本文關(guān)鍵詞：主輔制造商協(xié)同生產(chǎn)系統(tǒng)博弈模型研究　出處：《天津大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 主輔制造商 非線性動(dòng)力系統(tǒng) Cournot-Bertrand博弈 混沌控制 質(zhì)量投資 企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任

【摘要】：隨著市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的進(jìn)一步加劇,企業(yè)間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不僅僅局限在產(chǎn)業(yè)內(nèi)部,大多數(shù)產(chǎn)品都在一定程度上受到互補(bǔ)產(chǎn)品的影響,越來(lái)越多的企業(yè)選擇在產(chǎn)業(yè)外部的“藍(lán)海區(qū)域”進(jìn)行拓展,企業(yè)管理創(chuàng)新勢(shì)在必行。然而,互補(bǔ)品策略的選擇是一個(gè)復(fù)雜的系統(tǒng)工程,受到諸如產(chǎn)品發(fā)展周期,主體產(chǎn)品之間的替代性,主體產(chǎn)品與互補(bǔ)品之間的互補(bǔ)性,決策模式等因素的影響。所以,企業(yè)必須認(rèn)真辨析上述因素才能有效利用互補(bǔ)品策略來(lái)達(dá)到盈利的目的。本文借鑒了國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)學(xué)者的研究,以制造商及其互補(bǔ)品制造商組成的主輔制造商復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)為研究對(duì)象,基于行為科學(xué)相關(guān)理論探索制造商行為視角下的主輔制造系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定性及最優(yōu)控制問(wèn)題。論文主要的研究?jī)?nèi)容以及創(chuàng)新性結(jié)論如下:1、以互補(bǔ)品策略的演化過(guò)程為研究目的,分別構(gòu)建了無(wú)互補(bǔ)品策略模型、單邊互補(bǔ)品策略模型、雙邊競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的互補(bǔ)品策略模型、雙邊合作的互補(bǔ)品策略模型。以模型解析與數(shù)值仿真相結(jié)合的方法,研究了參數(shù)變化對(duì)模型穩(wěn)定性的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)單邊的互補(bǔ)品策略是一個(gè)不穩(wěn)定的策略,雙邊合作的互補(bǔ)品策略模型下,隨著互補(bǔ)性的提高,系統(tǒng)所有成員都是受益的。2、構(gòu)建了主輔制造商互補(bǔ)策略的Cournot-Bertrand混合動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,借助混沌理論與動(dòng)態(tài)仿真探索Cournot-Bertrand混合動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型所變現(xiàn)的復(fù)雜動(dòng)力學(xué)特征。研究結(jié)果表明系統(tǒng)存在模型納什均衡點(diǎn),隨著參數(shù)的變化,系統(tǒng)的穩(wěn)定性會(huì)隨之發(fā)生變化;參數(shù)調(diào)整控制法能很好的控制系統(tǒng)的混沌行為。3、考慮制造商的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好、質(zhì)量投資和企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任,構(gòu)建了主輔制造商在不同市場(chǎng)力結(jié)構(gòu)下的動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型。運(yùn)用分岔圖、最大李雅普諾夫指數(shù)、0-1測(cè)試探索系統(tǒng)所變現(xiàn)的復(fù)雜動(dòng)力學(xué)特征。研究結(jié)果表明:參數(shù)對(duì)系統(tǒng)穩(wěn)定性有很大的影響,參數(shù)值應(yīng)該保持在一定范圍內(nèi),否則系統(tǒng)將會(huì)通過(guò)被周期分岔進(jìn)入混沌狀態(tài);最后運(yùn)用參數(shù)域?qū)θ髂Ｐ瓦M(jìn)行穩(wěn)定域分析,發(fā)現(xiàn)Stackelberg博弈模型比納什博弈模型具有更好的穩(wěn)定性。
[Abstract]:With the further aggravation of market competition, the competition between enterprises is not confined to the industry, most products are affected by complementary products to some extent. More and more enterprises choose to expand in the "Blue Sea area" outside the industry. Enterprise management innovation is imperative. However, the choice of complementary product strategy is a complex system engineering, subject to such as product development cycle. The substitution between the main products, the complementarity between the main products and the complementary products, and the influence of the decision-making model. Enterprises must carefully identify the above factors in order to effectively use complementary products strategy to achieve the purpose of profit. This paper draws lessons from the relevant scholars at home and abroad. The research object is the complex system of the main and auxiliary manufacturers, which is composed of the manufacturers and their complementary manufacturers. Based on the theory of behavioral science, this paper explores the stability and optimal control of manufacturing systems from the perspective of manufacturer behavior. The main research contents and innovative conclusions are as follows: 1. Aiming at the evolution process of complementary product strategy, the models of non-complementary product strategy, one-sided complementary product strategy and bilateral competition complementary product strategy are constructed respectively. The influence of parameter changes on the stability of the model is studied by the method of model analysis and numerical simulation. It is found that unilateral complementary strategy is an unstable strategy. Under the complementary strategy model of bilateral cooperation, all members of the system benefit from the improvement of complementarity. The Cournot-Bertrand hybrid dynamic game model with complementary strategies of main and auxiliary manufacturers is constructed. By means of chaos theory and dynamic simulation, the complex dynamic characteristics of Cournot-Bertrand hybrid dynamic game model are explored. The results show that the model Nash equilibrium exists in the system. With the change of parameters, the stability of the system will change. The parameterized control method can well control the chaotic behavior of the system. It takes into account the manufacturer's risk preference, quality investment and corporate social responsibility. The dynamic game model of the main and auxiliary manufacturers under different market power structures is constructed. The maximum Lyapunov exponent is obtained by using the bifurcation diagram. The results show that the parameters have a great influence on the stability of the system, and the parameters should be kept in a certain range. Otherwise, the system will be chaotic by periodic bifurcation. Finally, the stability of the three models is analyzed by using the parameter domain, and it is found that the Stackelberg game model is more stable than the Nash game model.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F273;F224.32

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