本文選題：高鐵走出去　切入點(diǎn)：PPP風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：目前中國(guó)高鐵走出去面臨轉(zhuǎn)型階段,傳統(tǒng)的機(jī)車出口或工程總承包模式已無(wú)法滿足戰(zhàn)略發(fā)展需求,同時(shí)全球高鐵市場(chǎng)的日益壯大為中國(guó)高鐵走出去合作模式的創(chuàng)新提供了絕佳的機(jī)會(huì),PPP模式或成為快速部署一帶一路戰(zhàn)略、打造中國(guó)高鐵品牌的突破點(diǎn)。而PPP模式面對(duì)復(fù)雜多變的海外項(xiàng)目環(huán)境顯得尤其困難重重,對(duì)于高鐵走出去PPP項(xiàng)目的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究十分必要。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)與利益分配是PPP模式的核心點(diǎn),同時(shí)也是目前國(guó)內(nèi)外研究的熱點(diǎn)和難點(diǎn)。因此,本文以中國(guó)高鐵走出去的PPP項(xiàng)目為對(duì)象,針對(duì)其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)以及利益分配等一系列問(wèn)題展開(kāi)研究。首先,本文從PPP項(xiàng)目的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)識(shí)別、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)機(jī)制、利益分配機(jī)制入手,閱讀了大量國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn),明晰了 PPP項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究的國(guó)內(nèi)外現(xiàn)狀,梳理了目前對(duì)于PPP風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)的研究方法,確定了采用合作博弈中的討價(jià)還價(jià)理論對(duì)高鐵走出去風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模型進(jìn)行構(gòu)建;其次歸納總結(jié)了高鐵走出去PPP項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)研究的相關(guān)基本理論,通過(guò)案例研究法對(duì)高鐵走出去關(guān)鍵風(fēng)險(xiǎn)清單進(jìn)行整理,分析了高鐵走出去PPP項(xiàng)目的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)基本原則與分配流程,簡(jiǎn)單討論了利益分配的要點(diǎn);然后本文核心部分在于利用Nash討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈與Rubinstein討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈方法分別構(gòu)建了高鐵走出去PPP項(xiàng)目的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模型,考慮了談判能力、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管控努力水平、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)償以及政府強(qiáng)勢(shì)程度等參數(shù),得到公共部門與私營(yíng)部門的最優(yōu)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)比例,并針對(duì)Rubinstein討價(jià)還價(jià)模型進(jìn)行了數(shù)值分析,調(diào)整參數(shù)的不同取值,得出了最優(yōu)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)比例的變化趨勢(shì);另外,本文還基于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模型對(duì)雙方風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承擔(dān)水平進(jìn)行計(jì)算,以此為調(diào)整因素對(duì)利益分配的Shapley值進(jìn)行了修正,使得高鐵走出去PPP項(xiàng)目利益分配機(jī)制更加公平合理,并以印尼雅萬(wàn)高鐵項(xiàng)目背景為參考,識(shí)別項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn),設(shè)定參數(shù)取值,對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)模型和Shapley值改進(jìn)模型進(jìn)行了應(yīng)用;最后本文針對(duì)高鐵走出去PPP項(xiàng)目的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分擔(dān)等問(wèn)題提出了詳細(xì)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:At present, China's high-speed railway is facing a transitional stage. The traditional mode of locomotive export or general contracting of projects can no longer meet the needs of strategic development. At the same time, the growing global high-speed rail market provides an excellent opportunity for the innovation of China's high-speed rail cooperation mode to go out to the outside world, or the PPP model or the rapid deployment of Belt and Road's strategy. The PPP model is especially difficult to face the complex and changeable overseas project environment, so it is necessary to study the risk of the high-speed railway going out of the PPP project. Risk sharing and benefit distribution are the core of the PPP model. At the same time, it is also a hot and difficult point at home and abroad. Therefore, this paper takes the PPP project of high-speed railway in China as the object of study, aiming at a series of problems such as risk sharing and benefit distribution. First of all, This paper starts with the risk identification, risk sharing mechanism and benefit distribution mechanism of PPP project, reads a large number of domestic and foreign literatures, clarifies the domestic and foreign present situation of risk research on PPP project, and combs the research methods of PPP risk sharing at present. The paper establishes the model of risk sharing of high-speed railway going out by using bargaining theory in cooperative game. Secondly, it summarizes the relevant basic theory of risk research of high-speed railway going out PPP project. Through the case study method, this paper collates the list of key risks of high-speed railway going out, analyzes the basic principle and flow of risk sharing of high-speed railway going out PPP project, and briefly discusses the main points of benefit distribution. Then the core part of this paper is to use Nash bargaining game and Rubinstein bargaining game method to build the risk sharing model of high-speed railway going out PPP project, considering the negotiation ability, the level of risk management and control efforts. The optimal risk-sharing ratio between the public sector and the private sector is obtained by the parameters of risk compensation and the degree of government strength, and the Rubinstein bargaining model is analyzed numerically to adjust the different values of the parameters. In addition, based on the risk sharing model, this paper calculates the risk-bearing level of both sides, which is used as the adjustment factor to modify the Shapley value of benefit distribution. Make the benefit distribution mechanism of PPP project more fair and reasonable, and take Indonesia Yawan high-speed railway project background as reference, identify project risk, set parameter value, apply risk sharing model and Shapley value improvement model; Finally, the paper puts forward detailed policy suggestions on the risk sharing of PPP project.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F283

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