【摘要】：基于顯示原理以及機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的思想,運(yùn)用廣義質(zhì)量生產(chǎn)函數(shù)模型,針對(duì)PPP項(xiàng)目招標(biāo)建立了關(guān)于PPP項(xiàng)目特許經(jīng)營權(quán)期與廣義質(zhì)量的二維信息招標(biāo)直接機(jī)制模型,在保證投標(biāo)人真實(shí)顯示自己綜合管理能力的條件下最大化參與雙方的福利。通過模型求解,得到了該招標(biāo)機(jī)制的最優(yōu)分配以及最低質(zhì)量的設(shè)定條件,并得出在該機(jī)制下能實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)福利最優(yōu)。并鑒于機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)的復(fù)雜性,給出了該機(jī)制的實(shí)施規(guī)則。最后通過算例,證明了該直接機(jī)制的有效性,對(duì)PPP項(xiàng)目招標(biāo)提供了理論上的指導(dǎo)。
[Abstract]:Based on the principle of display and the idea of mechanism design, the direct mechanism model of two-dimensional information bidding for PPP project is established based on the generalized quality production function model and the franchise period and generalized quality of PPP project. Maximize the benefits of both parties under the condition that the bidder truly demonstrates his or her comprehensive management ability. By solving the model, the optimal allocation of the bidding mechanism and the setting conditions of the lowest quality are obtained, and the optimal social welfare can be realized under this mechanism. In view of the complexity of the mechanism design, the implementation rules of the mechanism are given. Finally, the effectiveness of the direct mechanism is proved by an example, which provides theoretical guidance for PPP project bidding.
【作者單位】： 武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目資助(71231007)
【分類號(hào)】：F283
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本文編號(hào)：2231060