本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 動(dòng)因分析 業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)屬于期權(quán)激勵(lì)的范疇,是公司為了激勵(lì)并留住核心人才而實(shí)施的一種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制。這種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制是采用有條件地賦予經(jīng)營(yíng)者部分股東權(quán)益,使經(jīng)營(yíng)者成為激勵(lì)對(duì)象并與公司形成利益共同體,讓激勵(lì)對(duì)象從經(jīng)營(yíng)者轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樗姓�。然后以公司所有者的身份參與到公司的管理決策當(dāng)中,與公司共同分享利潤(rùn)并一起承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn),從而鞭策經(jīng)營(yíng)者為了提高公司業(yè)績(jī)而更加努力地工作,進(jìn)一步實(shí)現(xiàn)企業(yè)的長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展目標(biāo)并達(dá)到股權(quán)財(cái)富最大化。我國(guó)市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的飛速發(fā)展和市場(chǎng)環(huán)境的日益規(guī)范以及法律環(huán)境的日趨完善,使股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國(guó)公司中實(shí)施成為可能,吸引了愈來(lái)愈多的上市公司嘗試推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃。然而我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的發(fā)展時(shí)間過(guò)短,相關(guān)制度不夠完善,法律環(huán)境也有待提高,使得許多公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)后在經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)方面沒(méi)有得到提高。一些公司不知道自己應(yīng)當(dāng)采用怎樣的激勵(lì)模式、股票來(lái)源以及激勵(lì)比例等,使股權(quán)激勵(lì)難以發(fā)揮很好的激勵(lì)效果。國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)術(shù)界現(xiàn)階段在股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度方面的研究,大多數(shù)是選用我國(guó)上市公司的大樣本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行統(tǒng)計(jì)實(shí)證研究,這些研究為股權(quán)激勵(lì)在我國(guó)上市公司中的應(yīng)用提供了共性問(wèn)題的解決方案,站在以前學(xué)者實(shí)證研究的研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,可以選取具體案例進(jìn)行個(gè)性化分析,擬通過(guò)具體分析得出相關(guān)結(jié)論,為其個(gè)性問(wèn)題提供解決方案。經(jīng)綜合考慮,本文決定選取我國(guó)支柱產(chǎn)業(yè)房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)中的佼佼者——保利地產(chǎn)來(lái)進(jìn)行案例研究,結(jié)合股權(quán)激勵(lì)運(yùn)行機(jī)理和相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ),選取具有代表性的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)建立公司業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn),從盈利能力、營(yíng)運(yùn)能力、長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展能力、改進(jìn)融資短視行為和擴(kuò)大市場(chǎng)份額五個(gè)方面對(duì)保利地產(chǎn)的實(shí)施效果進(jìn)行縱向分析。除此之外,本文使用了房地產(chǎn)行業(yè)中未實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)和己實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的A股上市公司的相關(guān)財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),計(jì)算出其平均值并與保利地產(chǎn)進(jìn)行橫向?qū)Ρ?對(duì)保利地產(chǎn)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果進(jìn)行更為綜合全面的分析評(píng)價(jià),最后總結(jié)歸納出保利地產(chǎn)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案制定和經(jīng)營(yíng)管理上所存在的主要問(wèn)題,提出相關(guān)改善建議。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive belongs to the category of option incentive, which is a long-term incentive mechanism implemented by companies in order to encourage and retain core talents. Make the manager become the incentive object and form the interest community with the company, and change the incentive object from the operator to the owner. Then participate in the management decision of the company as the owner of the company. Sharing profits and taking risks with the company motivates managers to work harder to improve their company's performance. With the rapid development of market economy, the standardization of market environment and the improvement of legal environment, it is possible to implement equity incentive in Chinese companies. It has attracted more and more listed companies to try to launch equity incentive plan. However, the development of equity incentive in China is too short, the relevant system is not perfect, and the legal environment needs to be improved. As a result, many companies have not improved their operating performance after implementing equity incentives. Some companies do not know what incentive model they should adopt, the source of stock and the proportion of incentives, etc. It is difficult to give full play to the effect of equity incentive. At the present stage, the majority of the domestic academic research on equity incentive system is based on the large sample data of listed companies in China for statistical and empirical research. These studies provide common solutions for the application of equity incentive in listed companies in China. On the basis of the previous research results of empirical research by scholars, we can select specific cases for individualized analysis. Through specific analysis to draw relevant conclusions, to provide a solution to its personality problems. After comprehensive consideration, this paper decides to select the leading real estate industry in our country-Poly Real Estate to carry out a case study. Combined with the operating mechanism of equity incentive and relevant theoretical basis, select representative financial indicators to establish the performance evaluation criteria, from the profitability, operating capacity, long-term development capacity, This paper analyzes the effect of Poly Real Estate from five aspects: improving financing short-sighted behavior and expanding market share. In addition, In this paper, we use the financial data of A-share listed companies that have not implemented equity incentive and have implemented equity incentive in real estate industry, calculate the average value and compare it horizontally with Poly Real Estate. This paper makes a more comprehensive analysis and evaluation on the effect of equity incentive of Poly Real Estate. Finally, it summarizes the main problems existing in the formulation and management of the equity incentive scheme of Poly Real Estate, and puts forward relevant suggestions for improvement.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F299.233.4;F272.92

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