本文選題：博弈模型 + 完全序貫決策　； 參考：《山東大學(xué)學(xué)報(理學(xué)版)》2017年06期

【摘要】：針對現(xiàn)代市場中廣泛存在廠商先后進入的情況,基于Hotelling模型構(gòu)建了線性市場上二次運輸成本下兩廠商水平競爭的完全序貫決策模型,其中先進入市場的廠商先選址再定價,隨后跟隨者先選址再定價。兩廠商的博弈分析表明:跟隨者具有后發(fā)優(yōu)勢,將獲得更大的利潤;先進入者將定位在市場端點,并采取低價策略;跟隨者將定位在市場中心,并采取高價策略。進一步對所建的完全序貫決策模型、兩廠商先后同時選址與定價的博弈模型、兩廠商先同時選址再同時定價的博弈模型、兩廠商先同時選址再先后定價的博弈模型進行了對比分析,研究結(jié)果表明:完全序貫決策與兩廠商先后同時選址與定價的決策一致,且定價和廠商利潤均較低;4種博弈順序下兩廠商水平競爭均衡都難以實現(xiàn)社會福利最大,需要政府"有形的手"發(fā)揮作用。
[Abstract]:Based on Hotelling model, a complete sequential decision model of horizontal competition between two firms in the linear market under secondary transportation cost is constructed, in which the firms that enter the market are located first and then priced. The follower then selects the site and then sets the price. The game analysis of the two firms shows that the follower has the advantage of late development and will gain more profit; the first entrant will be positioned at the end of the market and will adopt the low price strategy; the follower will be positioned in the market center and will adopt the high price strategy. Furthermore, for the established complete sequential decision model, the game model for the two firms to locate and price at the same time, and the game model for the two firms to locate and then price at the same time. The results show that the complete sequential decision is consistent with the decision of the two firms to locate and price at the same time. Moreover, the equilibrium of horizontal competition between the two firms is difficult to achieve the maximum social welfare under the four kinds of game order of lower price and lower profit, which requires the government's "tangible hand" to play its role.
【作者單位】： 南昌大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;南昌大學(xué)中國中部經(jīng)濟社會發(fā)展研究中心;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項目(71561018,71502076) 江西省高校人文社會科學(xué)重點研究基地項目 2016年度江西省研究生創(chuàng)新項目(YC2016-B015)
【分類號】：F224;F274

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1 葉永;劉南;詹沙磊;;基于信息更新的應(yīng)急資源配置序貫決策方法[J];浙江大學(xué)學(xué)報(工學(xué)版);2013年12期

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本文編號：1910823