發(fā)布時間：2018-09-08 16:26

【摘要】：基于顯示原理以及機制設(shè)計的思想,運用廣義質(zhì)量生產(chǎn)函數(shù)模型,針對PPP項目招標建立了關(guān)于PPP項目特許經(jīng)營權(quán)期與廣義質(zhì)量的二維信息招標直接機制模型,在保證投標人真實顯示自己綜合管理能力的條件下最大化參與雙方的福利。通過模型求解,得到了該招標機制的最優(yōu)分配以及最低質(zhì)量的設(shè)定條件,并得出在該機制下能實現(xiàn)社會福利最優(yōu)。并鑒于機制設(shè)計的復(fù)雜性,給出了該機制的實施規(guī)則。最后通過算例,證明了該直接機制的有效性,對PPP項目招標提供了理論上的指導(dǎo)。
[Abstract]:Based on the principle of display and the idea of mechanism design, the direct mechanism model of two-dimensional information bidding for PPP project is established based on the generalized quality production function model and the franchise period and generalized quality of PPP project. Maximize the benefits of both parties under the condition that the bidder truly demonstrates his or her comprehensive management ability. By solving the model, the optimal allocation of the bidding mechanism and the setting conditions of the lowest quality are obtained, and the optimal social welfare can be realized under this mechanism. In view of the complexity of the mechanism design, the implementation rules of the mechanism are given. Finally, the effectiveness of the direct mechanism is proved by an example, which provides theoretical guidance for PPP project bidding.
【作者單位】： 武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金重點項目資助(71231007)
【分類號】：F283
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本文編號：2231060