發(fā)布時間：2018-02-04 09:32

  本文關鍵詞： 房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控 博弈 中央政府 地方政府　出處：《江蘇師范大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：我國住房制度自1998年市場化改革以來,期間經(jīng)歷了爆炸式的增長。為遏制盲目投資、無序擴張和房價過快上漲,保障房地產(chǎn)市場健康有序發(fā)展,中央曾多次進行調(diào)控。然而,回顧十余年來的調(diào)控史不難發(fā)現(xiàn),相當一部分調(diào)控政策并未真正達到目的。盡管房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控效果不佳的原因是多方面的,但其最核心的原因在于:作為政策執(zhí)行者的地方政府同時既是被調(diào)控的對象,又是利益相關者。在房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控中,地方政府不斷與中央政府進行博弈,造成政策扭曲、偏離和阻滯。本文以十余年來我國房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控為研究對象,運用博弈論的研究方法,首先分析從理論上分析在我國當前的政治體制下,在房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控中中央政府與地方政府的博弈格局和各自的利益訴求,探討他們各自可用的支付手段和博弈策略,以及可能產(chǎn)生的影響,構(gòu)建本研究的總體分析框架。其次,本文通過回顧十年來我國房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控的政策演變,從宏觀層面回顧我國房地產(chǎn)的興衰起伏,分析為應對房地產(chǎn)市場出現(xiàn)的各種問題,中央房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控政策的演變,并透視中央的政策目標和調(diào)控手段的變化。同時研究地方政府在執(zhí)行房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控政策中的行為。在此基礎上,分析中央和地方的互動對房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控政策執(zhí)行情況的影響,并總體分析中央房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控政策目標的實現(xiàn)程度,以及對我國房地產(chǎn)市場發(fā)展造成的各種影響。再次,在對十年來我國房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控政策和調(diào)控效果總體分析的基礎上,從中觀角度,剖析在不同時期、執(zhí)行不同政策的過程中,中央與地方政府博弈的具體目標、策略和效果,進而分析在不同階段不同調(diào)控效果的原因,并探析部分調(diào)控政策失效或者失敗的原因。最后,從未來更科學和更有效地房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控的角度,探析如何更加科學地構(gòu)建我國房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控中中央與地方的博弈格局,包括利益分配格局、權力分享格局和責任分擔格局等。如何出臺更能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)中央與地方利益均衡,并能夠更精準進行調(diào)控的政策體系,以及如何更有效地規(guī)制地方政府,確保中央調(diào)控政策能夠不擇不扣得到執(zhí)行的路徑,試圖提出具有可操作性的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since 1998, China's housing system has experienced explosive growth. In order to curb blind investment, disorderly expansion and rapid rise of house prices, the real estate market can be ensured to develop in a healthy and orderly manner. The central government has carried out regulation and control many times. However, it is not difficult to find that a considerable part of the regulation and control policies have not really achieved the purpose, even though there are many reasons for the poor effect of real estate regulation and control. But the most important reason is that the local government, as the policy executor, is not only the object to be regulated, but also the stakeholders. In the real estate regulation, the local government and the central government continue to play games. This article takes the real estate regulation and control of our country for more than ten years as the research object, uses the game theory research method, first analyzes theoretically under the current political system of our country. In the real estate regulation and control of the central government and local governments of the game pattern and their respective interests, to explore their own available means of payment and game strategy, as well as the possible impact. Secondly, by reviewing the policy evolution of real estate regulation and control in China over the past ten years, this paper reviews the rise and fall of China's real estate from the macro level. In order to deal with the various problems in the real estate market, the evolution of the central real estate regulation and control policy is analyzed. At the same time, it studies the behavior of the local government in the implementation of the real estate regulation policy. Analysis of the interaction between the central and local real estate policy implementation of the impact of the overall analysis of the realization of the central real estate control policy objectives. Third, on the basis of the overall analysis of China's real estate control policies and regulatory effects in the past ten years, from the perspective of the meso, analyze the different periods. In the process of implementing different policies, the specific objectives, strategies and effects of the game between central and local governments are analyzed, and then the reasons for different regulatory effects in different stages are analyzed. Finally, from the perspective of more scientific and effective real estate regulation in the future. How to construct the game pattern between central and local government, including the pattern of benefit distribution, in real estate regulation and control of our country more scientifically. Power sharing pattern and responsibility sharing pattern, etc. How to introduce a policy system that can achieve more balance between central and local interests, and more accurate regulation and control, and how to regulate and regulate local governments more effectively. To ensure that the central regulatory policy can be implemented regardless of the path, trying to put forward operational policy recommendations.
【學位授予單位】：江蘇師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F299.23;D630

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本文編號：1489925