本文關(guān)鍵詞：高耗能制造企業(yè)節(jié)能方式選擇研究　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 能源管理 節(jié)能服務(wù)公司 合同能源管理 節(jié)能方式選擇 動態(tài)經(jīng)濟批量模型 博弈模型

【摘要】：當(dāng)今社會,能源成本的快速增加、日益嚴(yán)厲的環(huán)保政策和消費者環(huán)保意識的不斷增強正成為眾多高能耗制造企業(yè)必須面對的“三座大山”。而節(jié)能成為制造企業(yè)(為簡潔起見,下文的制造企業(yè)均指高耗能制造企業(yè))應(yīng)對這“三座大山”的一種有效手段。在實際中,制造企業(yè)可以選擇主要依靠自身的力量購買節(jié)能設(shè)備／節(jié)能技術(shù)或設(shè)計節(jié)能方案、建設(shè)和運行節(jié)能項目而達到節(jié)能的效果,其具有一些典型的特征,如主要依靠自身的力量、需對節(jié)能項目進行融資、承擔(dān)所有的項目風(fēng)險、獨自享有所有的節(jié)能收益等,為簡潔起見,在本文中我們稱之為自我節(jié)能。然而,自我節(jié)能方式存在諸多缺陷,如由于制造企業(yè)不具備專業(yè)的節(jié)能改造技術(shù)知識和經(jīng)驗導(dǎo)致節(jié)能方案制定和設(shè)備的選擇可能不合理、制造企業(yè)自運行項目可能導(dǎo)致設(shè)備使用方法不科學(xué)造成設(shè)備過快老化或沒有達到預(yù)期的節(jié)能效果等,最終導(dǎo)致節(jié)能效益不能彌補項目投資,從而造成許多潛在的有利可圖的節(jié)能項目無法執(zhí)行。為了解決制造企業(yè)選擇自我節(jié)能所存在的問題,其也可以選擇將節(jié)能服務(wù)外包給節(jié)能服務(wù)公司或能源服務(wù)供應(yīng)商。通常,節(jié)能服務(wù)公司提供的績效合同的形式是合同能源管理,其主要包括節(jié)能效益分享和節(jié)能量保證兩種運作模式。因此,在節(jié)能管理中,制造企業(yè)必須解決一個重要的運營決策,即,面對現(xiàn)實中的各種節(jié)能方式,選擇哪一種節(jié)能方式對自身最有利�；诖藙訖C,本文聚焦于制造企業(yè)一個重要的節(jié)能動機,即降低能源成本,研究制造企業(yè)面臨自我節(jié)能和合同能源管理兩種常見的節(jié)能方式,如何選擇最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式問題。具體來說,包括以下三個子問題：(1)有限期時變需求情況下制造企業(yè)節(jié)能方式選擇問題；(2)單位產(chǎn)品節(jié)能量內(nèi)生情形下制造企業(yè)節(jié)能方式選擇問題；(3)競爭環(huán)境下制造企業(yè)節(jié)能方式選擇問題。作為嘗試用數(shù)學(xué)模型的方法研究制造企業(yè)最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式選擇問題的第一步,第二章以現(xiàn)實中被廣泛應(yīng)用的動態(tài)經(jīng)濟批量模型為基礎(chǔ),假設(shè)不存在節(jié)能政策,建立了自我節(jié)能、節(jié)能效益分享和節(jié)能量保證三種情形下的動態(tài)批量生產(chǎn)決策模型,之后基于模型分析有限期時變需求情況下制造企業(yè)如何選擇最優(yōu)的節(jié)能方式。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)面臨自我節(jié)能和節(jié)能效益分享兩種節(jié)能方式時,當(dāng)節(jié)能服務(wù)公司與制造企業(yè)的節(jié)能投資成本系數(shù)比率和合同能源管理情形下的單位產(chǎn)品預(yù)計節(jié)能率較小時,制造企業(yè)應(yīng)選擇節(jié)能效益節(jié)能方式；當(dāng)節(jié)能服務(wù)公司與制造企業(yè)的節(jié)能投資成本系數(shù)比率和合同能源管理情形下的單位產(chǎn)品預(yù)計節(jié)能率增大到一個閾值之后,制造企業(yè)應(yīng)選擇自我節(jié)能；(2)制造企業(yè)面臨節(jié)能效益分享和節(jié)能量保證兩種節(jié)能方式,假定分享期等于節(jié)能量保證期,當(dāng)合同能源管理情形下的單位產(chǎn)品預(yù)計節(jié)能率較小時,制造企業(yè)選擇節(jié)能效益分享或節(jié)能量保證無差異；當(dāng)合同能源管理情形下的單位產(chǎn)品預(yù)計節(jié)能率增大到一個閾值之后,制造企業(yè)應(yīng)選擇節(jié)能效益分享；(3)當(dāng)制造企業(yè)面臨自我節(jié)能和節(jié)能量保證兩種節(jié)能方式時,具有與(1)相類似的性質(zhì)。進一步將基本模型拓展到能源稅情形,分析能源稅對制造企業(yè)最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式選擇決策的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(4)能源稅沒有改變制造企業(yè)的最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式選擇決策。不同于第二章的假設(shè),考慮到單位產(chǎn)品的節(jié)能量往往是制造企業(yè)或節(jié)能服務(wù)公司的重要決策,制造企業(yè)或節(jié)能服務(wù)公司通過設(shè)置不同的單位產(chǎn)品節(jié)能量來優(yōu)化節(jié)能項目的經(jīng)濟性,即單位產(chǎn)品節(jié)能量內(nèi)生。基于此動機,第三章研究單位產(chǎn)品節(jié)能量內(nèi)生情形下制造企業(yè)最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式選擇問題。首先,僅考慮自我節(jié)能和節(jié)能效益分享兩種節(jié)能方式,建立自我節(jié)能情形下的優(yōu)化模型和節(jié)能效益分享情形下的斯坦科爾伯格博弈模型。通過模型分析發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)面臨自我節(jié)能和節(jié)能效益分享兩種節(jié)能方式,當(dāng)節(jié)能服務(wù)公司與制造企業(yè)投資成本系數(shù)的比率較小時,制造企業(yè)應(yīng)選擇節(jié)能效益分享,反之,制造企業(yè)選擇自我節(jié)能方式更優(yōu)。進一步將基本模型拓展到價格內(nèi)生、需求不確定、節(jié)能量不確定和考慮節(jié)能間接效益四種情形,并分析這四種情形對制造企業(yè)最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式選擇決策的影響。研究結(jié)果表明：(2)價格內(nèi)生和需求不確定性對制造企業(yè)的最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式選擇決策不會產(chǎn)生影響；(3)當(dāng)實際節(jié)能量不確定時,制造企業(yè)引入了第三種節(jié)能方式-節(jié)能量保證,與基本模型不同的是,若節(jié)能服務(wù)公司與制造企業(yè)投資成本系數(shù)的比率較小,制造企業(yè)由選擇節(jié)能效益分享轉(zhuǎn)向選擇節(jié)能量保證；(4)當(dāng)考慮節(jié)能間接收益時,則制造企業(yè)的最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式選擇決策在某些情形下發(fā)生較大的變化(具體可見3.4.4節(jié)或5.1節(jié))。前兩章的相關(guān)結(jié)論都是基于完全壟斷假設(shè)前提下,在現(xiàn)實中,制造企業(yè)常須面對激烈的市場競爭。因此,第四章研究競爭環(huán)境下制造企業(yè)如何選擇最優(yōu)的節(jié)能方式。首先假設(shè)兩家制造企業(yè)在市場上進行數(shù)量競爭且相互對稱(即兩者具有相同的特征),建立兩家制造企業(yè)的多階段博弈模型并分析高耗能制造企業(yè)的節(jié)能方式選擇均衡策略。研究結(jié)果表明：(1)此時存在兩個對稱的納什均衡；當(dāng)節(jié)能服務(wù)公司與制造企業(yè)的投資成本系數(shù)比率較小時,兩家制造企業(yè)均應(yīng)選擇節(jié)能效益分享；反之,兩家制造企業(yè)均應(yīng)選擇自我節(jié)能。之后將基本模型分別拓展到兩家制造企業(yè)的投資成本系數(shù)不對稱、初始能效不對稱和分享期小于節(jié)能系統(tǒng)的生命周期三種情形,分別探討每種情形對制造企業(yè)節(jié)能方式選擇均衡策略的影響。結(jié)果表明：(2)若一家制造企業(yè)的投資成本系數(shù)比另一家制造企業(yè)的投資成本系數(shù)大時,則存在兩個對稱的納什均衡和一個不對稱的納什均衡；當(dāng)節(jié)能服務(wù)公司和制造企業(yè)的投資成本系數(shù)比率處于中間值時,兩種制造企業(yè)選擇不同的節(jié)能方式,即前一家制造企業(yè)應(yīng)選擇節(jié)能效益分享,而后一家制造企業(yè)應(yīng)選擇自我節(jié)能；當(dāng)節(jié)能服務(wù)公司和制造企業(yè)的投資成本系數(shù)比率較小或較大時,兩家制造企業(yè)的最優(yōu)節(jié)能方式選擇均衡策略與基本模型一致；(3)初始能效不對稱和分享期小于節(jié)能系統(tǒng)的生命周期均不會改變兩家制造企業(yè)節(jié)能方式選擇的均衡策略。第五章總結(jié)了論文的研究成果,并進一步指明了未來的研究方向。
