基于博弈視角的我國(guó)財(cái)政透明度提升路徑與策略研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-05-02 13:16
本文選題:財(cái)政透明度 + 公眾監(jiān)督; 參考:《管理評(píng)論》2017年09期
【摘要】:在財(cái)政透明度推動(dòng)過(guò)程中,公眾和政府官員形成了動(dòng)態(tài)的利益博弈關(guān)系。在分別構(gòu)建無(wú)獎(jiǎng)懲條件下、實(shí)施懲罰機(jī)制下和獎(jiǎng)懲并存機(jī)制的財(cái)政透明度博弈模型的基礎(chǔ)上,研究表明:(1)當(dāng)提高財(cái)政透明度是政府官員和公眾的一種自發(fā)行為時(shí),財(cái)政透明度不會(huì)達(dá)到社會(huì)滿(mǎn)意的程度;(2)強(qiáng)有力的懲罰是保證官員認(rèn)真履行提高財(cái)政透明度責(zé)任的首要條件;(3)公眾監(jiān)督是促進(jìn)官員提升財(cái)政透明度不可或缺的條件。因此,現(xiàn)階段,需要在完善法律體系、嚴(yán)格財(cái)政透明度考核指標(biāo)、培育社會(huì)組織、推動(dòng)參與式預(yù)算和鼓勵(lì)公眾參與等方面進(jìn)行制度創(chuàng)新。
[Abstract]:In the process of promoting fiscal transparency, the public and government officials form a dynamic interest game relationship. On the basis of constructing the game model of fiscal transparency under the condition of no reward and punishment, under the implementation of punishment mechanism and the mechanism of reward and punishment, the research shows that when improving financial transparency is a kind of spontaneous behavior of government officials and the public, Financial transparency will not reach the level of social satisfaction) strong punishment is the most important condition to ensure that officials seriously carry out the duty to improve fiscal transparency. 3) Public supervision is an indispensable condition for promoting officials to enhance fiscal transparency. Therefore, at the present stage, it is necessary to improve the legal system, strictly check the index of financial transparency, cultivate social organizations, promote participatory budgeting and encourage public participation and other aspects of institutional innovation.
【作者單位】: 山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)財(cái)政稅務(wù)學(xué)院;山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)管理科學(xué)與工程學(xué)院;
【基金】:國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目(71501111) 中國(guó)法學(xué)會(huì)部級(jí)法學(xué)研究課題(CLS(2016)D34) 山東省自然科學(xué)基金(ZR2014JL046) 山東省軟科學(xué)重點(diǎn)項(xiàng)目(2016RZB01049) 山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)優(yōu)秀青年人才支持計(jì)劃資助
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】:F224.32;F812
【相似文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前2條
1 申亮;;基于博弈理論的財(cái)政透明度問(wèn)題研究[J];地方財(cái)政研究;2008年08期
2 肖鵬;李燕;;基于Lüder政府會(huì)計(jì)環(huán)境評(píng)估模型的中國(guó)財(cái)政透明度研究[J];公共行政評(píng)論;2011年02期
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