本文選題：食品安全 + 誠信監(jiān)管　； 參考：《山東師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：食品安全關(guān)乎居民身體健康,近年來頻頻曝出的食品安全事件引發(fā)了社會各界對食品安全的高度重視。食品安全由于其信任品屬性使得食品安全信息在政府監(jiān)管部門與食品企業(yè)之間、食品企業(yè)與消費者之間嚴重不對稱,食品企業(yè)在利益驅(qū)使下選擇失信經(jīng)營生產(chǎn)不合格食品的概率很大,因此需要對食品企業(yè)進行誠信監(jiān)管。食品安全由于其公共產(chǎn)品、外部性等屬性使得食品安全誠信監(jiān)管需要政府主導(dǎo)進行。在梳理我國政府部門在食品安全誠信監(jiān)管方面的監(jiān)管職責(zé)分工的基礎(chǔ)上,運用博弈論的方法先后構(gòu)建了食品企業(yè)與消費者間食品安全誠信監(jiān)管博弈模型,基于食品企業(yè)規(guī)模分別構(gòu)建了小規(guī)模食品企業(yè)與地方監(jiān)管部門、大規(guī)模食品企業(yè)與地方監(jiān)管部門間食品安全誠信監(jiān)管博弈模型,在構(gòu)建兩方博弈基礎(chǔ)上又構(gòu)建了政府監(jiān)管部門、食品企業(yè)與消費者三方間食品安全誠信監(jiān)管動態(tài)博弈模型。針對影響機理較為復(fù)雜的影響因素進行了算例分析,以直觀得出其對各博弈主體均衡策略選擇的影響機理。結(jié)合博弈分析以及算例分析的結(jié)果可以得出在食品安全誠信監(jiān)管問題上政府監(jiān)管部門、食品企業(yè)與消費者之間是激勵不相容的,即有些政府監(jiān)管部門不積極進行監(jiān)管,監(jiān)管過程中存在濫用職權(quán)的情況,食品企業(yè)在經(jīng)濟利益驅(qū)使下選擇失信經(jīng)營生產(chǎn)不合格食品危害消費者健康,消費者維權(quán)意識低,不積極對食品安全采取投訴等間接監(jiān)管行動。結(jié)合各方的博弈機理,提出了實現(xiàn)各博弈方激勵相容的對策措施:政府監(jiān)管部門通過改變地方政府利益格局、事后追責(zé)與事前激勵相結(jié)合、政務(wù)公開制度等措施促使其自覺主動地進行食品安全誠信監(jiān)管;食品企業(yè)通過完善信息溝通機制以擴大聲譽效益,利用社會監(jiān)管力量,增強對其的處罰力度等使其自覺主動地采取誠信經(jīng)營策略;消費者通過增強對其維權(quán)的宣傳教育、降低維權(quán)成本等措施促使其自覺參與到食品安全誠信監(jiān)管行列中。
[Abstract]:Food safety is related to the health of residents. In recent years, the frequent exposure of food safety incidents has caused the community to attach great importance to food safety. Because of its trust property, food safety information is asymmetrical between the government supervision department and the food enterprise, and between the food enterprise and the consumer. The probability of food enterprises choosing to run and produce unqualified food under the driving of profit is very large, so it is necessary to supervise food enterprises in good faith. Due to its public products and externalities, food safety needs government-led supervision. On the basis of combing the division of responsibilities of government departments in the supervision of food safety integrity, the game model of food safety integrity supervision between food enterprises and consumers has been constructed by using the method of game theory. Based on the scale of food enterprises, the game model between small-scale food enterprises and local regulatory authorities, large-scale food enterprises and local regulatory authorities on food safety integrity supervision is constructed, and then the government supervision department is constructed on the basis of two-party game. The dynamic game model of food safety and good faith supervision between food enterprises and consumers. In order to find out the influence mechanism of the game players' equilibrium strategy selection, a numerical example is given to analyze the factors which influence the mechanism of the game. Combined with the result of game analysis and example analysis, it can be concluded that the government supervision department, food enterprise and consumer are incentive incompatible on the issue of food safety integrity supervision, that is, some government regulators do not actively carry out supervision. There is abuse of power in the process of supervision and control. Food enterprises choose to discredit and produce unqualified food under the economic interests and harm consumers' health. Consumers have low awareness of protecting their rights and do not actively take indirect regulatory actions such as complaints against food safety. Combined with the game mechanism of all parties, the paper puts forward the countermeasures to realize the incentive compatibility of the game parties: the government supervision department combines the responsibility after the event with the prior incentive by changing the interest pattern of the local government. Measures such as the system of open government affairs and other measures have encouraged them to take the initiative to supervise and supervise food safety, and food enterprises have made use of the power of social supervision to expand their reputation and benefit by improving the information communication mechanism. Strengthen its punishment and other measures to consciously take the initiative to take good faith management strategy; consumers through strengthening their rights of publicity and education to reduce the cost of safeguarding their rights and other measures to promote their conscious participation in food safety integrity supervision ranks.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F203;F224.32

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本文編號：1966974