非對稱信息下PPP模式的逆向選擇與道德風險防范研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-09-05 19:16
【摘要】：公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施是經(jīng)濟發(fā)展的奠基石,立足國內(nèi)實踐,借鑒國際成功經(jīng)驗,減輕政府財政壓力,推廣運用政府和社會資本合作模式(PPP)是國家進行經(jīng)濟改革的重大任務(wù)。然而,PPP模式具有全壽命周期長、投資額大、合約關(guān)系復(fù)雜等特點,社會資本作為PPP項目的投標人以及項目公司的組建者,其能力高低對PPP模式的順利實施至關(guān)重要,而由于政府對社會資本掌握的信息不全,導(dǎo)致政府在招標階段未篩選出優(yōu)秀的社會資本,從而出現(xiàn)合約簽訂前的逆向選擇與合約簽訂后的道德風險問題。鑒于此,基于政府角度,對非對稱信息下PPP模式的逆向選擇與道德風險問題進行研究具有重要的理論意義和實用價值。本文主要研究內(nèi)容如下:(1)通過對國內(nèi)外PPP模式相關(guān)文獻的閱讀,引入信息不對稱理論,運用定量與定性分析相結(jié)合的方法,綜合分析合約簽訂前的逆向選擇問題與合約簽訂后的道德風險問題。(2)在PPP模式招標階段,分析了逆向選擇問題產(chǎn)生的原因、危害及措施。結(jié)合綜合評分法與價值工程評價方法,提出以社會資本可提供的公共服務(wù)質(zhì)量與全壽命周期成本累計現(xiàn)值的比值作為信號的信息傳遞模型,運用帕累托分離均衡理論,分析該信號可作為政府篩選出合適社會資本的依據(jù)。其次,為保證社會資本提供信息的真實性,提出基于自報成本目標值的激勵模型以及基于需求風險的動態(tài)補償模型,兩種模型的建立增加了合約完整性,提高了信息傳遞模型有效甄別優(yōu)秀社會資本的準確度。(3)在PPP模式合約的執(zhí)行階段,分析了道德風險問題產(chǎn)生的原因、危害及措施。通過對PPP模式收益的分析,建立道德風險分析模型求得PPP項目總收益最大時項目公司的最優(yōu)努力水平,并通過MATLAB分析各變量對最優(yōu)努力水平的影響程度。同時運用演化博弈理論建立了政府與項目公司激勵努力的收益矩陣,并給出不同收益條件下系統(tǒng)的均衡穩(wěn)定策略,研究結(jié)果可為政府如何激勵項目公司付出高努力水平提供指導(dǎo)。(4)最后,通過算例分析了模型的可操作性,對政府防范信息不對稱導(dǎo)致的逆向選擇與道德風險問題具有一定的參考價值。
[Abstract]:Public infrastructure is the cornerstone of economic development. It is an important task for the country to carry out economic reform based on domestic practice, draw lessons from international successful experience, reduce the pressure of government finance, and popularize the mode of cooperation between government and social capital, (PPP). However, the model has the characteristics of long life cycle, large investment, complicated contract relationship, etc. As the bidder of PPP project and the organizer of project company, the ability of social capital is very important to the smooth implementation of PPP model. Due to the incomplete information of the government on the social capital, the government does not screen out the excellent social capital in the bidding stage, which leads to the problem of moral hazard before the contract is signed and after the contract is signed. In view of this, it is of great theoretical significance and practical value to study the adverse selection and moral hazard of PPP model under asymmetric information from the angle of government. The main contents of this paper are as follows: (1) through the reading of domestic and foreign PPP model related literature, the information asymmetry theory is introduced, and the method of combining quantitative and qualitative analysis is used. This paper comprehensively analyzes the adverse selection problem before the contract signing and the moral hazard problem after the contract signing. (2) in the bidding stage of PPP mode, the causes, harm and measures of the reverse selection problem are analyzed. Combined with the comprehensive scoring method and the value engineering evaluation method, this paper puts forward a information transmission model based on the ratio of the public service quality and the cumulative present value of the whole life cycle cost, which can be provided by social capital, and applies the Pareto separation equilibrium theory. The analysis of the signal can be used as the basis for the government to screen out the appropriate social capital. Secondly, in order to ensure the authenticity of the information provided by social capital, the incentive model based on the target value of self-reported cost and the dynamic compensation model based on demand risk are proposed. The establishment of the two models increases the integrity of the contract. It improves the accuracy of the information transfer model in effectively discriminating excellent social capital. (3) in the implementation stage of PPP model contract, the causes, harm and measures of moral hazard are analyzed. By analyzing the income of PPP model, the moral hazard analysis model is established to obtain the optimal effort level of the project company when the total income of the PPP project is the largest, and the influence of each variable on the optimal effort level is analyzed by MATLAB. At the same time, by using the evolutionary game theory, the paper establishes the income matrix of the government and the project company, and gives the equilibrium and stability strategy of the system under different income conditions. The results of the study can provide guidance for the government to encourage the project companies to pay a high level of effort. (4) finally, the feasibility of the model is analyzed through an example. It has certain reference value for government to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F283
[Abstract]:Public infrastructure is the cornerstone of economic development. It is an important task for the country to carry out economic reform based on domestic practice, draw lessons from international successful experience, reduce the pressure of government finance, and popularize the mode of cooperation between government and social capital, (PPP). However, the model has the characteristics of long life cycle, large investment, complicated contract relationship, etc. As the bidder of PPP project and the organizer of project company, the ability of social capital is very important to the smooth implementation of PPP model. Due to the incomplete information of the government on the social capital, the government does not screen out the excellent social capital in the bidding stage, which leads to the problem of moral hazard before the contract is signed and after the contract is signed. In view of this, it is of great theoretical significance and practical value to study the adverse selection and moral hazard of PPP model under asymmetric information from the angle of government. The main contents of this paper are as follows: (1) through the reading of domestic and foreign PPP model related literature, the information asymmetry theory is introduced, and the method of combining quantitative and qualitative analysis is used. This paper comprehensively analyzes the adverse selection problem before the contract signing and the moral hazard problem after the contract signing. (2) in the bidding stage of PPP mode, the causes, harm and measures of the reverse selection problem are analyzed. Combined with the comprehensive scoring method and the value engineering evaluation method, this paper puts forward a information transmission model based on the ratio of the public service quality and the cumulative present value of the whole life cycle cost, which can be provided by social capital, and applies the Pareto separation equilibrium theory. The analysis of the signal can be used as the basis for the government to screen out the appropriate social capital. Secondly, in order to ensure the authenticity of the information provided by social capital, the incentive model based on the target value of self-reported cost and the dynamic compensation model based on demand risk are proposed. The establishment of the two models increases the integrity of the contract. It improves the accuracy of the information transfer model in effectively discriminating excellent social capital. (3) in the implementation stage of PPP model contract, the causes, harm and measures of moral hazard are analyzed. By analyzing the income of PPP model, the moral hazard analysis model is established to obtain the optimal effort level of the project company when the total income of the PPP project is the largest, and the influence of each variable on the optimal effort level is analyzed by MATLAB. At the same time, by using the evolutionary game theory, the paper establishes the income matrix of the government and the project company, and gives the equilibrium and stability strategy of the system under different income conditions. The results of the study can provide guidance for the government to encourage the project companies to pay a high level of effort. (4) finally, the feasibility of the model is analyzed through an example. It has certain reference value for government to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安建筑科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F283
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