[Abstract]:In today's society, the rapid increase in energy costs, increasingly stringent environmental protection policies and constantly enhance consumer awareness of environmental protection is becoming a large number of high energy consumption of manufacturing enterprises must face the "three big mountains". The energy has become the manufacturing enterprise (for the sake of simplicity, the following manufacturing enterprises refer to high energy manufacturing enterprises) is an effective way to deal with the "three mountains". In practice, the manufacturing enterprises can choose to rely mainly on their own strength to buy energy-saving equipment / energy saving technology or energy saving design, construction and operation of energy-saving projects and energy-saving effect, it has some typical characteristics, such as mainly rely on its own strength, to the financing of energy saving project, take all the risk, enjoy alone all of the benefits of energy saving and so on, for the sake of simplicity, in this paper we call self saving. However, such way has many defects, such as manufacturing enterprises do not have the professional knowledge and experience in the energy saving technology of energy-saving scheme and equipment selection may not be reasonable, since the operation of the project manufacturing enterprises may lead to equipment using scientific method of equipment caused by excessive aging or did not reach the expected energy-saving effect, resulting in such benefits can make up for the project investment, which causes a lot of potentially profitable energy-saving projects cannot be performed. In order to solve the problem that manufacturing enterprises choose to choose self saving energy, they can also choose to outsource energy saving services to energy saving service companies or energy service providers. Generally, the form of the performance contract provided by the energy saving service company is the energy management of the contract, which mainly includes two operating modes: energy saving benefit sharing and energy saving. Therefore, in energy saving management, manufacturing enterprises must solve an important operation decision, that is, facing the various ways of energy saving in the real world, choose which energy saving way is most beneficial to themselves. Based on this motivation, this paper focuses on an important energy-saving motivation of manufacturing enterprises, that is, to reduce energy costs, and study the two common ways of energy saving for manufacturing enterprises, which are self energy saving and contract energy management, and how to choose the best way to save energy. Specifically, include the following three questions: (1) the limited period of time varying selection of manufacturing enterprise energy demand situation; (2) energy saving unit product endogenous manufacturing enterprises such circumstances; (3) selection of manufacturing energy saving mode in enterprise competition. As an attempt by a mathematical model of first step in making the optimal energy saving enterprise selection problem, dynamic EOQ model is widely used in the second chapter, in reality based on the assumption that there is no such policy, set up a self energy saving, energy saving benefit sharing and dynamic energy savings guarantee under the three situations of mass production decision model. Based