本文選題：低碳經(jīng)濟 + 差異碳稅��； 參考：《江西師范大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：工業(yè)革命帶來經(jīng)濟快速發(fā)展的同時,也加劇了全球氣候變暖現(xiàn)象,危害著社會的發(fā)展與人類的生存。已知溫室氣體中二氧化碳對氣候變暖的影響最大,因此世界將節(jié)能減排的目光聚焦在二氧化碳的減排上。發(fā)達國家對低碳經(jīng)濟的研究先于中國等發(fā)展中國家,在低碳技術研發(fā)、新能源開發(fā)、清潔生產(chǎn)等方面取得了顯著的成效。最廣泛使用的市場碳減排政策包括碳排放權交易和碳稅,而碳稅因為成本最低、途徑單一、減排效果好,瑞典、丹麥、荷蘭、意大利等多個國家紛紛征收碳稅來控制碳排量。中國雖然是碳排放量最多的發(fā)展中國家,但是積極地承擔著減排的任務,碳稅這一有力減排政策將來也會納入中國稅收體系中來,因此研究碳稅背景下企業(yè)的低碳生產(chǎn)行為具有重要的意義。本文運用演化博弈的相關理論,構建政府與企業(yè)策略選擇的博弈模型,探索政府分別對低碳生產(chǎn)企業(yè)和非低碳生產(chǎn)企業(yè)征收統(tǒng)一碳稅和高額碳稅的情況下,企業(yè)生產(chǎn)行為的變化情況。通過構建微分方程、求解復制動態(tài)方程,得出系統(tǒng)演化的穩(wěn)定點,并進一步分析政府、企業(yè)和系統(tǒng)的演化穩(wěn)定性。得知只有企業(yè)低碳生產(chǎn)的額外收益收入大于成本時,企業(yè)才會傾向于低碳生產(chǎn);政府實施監(jiān)管時的總成本小于稅收收入,且企業(yè)低碳生產(chǎn)與非低碳生產(chǎn)的收益差大于實際投入成本時,系統(tǒng)會演化至政府監(jiān)管企業(yè)選擇低碳生產(chǎn)這一狀態(tài)。最后運用Matlab R2014b進行數(shù)值仿真,分析了政府監(jiān)管概率、補貼系統(tǒng)、差異碳稅稅率變動時對系統(tǒng)演化的影響,最終得出政府初期監(jiān)管意愿越高,企業(yè)選擇低碳生產(chǎn)的可能越大;政府的補貼系數(shù)對企業(yè)生產(chǎn)行為的影響較小;政府的差異碳稅稅率對企業(yè)的影響較大,稅率提升越快,企業(yè)選擇低碳生產(chǎn)的速度也越快。
[Abstract]:The industrial revolution brought about rapid economic development, but also aggravated the global warming phenomenon, which endangers the development of society and the survival of human beings. Carbon dioxide is known to have the greatest impact on global warming, so the world is focusing on reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The research on low-carbon economy in developed countries is ahead of that in developing countries such as China, and has achieved remarkable results in low-carbon technology research and development, new energy development, cleaner production and so on. The most widely used market carbon abatement policies include carbon trading and taxes on carbon emissions, which have the lowest cost, a single path and a good effect, with Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Italy and other countries imposing carbon taxes to control carbon emissions. Although China is the developing country with the most carbon emissions, it is actively undertaking the task of reducing emissions. The carbon tax policy, which is capable of reducing emissions, will also be included in China's tax system in the future. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the low-carbon production behavior of enterprises under the background of carbon tax. Based on the theory of evolutionary game, this paper constructs a game model of government and enterprise strategy choice, and explores the case that the government collects unified carbon tax and high carbon tax on low-carbon production enterprises and non-low-carbon production enterprises, respectively. Changes in the production behavior of the enterprise. By constructing the differential equation and solving the replicating dynamic equation, the stable point of system evolution is obtained, and the evolutionary stability of government, enterprise and system is further analyzed. Only when the additional revenue from low-carbon production is greater than the cost, the enterprise will tend to low-carbon production; the total cost of government regulation is less than the tax revenue. When the profit difference between low carbon production and non low carbon production is greater than the actual input cost, the system will evolve to the state of government supervising enterprises to choose low carbon production. Finally, using Matlab R2014b to carry on the numerical simulation, analyzed the government supervision probability, the subsidy system, the difference carbon tax rate change to the system evolution influence, finally obtained the government early stage supervision will be higher, the enterprise chooses the low carbon production likely to be bigger; The government's subsidy coefficient has little influence on the enterprise's production behavior, and the difference of government's carbon tax rate has a greater influence on the enterprise's production behavior. The faster the tax rate rises, the faster the enterprise chooses the low carbon production rate.
【學位授予單位】：江西師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F279.2;F812.42;F224.32

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