and uniqueness of solution, however, there is a mutual influence between the equilibrium price, if a platform of buyer's customer price, then another platform also to the buyer price. The equilibrium price strength direct network effect to the buyer the seller user is not affected, but the equilibrium pricing of the user's influence, this influence is the size of the user scale and the user platform decisions. The more users of the platform, the seller to provide differentiated products is conducive to the interests of the seller users themselves. Second, in the implementation of strategy of tying behavior, the platform for enterprise to charge the seller and the buyer registration fee, the size and number of users balanced equilibrium pricing platform to maximize profits associated with additional net utility. Moreover, additional net effect to the user The influence and user is the opposite. When additional net utility is positive, said the platform of enterprise through the sum of fees charged by the user on both sides is greater than the platform of enterprise because of fixed costs take bundling strategies are generated at the same time, the seller and the buyer will get higher user scale, without the implementation of equilibrium price and user the size of the Bundling Strategy Platform of enterprises will be lower than the original two platform companies have not taken the equilibrium price and market share tying strategies. However, tying strategy can not guarantee to take the escort business platform sales strategy for the implementation of competition in the industry. Only when the two kinds of network externality tying product extra the net effect on both sides of the user and satisfy certain conditions, the platform enterprises can develop a reasonable price for both users to ensure that their own profit maximization. In third, a As a platform of strategic behavior of new entrants is completely compatible with the selected case, the equilibrium price and new platform for both sides to enter the number of users users: buyers and sellers are related to the original formulation incumbent for bilateral users to make the price and on the basis of the formation of the scale of users. At the same time, the indirect network externality formation platform two for both users to make the equilibrium price and on the basis of the user scale and the buyer and seller user user's balance. The indirect network externality of the buyer and the seller platform user user difference is a platform for the seller and the price charged to the user to play the role for the buyer. The size is completely compatible with the equilibrium pricing the size of the pricing strategy under the direct network externalities are negatively related with the platform. Fully compatible and can not guarantee the platform two In the competition, the maximum effect can be achieved. Only when the cost that is completely compatible with certain conditions is satisfied, and the strength of the network externalities of both sides satisfy certain conditions, platform two can receive a higher registration fee for the seller and the buyer.

【學位授予單位】：山東財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F724.6

【相似文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 干春暉,姚瑜琳;中期策略性行為分析[J];上海管理科學;2004年04期

2 干春暉;姚瑜琳;;策略性行為理論研究[J];中國工業(yè)經(jīng)濟;2005年11期

3 董鋒;;合作博弈策略性行為的產(chǎn)業(yè)組織分析[J];黑龍江對外經(jīng)貿(mào);2006年07期

4 李美娟;;論網(wǎng)絡產(chǎn)業(yè)接入定價與策略性行為[J];科技管理研究;2012年17期

5 干春暉;企業(yè)非合作策略性行為的產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論述評[J];經(jīng)濟學動態(tài);2001年11期

6 吳昌南;;知識披露策略:專利競賽中的廠商策略性行為[J];科技進步與對策;2011年10期

7 蔣傳海;夏大慰;;具有轉移成本市場中的企業(yè)策略性行為分析[J];財經(jīng)研究;2009年06期

8 董維剛;論進入障礙中的策略性行為及公共政策的困難[J];遼東學院學報;2004年S1期

9 陳義國;馬志勇;;基于產(chǎn)品質量策略性行為的進入壁壘研究[J];經(jīng)濟評論;2010年03期

10 劉恩華;王今;;基于產(chǎn)業(yè)生命周期的策略性行為組合研究[J];汽車工業(yè)研究;2011年11期

相關會議論文 前1條

1 毛壽龍;;權力、市場與城市治理[A];自主治理與擴展秩序：對話奧斯特羅姆[C];2012年

相關重要報紙文章 前1條

1 埃爾文·E 羅斯(Alvin E Roth)　記者 鄭景昕 翻譯;我們從市場設計中學會了什么[N];東方早報;2012年

相關博士學位論文 前1條

1 武治國;技術特征變動下市場結構變遷及企業(yè)技術策略性行為研究[D];吉林大學;2008年

相關碩士學位論文 前6條

1 汪鯨;管制策略與政府管制行為[D];浙江財經(jīng)大學;2016年

2 蘇清芳;雙邊市場競爭策略性行為分析[D];山東財經(jīng)大學;2016年

3 魏明;基于產(chǎn)品選擇的企業(yè)非合作策略性行為研究[D];上海財經(jīng)大學;2005年

4 石慧;市場進入的理論分析與典型工業(yè)市場的實證檢驗[D];吉林大學;2006年

5 洪龍華;中國房地產(chǎn)上市公司策略性行為分析[D];蘇州大學;2008年

6 李哲;我國公共政策制定中交易成本問題研究[D];西北大學;2013年

，

本文編號：1492992