on the enterprise how to choose the optimal way of making such model analysis of finite period time-varying demand situation. The study found that: (1) self facing energy-saving and benefit share two energy saving mode, when the unit product energy service companies and manufacturing enterprises energy saving investment cost coefficient ratio and energy management contract under the expected energy saving rate is low, manufacturing enterprises should choose the way of energy saving energy saving; when the unit product energy service companies and manufacturing the company's energy investment cost coefficient ratio and energy management contract under the expected energy saving rate increases to a threshold, the enterprise should choose self energy; (2) manufacturing enterprises are facing energy efficiency share and energy saving guarantee two energy saving, energy saving is assumed to share the period of guarantee period, when the unit product energy management contract under the condition of the expected energy saving rate is small, the selection of manufacturing enterprises or energy saving benefit sharing to ensure that no difference; when the contract energy management under the condition of single When the bit product is expected to increase its energy efficiency to a threshold, the manufacturing enterprises should choose energy saving benefit sharing. (3) when manufacturing enterprises are faced with two ways of energy saving, which are self energy saving and energy saving, they have similar properties to (1). Further, the basic model is extended to the energy tax situation, and the influence of energy tax on the decision making of the optimal energy saving mode selection of the manufacturing enterprises is analyzed. It is found that: (4) the energy tax does not change the choice of the best way of energy saving of the manufacturing enterprises. The second chapter is different from the assumption, considering the amount of energy saving unit is an important decision of manufacturing enterprises or energy service companies, economy of manufacturing enterprises or energy service companies by setting different products to optimize the energy saving unit of energy saving project, namely the unit product energy saving endogenous. Based on this motive, the third chapter studies the choice of the optimal energy saving mode of the manufacturing enterprise under the energy endogenous situation of the unit. First, we consider only two ways of energy saving, which are self energy saving and energy saving benefit sharing. We set up the Stan Kolberg game model under the condition of self energy saving and the sharing of energy saving benefits. The model analysis shows: (1) self facing energy-saving and benefit share two energy saving mode, when the ratio of energy service companies and manufacturing enterprises investment cost coefficient is small, manufacturing enterprises should choose energy-saving benefit sharing, on the other hand, the selection of manufacturing enterprises such way better. Further, the basic models are expanded to four situations, which are price endogenous, uncertain demand, uncertain energy consumption and energy saving indirect benefits. The influence of these four situations on the optimal energy saving decision of manufacturing enterprises is analyzed. The results show that: (2) endogenous price and demand uncertainty on the optimal energy saving manufacturing enterprise decision is not affected; (3) when the actual energy savings is uncertain, manufacturing enterprises into the guarantee third energy saving - energy saving, and the basic model is different, if the energy service companies and manufacturing investment cost coefficient ratio is relatively small, manufacturing enterprises by selecting energy efficiency
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F206;F424

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