本文選題：泛�？毓� + 大股東　； 參考：《石河子大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：由公司所有者和管理層利益不一致導致的代理問題一直是公司治理的焦點。然而,在公司股權集中的情況下,大股東與中小股東之間的第二類代理問題引起越來越多學者的關注。控制權和現(xiàn)金流權的分離是引發(fā)大股東與中小股東之間重大利益沖突的主要原因,大股東通過違規(guī)擔保、挪用資金等方式掏空上市公司。股權質押式融資因為其質押標的股權流動性強、易于處置和管控風險,為銀行所接受,也成為近些年廣大上市公司股東青睞的融資方式。作為出質人的大股東在質押股權后,除了可以融得資金,仍能維持自己的大股東地位,于是股權質押成為控股股東為私人或者民營企業(yè)的上市公司偏好的融資手段。在這種情況下,大股東股權質押會對公司價值產生何種影響成為學者關注的一個話題。本文希望通過研究,有助于深化對股權質押的研究、為投資者辨別大股東股權質押行為是支持還是侵占公司利益以及為監(jiān)管機構規(guī)范股權質押行為提供一些參考意見。本文結合具體上市公司泛�？毓蓙硌芯看蠊蓶|股權質押行為對公司價值的影響。首先對國內外文獻進行梳理,大部分學者基于大股東與小股東的利益沖突,認為大股東股權質押會加劇兩權分離,引發(fā)更為嚴重的代理問題,從而損害公司價值。但部分學者得出了相反的結論,認為民營企業(yè)大股東股權質押反而會使大股東有強烈動機改善上市公司業(yè)績;或者從不同的角度研究股權質押對公司績效的影響是正相關的。其次,闡述本文的理論基礎是代理理論,即在我國上市公司中,股權集中的情況極為普遍,第二類代理問題較為突出,然后論述股權質押的概念、大股東股權質押的風險和動機,并解釋了兩權分離等概念。再次,對本文的案例公司泛�？毓蛇M行介紹,分析案例公司的實際控制人的兩權分離程度在質押前后的變化和上市公司的經營狀況;使用EVA模型和托賓Q值,對2011年至2015年間泛海控股的公司價值進行評價,分析股權質押對公司價值的影響,并使用事件研究法分析股權質押行為在短期內對股價的影響;運用Z計分模型分析股權質押對公司財務的影響。在前述分析的基礎上,總結本文的研究結論,認為泛海控股大股東對上市公司股權長期、頻繁的高比例質押行為,導致泛�？毓晒镜目刂茩嗪退袡喾蛛x程度加劇,從而在一定程度上能夠加大公司的財務風險。而且,從長期來看,大股東高比例、頻繁的股權質押行為對上市公司價值產生了負面的影響。但是,由于我國資本市場的特殊性,股權質押事件在短期并沒有對股價產生顯著影響。最后提出建議,上市公司披露的大股東股權質押信息應當盡可能詳實,投資者和大股東應當注意股權質押帶來的風險,監(jiān)管機構應該盡快出臺專門法規(guī)規(guī)范股權質押行為。
[Abstract]:The agency problem caused by the inconsistent interests of the owner and the management has always been the focus of corporate governance.However, in the case of corporate equity concentration, the second kind of agency problem between large shareholders and minority shareholders has attracted more and more scholars' attention.The separation of the right of control and the right of cash flow is the main cause of the major conflict of interest between the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder. The majority shareholder empties the listed company through illegal guarantee and misappropriation of funds.Equity pledge financing is accepted by banks because of its strong liquidity of pledge, easy to deal with and control risks, and it has become a preferred financing method for shareholders of listed companies in recent years.As a pledge shareholder, the majority shareholder can maintain his position as a major shareholder in addition to raising funds, so the pledge becomes a preferred financing method for the listed companies of private or private enterprises.In this case, the impact of major shareholder equity pledge on the value of the company has become a topic of concern to scholars.This paper hopes to help deepen the research on equity pledge and provide some reference for investors to distinguish between supporting or encroaching on the interests of the company and for regulators to regulate the behavior of equity pledge.This paper studies the influence of the stock pledge behavior of large shareholders on the value of the listed company.First of all, the literature at home and abroad is combed, most scholars based on the conflict of interest between large shareholders and minority shareholders, think that the pledge of large shareholders equity will aggravate the separation of the two rights, lead to a more serious agency problem, thereby damaging the value of the company.However, some scholars have come to the contrary conclusion that the large shareholders of private enterprises will have strong motivation to improve the performance of listed companies; or it is positive correlation to study the impact of equity pledge on corporate performance from different angles.Secondly, the theoretical basis of this paper is agency theory, that is, in our listed companies, the situation of equity concentration is very common, the second kind of agency problem is more prominent, and then discusses the concept of equity pledge.The risk and motivation of major shareholder equity pledge, and explain the concept of separation of two rights.Thirdly, the paper introduces the case company Pan Hai holding, analyzes the change of the degree of separation between the two rights of the actual controller of the case company before and after the pledge and the operating situation of the listed company; using the EVA model and Tobin Q value,The paper evaluates the company value of Panhai holding from 2011 to 2015, analyzes the influence of equity pledge on company value, and analyzes the impact of equity pledge on stock price in the short term by the method of event study.Z-score model is used to analyze the influence of equity pledge on corporate finance.On the basis of the above analysis, the conclusion of this paper is summarized, and it is concluded that the Pan-Hai controlling shareholder's long-term and frequent high proportion pledge behavior to the listed company leads to the intensification of the degree of separation of control and ownership of the pan-sea holding company.Thus, to a certain extent, the company can increase the financial risk.Moreover, in the long run, the high proportion of large shareholders and frequent stock pledge have a negative impact on the value of listed companies.However, because of the particularity of China's capital market, equity pledge has no significant effect on stock price in the short term.Finally, it is suggested that the information of major shareholders' equity pledge should be as detailed as possible, investors and major shareholders should pay attention to the risks brought by equity pledge, and regulators should introduce special regulations to regulate the behavior of equity pledge as soon as possible.
【學位授予單位】：石河子大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F299.233.42

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