本文選題：計劃單列市　切入點：行政權(quán)分割　出處：《經(jīng)濟(jì)理論與經(jīng)濟(jì)管理》2017年03期

【摘要】：針對計劃單列市經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的特殊表現(xiàn),本文利用2001—2015年市級面板數(shù)據(jù),使用系統(tǒng)GMM方法,實證分析了行政權(quán)分割、市場分割對城市經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的影響。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)行政權(quán)分割抑制了城市間的溢出效應(yīng),省會作為省內(nèi)中心城市對其他城市的經(jīng)濟(jì)效率具有正向溢出效應(yīng),而對計劃單列市則呈現(xiàn)抑制作用;(2)市場分割對經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的影響呈現(xiàn)非線性關(guān)系,即在初期其有利于經(jīng)濟(jì)效率的提升,但超過一定門檻值后將會導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)效率下降。
[Abstract]:In view of the special performance of the economic development of the planned single city, this paper analyzes the division of administrative power by using the panel data of city level from 2001 to 2015 and using the method of systematic GMM. This paper finds that the division of administrative power restrains the spillover effect between cities, and the provincial capital, as a central city in the province, has a positive spillover effect on the economic efficiency of other cities. The effect of market segmentation on economic efficiency is nonlinear, that is, it is beneficial to the improvement of economic efficiency at the initial stage, but above a certain threshold will lead to the decline of economic efficiency.
【作者單位】： 浙江大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然(71373235)的資助
【分類號】：D630;F224;F299.2
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本文編號：1680694