本文選題：交通運(yùn)輸經(jīng)濟(jì) + 停車定價(jià)　； 參考：《系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐》2017年07期

【摘要】：本文研究公共停車場(chǎng)和私營(yíng)停車場(chǎng)之間的定價(jià)博弈問(wèn)題.考慮早高峰出行模式,出行者可以選擇小汽車或者軌道交通出行.小汽車出行用戶在到達(dá)目的時(shí),需考慮停車問(wèn)題(選用公共停車場(chǎng)或私營(yíng)停車場(chǎng)).本文首先采用交通流的瓶頸模型分析出行模式與兩類停車場(chǎng)定價(jià)、各自停車位數(shù)量的關(guān)系.在此基礎(chǔ)上,建立了政府決策者(公共停車場(chǎng))與私人效益最大化追求者(私營(yíng)停車場(chǎng))參與的NASH博弈模型,探討NASH平衡條件下的兩類停車場(chǎng)的最優(yōu)收費(fèi)模式.同時(shí),比較了兩類停車場(chǎng)共存的博弈競(jìng)價(jià)機(jī)制與單一私營(yíng)停車場(chǎng)供應(yīng)的社會(huì)效益.研究結(jié)果表明,以最小化社會(huì)總成本為目標(biāo),政府決策者是否實(shí)施停車補(bǔ)貼,將取決于公用停車場(chǎng)停車位數(shù)量.政府決策者可以通過(guò)調(diào)整公共停車位的數(shù)量和收費(fèi)水平,使得交通系統(tǒng)性能趨于系統(tǒng)最優(yōu).
[Abstract]:This paper studies the pricing game between public parking and private parking. Considering the morning rush trip mode, travelers can choose to travel by car or rail transit. Car users should consider parking when they reach their destination (public parking or private parking). In this paper, the bottleneck model of traffic flow is used to analyze the relationship between the travel mode and the pricing of the two types of parking lots, as well as the number of parking spaces. On this basis, a Nash game model involving government decision makers (public parking) and private maximizer (private parking) is established, and the optimal charging models of two types of parking lots under Nash equilibrium are discussed. At the same time, the game bidding mechanism of two kinds of parking lot and the social benefit of single private car park supply are compared. The results show that whether government decision makers implement parking subsidies in order to minimize the total social cost will depend on the number of parking spaces in public parking lots. Government decision makers can adjust the number of public parking spaces and the level of fees to make the system performance more optimal.
【作者單位】： 同濟(jì)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金(71531011,71601142,71125004) 上海市浦江人才計(jì)劃項(xiàng)目(16PJC090)~~
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F570.5;F572
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本文編號(hào)：2004416